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ONOF- 
1.a) This document is one of the contributions expected by the EC to 
cover the research programme contracted to DIAL : How to pass from a war to a 
peace economy : the Ethiopian case. 
b) The programme has to focus on two subjects. One purely related to 
Ethiopia has to throw some light on what are the major EC’s fields of action to help 
the country to recover. The second has to indicate what can be grasped from the 
Ethiopian case to ease analogous transition of other developing country. 
c) As agreed between the members of the international working group 
assembled by DIAL this document presents and discusses the Ethiopia’s Economic 
Policy during the Transitional Period (EPTP). It is organized as follows : first, an 
introduction to the political framework of the EPTP ; second, a description of the 
EPTP ; third, a scrutinity of it and fourth some conclusions related to the two 
subjects of the programme. It is worth indicating that the EPTP is scrutinized at both 
conceptual and past trends level. Further scrutinity will appear through the other 
documents of the working group dealing with the EC’s questions. That will specially 
be the case with the document dealing with what would be the expected 
macroeconomic and general equilibrium and/or disequilibrium effects of the 
transition as those focusing on its sectoral potentials. Readers who are time 
constrained may immediately jump to the conclusions. Indeed, they are 
introduced by a summary of the all document. 
d) The scrutinity of the EPTP and beyond it the interest for the 
Ethiopian transition has revealed the need to identify what could be some market 
parameters of the Ethiopian economy. This has led to estimate a set of relevant 
elasticities using econometrics. They will appear in another document probably 
available by end of July. These elasticities would illuminate Ethiopian transition 
departing from three periods i.e. 1960-74 : the market functioning before the 
marxist regime, 1974-90 i.e. the command economy period or the marxist one, 
1960-90 i.e. Ethiopia at long run. 
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I-INTRODUCTION 
F. The government which has overthrown the DERG-regime has 
recognized that Ethiopia was in dire conditions by issuing documents on its 
intentions related to Ethiopia’s Economic Policy during the Transitional Period 
(EFTP): This one is defined to be the period (after the DERG-regime) 
characterized by the coalition of various forces (represented in the Council of 
Representatives) around a common Charter which is the pillar of the transitional 
economic policy (but not only). It will cover the years 1991 to 1993 and end by free 
elections. With regard to economic rationality, the coalition resembles mainly 
marxist reformists and market ones. So, the EFTP is a compromise policy 
document. 
3. The Charter has a major aim which is the strengthening of peace. 
Therefore, although the economic policy (intentions of) has been designed to 
provide satisfactory solutions to urgent problems so as to get i.e. stabilize (and 
maybe improve) a basic peace economy, the government intends to do so in the 
framework of the given reached broad political consensus(l). Moreover, the related 
documents indicate that the EPTP has to serve a longer period than the transitional 
one with minor changes. The preceding reveals that the EPTP is fundamentally a 
political macro framework to refer to during a transition deeply marked by the 
need to sustain peace i.e. to get it as the permanent state of the Ethiopian 
society. Therefore the measures (i.e. the laws, regulation and detailed procedures of 
implementation) which have to be decided to shape the economy along the lines of 
the EFTP have not only to be relevant (given urgent needs) but also “featured” by a 
certain amount of political neutrality so as to permit the expected continuity. From 
an Ethiopian political viewpoint such a continuity will pave the way to democracy 
i.e. a political regime which would no more trample upon the human and democratic 
rights of the people. 
I That means the political framework of Ethiopia is giveri till the announced free elections. 
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4. With regard to expected changes, the EPT? illuminates five 
overlapping processes the Ethiopian society has to go through : 
- two institutional ones i.e. a transition 
(i) from civil war to peace which would permit (it is expected so) ; 
(ii) that to a democratic order. 
- three economic ones i.e. a transition 
(i) from a military and command use of resources to a civilian productive basic 
one ; 
(ii) from a basic peace economy to a market-based one ; and 
(iii) from market to sustained growth development. 
These processes shape the global transition movement of the Ethiopian society. The 
government’s documents indicate how the global transition is expected to 
sequence : recovery (Economic transition) depends on political changes 
(political transition) for these ones are the prerequisites to improve the general 
climate of the Ethiopian society. That is the reason why the documents list the 
anti-democratic nature of the regime to be one of the major non structural causes of 
Ethiopia’s economic crisis (from 1974 up to 90 compared to pre-1974 years). So, 
contrarily to what has been a belief in mainstream political economics since the 
196Os, the Ethiopian views (as reflected in the government’s documents) do not 
support the idea that growth carries with it democracy at long run. Neither they 
support the opposite view for there could not be any sustained democracy without 
income sharing i.e. when the social aspects of growth and income distribution are 
neglected. That is the reason why the EPTP advocates some policy mix i.e. coping 
with economic objectives (macroeconomic stabilization) and social concern, and, 
policy supporting voluntary people participation schemes. By emphasizing the 
needs to conserve and develop natural resources, the EFTP illuminates also a rather 
long term economic process, that to sustained economic development. 
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5. The democratic nature of the EPTP (at least expected to be so) is 
revealed by its content and a wide bargaining process to amend its initial version. 
Indeed, since the overthrowing of the DERG-regime there have been two 
documents in English issued by the government : one an unofficial translation 
dating from August 1991 intitled : the Economic Policy of Ethiopia for the 
Transition Period (a draft submitted for discussion by Tamrat Layne, the prime 
Minister) and an amended translation officially published on January 13, 1992. The 
amended document was adopted by the Council of Representatives in its amharic 
version on November 22, 1991. The amended version includes the results of 
discussions of the EPTP organized all over the country@) between August and 
November 1991. To my knowledge@) modifications would have concerned 
controversial issues especially that of the property rights related to rural and urban 
land and houses nationalized in 1975. That is through that bargaining process that 
the decision to keep state land ownership was taken as that not to return houses to 
their original owners but to sell out with a priority to the tenants. The end of state 
monopoly on foreign trade is also a product of the bargaining process as the 
liberalization of retail trade price. 
6. From several points (for instance, the accepted increased role of the 
private sector in development ; the emphasis put on profitability to manage the 
enterprises whatever their ownership is ; the acceptation of freedom as the only 
criteria to create producers’ co-operatives ; the confirmation of previously 
recognized rights to peasants : right to hire labour, possibility to transfer land-use 
rights to heirs, right to freely dispose of their produce on the open market ; the 
advocacy for the development of large-scale commercial farming, etc...) the EPTP 
assures the continuity with the reforms decided by the DERG-regime (March 5, 
1990) (annex 1). It differs from these reforms as follows : 
(i) it clearly indicates the nature (political and economical) of the transition 
movement as how it is globally expected to sequence. As a result it explicity 
mentioned that people have human and democratic rights they can eqjoy. Further, 
the govermnent intends to give rise to increased voluntary popular participation 
through the EPTP ; 
2 As said to me but not checked by me. 
3 That 15 on the basis of a!iscussbns held at AA. 
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(ii) it clearly indicates that the State will have a limited role on the decision 
making process at the opposite of its role to issue laws, regulation related to market 
or to define, shape and articulate market macroeconomic planning (such as fiscal 
and monetary policy, for instance) ; 
(iii) it links expected changes at the micro level to sound applied macro- 
economic policy ; 
.-- -. 
(iv) it tends to articulate the growth facets ; 
(v) it benefits from peace and international donors community’s concern as 
chance for its implementation ;
(vi) it no more refers to socialism as the basis direction of the country’s 
development although the State continues to support collective managing schemes 
(co-operatives, people’s associations : they have to be voluntarily decided 
nevertheless) ; it intends to use refurbished Agriculture Marketing Board (AMC 
previously abolished as a result of the DERG-regime’s reforms) to regulate the 
grain market and to give 30 per cent of the voting rights on enterprise 
management boards to the related workers. This later intention may again submit 
managers to collective pressures. 
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, H - mophis ECONOMIC POJ,ICY~ DUR-JNG T-+ mSI3TJON 
7. The EFTP is first introduced by a short summary of what are the 
economic conditions in Ethiopia when the civil war ends@1. Documents used are 
the government’s ones already mentioned plus notes taken during the Conference on 
the State of the Ethiopian Economy organized by A.A. University. These notes 
appear to me a little more objective to the achievements of the DERG-regime than 
the government’s documents. Indeed, the government’s final document overlooks 
the liberalization measures taken since 1988 in the agriculture and investment 
sectors and exaggerates the importance of corruption. The introduction is 
accompanied by an mex resuming Ethiopia’s key data. Through it the focus is on 
major past trends relevant for present and future economic reforms, 
exclusively. The reader is thus kindly invited to refer to the annex when reading the 
economic conditions at the end of the civil war as when analysing the EFTP. 
Second, the EPTP is described along lines which have been selected to provide 
its better understanding both in terms of economic and political analysis. The 
lines are a mixed product of those featuring the government’s documents and thoses 
reflecting the author’s perception and sensitiveness when being twice on mission to 
A.A. (from Nov. 19 to Dec. 1, 1991 and from March 22 to April 3,1992). The lines 
have also been selected so as to make easier to answer to the EC’s questions. 
A - THE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AT THE END OF THE CIVIL WAR 
8. When the civil war ends the Ethiopian economy may be featured as 
follows : it has become a supply-shortage economy under the DERG-regime. 
Indeed, from 1974 to 1990 the agriculture output could not supply enough food and 
goods, the industry one could not supply enough goods and the services one could 
not supply enough services. Some’ selected data can throw some light on that 
shortage economy. They are related to the agriculture sector which dominates 
output, employment and export receipts in Ethiopia. The average food surplus is 18 
gr per day and person under normal circumstances (OECD computation). This leads 
4 For more detailed analysis the reader should refer to DLU ‘s related work : 
S.REMY : Ethiopie - 1968ll988 : Note r&roJpective sur l’kvolution macro-konomique aks deux dkrni2res 
dkennies, Juin 1991, 28~. 
M-P. K%LAETEN: The Ethiopian versa, june 1991,39p. 
and to the papers issued during the Conference on the Stare of the Ethiopinn Economy organ&d by 
A.A. University. Further, he should also read the document issued by the DML’s working group on the question. 
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to an amount of 1760 gr which is 4 per cent below the FA0 emergency ration. At 
the end of the 80s food production per capita (1979-81 = 100) reaches the level of 
88.7. It has to be compared to the values of 97.6, fifteen to twenty years ago and 
109.6, twenty-five to thirthy years ago. With an amount of cereal imports of 609.0 
thou-metric tonnes in 1987 (last available data) Ethiopia has become Africa’s 
leading non-commercial food importer. But even as such twenty per cent of the 
population is in need for food aid at the beginning of the 90s. Even if shortage 
increased at the end of the 80s because of civil war, it is not only the result of that 
war. More fundamentally, it is due to a sample of facts. A combination of civil war, 
., . . anti-democratic choices, ‘policy distortions, environmental degradation, an 
unfavorable demographic dynamics, adverse external factors (drought, natural 
calamities, external shocks) and a host of structural problems (backward technology 
and methods of cultivation, weak linkages betwen sectors . ..) has been responsible 
for the disappointing performance of the economy from 1974 to 1990. As a result 
between 1974 and 1990 per capita real income declined by about 0.8% per 
annum revealing declining living standard of .a population already wallowing 
in extreme poverty (60 per cent of the population is living below the absolute 
poverty level) and being denied human and democratic rights. 
9. The dismal record of the Ethiopian economy was essentially due to 
the disappointing performance of the commodity producing sectors (i.e. agriculture 
plus industry : 1.2% per annum on average) especially agriculture the dominating 
sector of the economy, which grew by merely 0.7% or more than 2% below the rate 
of growth of population. The performance of the industrial sector was more 
respectable (2.5%) but only within limits imposed by a stagnating agriculture. The 
services performed better (3.5%) but largely on account of rising military 
expenditures and a vastly expanded government bureaucracy (public administration 
and defense : 5.7%). As a global outcome saving deteriorated strongly from 1974 to 
90 compared to pre-1974 years. In 1990, the share of gross national saving in GDP 
was 5.2 per cent while it was 12.9 per cent in 73. The situation yet aggravated in 
1991 with a saving ratio going to zero per cent. On account of a steadily declining 
saving rate and generally rising tendency of investment (i.e. military and defense 
ones mainly due to war) at least up to 1987-88, the country’s resource balance has 
been declining, reaching (-) 11% of GDP in 1988. On trend, the state of the 
country’s resource balance has meant increasing reliance on external resources(s) to 
5 Cessation of aid from a nwnber of major lending agencies followed the 1975 nationalizorion and subsequent 
compensation problems. This was even more true after november 1977 when Ethiopia received help from the USSR 
and Cuba to combat regional political activism and Somolio. Progress on this issue at the beginning of the 1980s 
led the World Bank to resume lending by February 1981. 
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finance the country’s investment effort. As far as productive investment was 
concerned this was one of the lowest in the world. Consequently, Ethiopia’s debt 
position has been deteriorating at an alarming rate. In 1990, for example, debt 
service payments to western donors(6) represented almost 60% of the value of 
exports. At the beginning of the 8Os, this ratio amounted 8% only. So, Ethiopia 
entered gradually into a solvability constraint. A corollary of the widening 
resource gap has been a large and steadily widening budget deficit by 1988-89 
(12% of GDP ; 16% in 1989-90), triggered to a large extent by mounting military 
expenditure and spending on the government bureaucracy. Despite the government 
matched its expenditure by vigorous revenue mobilization that peaked at 30 per cent 
of GDP in 1989, forced state enterprises to save and created exceptional sources of 
revenue (a war levy and the requirement of payment of arrears by state enterprises) 
this had led to a situation where almost two-thirds of this deficit was financed by 
external sources at the end of the 8Os, the rest being covered by borrowing from the 
banking system. Domestic bank financing, so far rarely above 4 per cent of GDP, 
exceeded 10 per cent in 1989-90. This has also meant a dramatic expansion in 
money supply, with obvious inflationary consequences. 
10. The state of the balance of payments was also unhealthy. The import 
cover of the country by the end of the 1980s was less than ten days. The decrease of 
the export to import ratio in real terms since 1973 was one of the results of a deep 
agriculture crisis. It gave rise to an increased structural resource imbalance whatever 
the terms of trade were. The situation improved a little in 1989 and 1990. In 1991, it 
deteriorated again because a greater part of coffee, the main export commodity, 
went to smuggling and drought affected the Hararghe production area. The fall in 
coffee export could not be compensated for by other commodities. Further, the rise 
in the oil price in the second half of 1990 worsened the terms of trade. So, Ethiopia 
became featured by a liquidity constraint. Resource imbalance taken into account 
with saving decrease compared to investment meant that Ethiopia became 
structurally a two gap country (trade plus saving gap). Pressures to devaluate the 
Birr, the local currency, increased giving rise to a parallel exchange rate and some 
capital outflows. In the light of all that preceeds, it is not surprising to have noticed 
that, there has been a worsening of unemployment and a general erosion in living 
standards. Not to mention people dying from starvation in some areas of the country 
because of recurrent droughts and misguided or frankly wrong agriculture policy. 
Although the military government attempted to introduce policy reforms in its last 
6 External debt reached the level of US % 3.3 billion at the beginning of the 19% of which about 8Oper cent &e 
by the Central government. The preceding amount does not i.nclu& Ethiopia’s military debt to the late USSR Since 
involment started in 1977, it was estimated to have reached US $5-6 billion by 1989. 
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days (annex 1) specially relevant for peasants agriculture (the dismantling of 
producers’ co-operatives, the recognition of tenure rights and the abolition of the 
Grain Marketing Board, mainly) these came too late to make any appreciable global 
macroeconomic and social difference. But there were differences at the sectoral 
level, for instance, at that of agriculture(7). Moreover, reforms have given rise to a 
process of increased informal market activities due to the reduced government’s 
legitimacy and operationality and people’s increased poverty. This process with the 
parallel exchange rate has created a dual economy in Ethiopia. To the DERG- 
regime’s credit it is worth mentioning the efforts in favour of education. Elementary 
and secondary education expanded at a rapid rate- -compared with the’ pre- 
revolutionary pexiod (school enrollment ratio 1985 : primary 36%, secondary 
15% - 1975 24% and 6% respectively ; literacy rate 1986 : 90% of population 
age 15+ - 1970 4%). Nevertheless, in the light of the UNDP human development 
index (varying between zero and one) which summarizes both real GDP and 
educational attainment (and life expectancy), Ethiopia has remained a low human 
development country. Its index has a value of 0.282 i.e. below the Bangladesh’s one 
(0.318). As such Ethiopia has been put by the N.U. in the sample of low social 
progress countries (lower value index : 0.116 for Niger, higher one 0.489 for 
Morocco). So, when the Derg-regime collapsed, it left behind it an economy in 
ruins and a society in extreme destitution. 
11. The Ethiopian potentials (where agriculture dominates) were also 
deeply challenged during the 1974-1990 period by increased soil erosion in 
response to recurrent droughts (1972-3, 1981, 1984-5, 1989-90) but not only. Soil 
erosion has become a permanent feature of Ethiopia since the end of World War II. 
Population growth in the twentieth century enhanced by the partial control of 
epidemies and by the relative peaceful period of Haile Selassie’s reign after World 
War II has given a new dimension to the pressure on land. Its impacts have been 
severe. Long fallow periods can no longer be maintained and arable land comes 
under continuous cultivation. Soil fertilization through organic manuring has 
become less frequent because the scarcity of firewood forces people to use cow- 
dung as household fuel. As a result erosion due to natural factors (wind, rainfall) has 
worsened or more precisely has been exacerbated by agricultural practices. It 
features mainly the Highlands which account for 90% of the population and 
economic activities, 95% of land cultivated and two thirds of lifestock. Of 53.6m ha 
in the Highlands, 6m are highly eroded, 8.5m are mediumly eroded, 13m are eroded 
7 Output increased after producers’ co-operatives were dismantled and output prices rose after Marketing Board 
Corporation were abolished Further, the response of agriculture supply to prices improved 
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and 10.9 are susceptible to be eroded. This lets 15.2m ha only to be not eroded. 
FA0 and the late government of Ethiopia with finance from the World Bank in 
1983-85 carried out a study to present a rural development strategy for the severely 
eroded Ethiopian Highlands. The study (never officially accepted by the 
government of Ethiopia) estimated that over 1,900 million tons of soil were lost 
from the Highlands of Ethiopia annually. The losses are of productive top soil, and 
they are for all practical purposes irreversible. The study characterized the 
Highlands of Ethiopia as “one of the largest areas of ecological degradation in 
Africa, if not in the world”. One of the findings of the study has been that, if 
present’trends continue, by the year 2010 some 38,000 sqkm of the Highlands 
would be eroded down to bare rock, a further 60,000 sqkm would have a soil depth 
of 1Ocm or below which would be too shallow to support cropping. This would 
mean that in that year almost 10 million people would have to derive their food 
and income from sources other than cropping their own lands and that they 
would have to be absorbed elsewhere in the economy. 
12. The Ethiopian government took measures or programmes to combat 
degradation which reduced agriculture potential productivity (land yield) by 1 to 2 
per cent per year on average. They included the building of terraces, the closure of 
hillsides, the planting of trees and the construction of irrigation schemes, as well as 
the relocation of people on a local level (villagization) and on a regional or 
national one (resettlement). Several organizations co-operate in the 
implementation of these programmes (the World Food Programme and the 
European Economic Community, for instance). Although being aware of the gravity 
of the degradation for agriculture production and, so, their welfare, it seems that the 
peasants’ responses to the government’s mesures have been weak. Apart from the 
fact, that the peasants were poor and lack the necessary tools and seeds to do 
something substantial to arrest erosion, the reason behind such a behaviour has 
likely to be found in the relations between the government i.e. its delegates 
and/or mandating bodies and the private farmers in the framework of the 
former’s agriculture policy. The focus was on ideology rather than efficiency. 
People were order what to do and opposition was considered to be a counter- 
revolutionary attitude. The official approach was prescriptive and commandist 
rather than consultative and supportive of local initiatives. In fact as several 
analysts of Ethiopia have said, the main feature of the structural changes in the 
Ethiopia countryside since the 1974-revolution was to substitute the State for feudal 
lords as the supreme appropriator of peasant produce, labour and think ! 
Consequently, peasants participated in environmental rehabilitation only when 
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food-for-work was arranged. In this framework, the government’s measures lost a 
certain amount of efficiency and participation because several ones had not only 
something to do with environmental degradation or drought but civil war also. So, it 
was not always very clear for peasants wether villagization or resettlement were 
decided to reduce the pressure on land or to empty the rebellion regions. This was 
particularly obvious in the case of Eritrea and Tigray proned to recurrent drought 
and so featured by pronounced environmental degradation. 
13. To conclude, at the end of the civil war, the Ethiopian monetary 
economy was about to collapsi ; Ethiopian identity, a product of effox% 
through history, was about to vanish and Ethiopia had remained one of the 
poorest country in the world. Its constant dollar GNP per capita .was lower 
than in 1965. So, the major challenges the government which overthrew the 
DERG-regime had to cope with were : 
(i) peace to secure ; 
(ii) relations between people to improve as much as these ones with the State ; 
(iii) the country to rehabilitate ; 
(iv) food reliance to modify so as to reduce risks to famine for the present ; 
(v) demobilized soldiers to accomodate properly ; 
(vi) a process of increased informal activities to manage ; 
(vii) external resources to secure in the framework of a position of illiquidity and 
quasi insolvability ; 
and 
(viii) poverty to alleviate. 
All this presumed :
ix) a state budget and moreover an evolution of it permitting to account for political, 
economical and social concern. 
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B - THE EPTP : SHAPING THE ECONOMY 
14. The EPTP lists intentions related to policies to re-shape the 
economy and grasp growth during the global transition movement. It gets its 
short term operationality by clearly spelling out the objectives assigned now to the 
Ethiopian policy. The main intentions of the EFTP on the basis of which policies 
have to be implemented can be synthetized as follows : 
.* i 
To set up Ethiopia with an efficient mixed economy where market rules apply and 
murket failure or lack of interest from the private sector are accounted for 
through State’s interventions directly i.e. as an investor and indirectly through a 
“social” treatment of the issues related to the private decision ntaking and 
modifications to the stance of applied macro policy. This leads to the following 
policies which should encompass the economy(8). 
Bl - A mixed economy 
15. P.(9) to redefine the role of the State and the private sector in the 
economy so as to increase their relative efficiency. As a result (of the expected 
mixed economy) the role of the State as a sole owner (i.e. as sole direct investor) 
should reduce at the opposite of that of the private sector. The state ownership 
sole or on joint venture arrangements with domestic or foreign capital should 
concentrate in sectors which are crucial for the economy ; cannot easily attract 
private capital because of a rather long period to get activities profitable or 
need to much capital, or imply large-scale units ; may help to stabilize prices ; 
may be a source of revenue to the State (when they can be run profitably) ; 
may be strategic to employment opportunities... 
8 Sentence from the author. 
9 P. is used for policy or policies. 
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16. On the basis of the preceding, the state ownership would be 
concentrated as follows : 
1. Agriculture : 
in 
- Large-scale units ; 
- Previous state farms strategic to employment opportunities ; 
- Ownership of rural land. 
2. Mining and energy : 
in 
- Strategic minerals and industrial input and minerals for which marketing 
opportunities would have to be explored ; 
- Major electric power generation activities. 
3. Industry : 
in 
- Large-scale engineering and metallurgical plants ; 
- Large-scale fertilizers and pharmaceutical plants and industries which supply 
strategic raw materials to major chemical industries ; 
- Some previous state industrial enterprises which can be run profitably and as 
such are a source of revenue to the State. 
4. Trade : 
Domestic Wholesale Trade 
in 
- Basic goods of mass consumption ; 
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Foreign Trade 
in 
- Management of foreign exchange earnings ; 
- Marketing activities. 
5. Tourism 
in 
- Some tour operators only. 
6. Services (other than mentioned elsewhere) 
in 
- Some limited areas when necessary. 
7. Financial Services (Banking, insurances, other financial institutions) 
in 
- Ownership in order to ensure that the related institutions will play their proper 
role in the process of economic development (while making profit). 
8. Transport (Air, sea, rail) 
in 
- Ownership with the exception of medium-sized air and rail operations. 
9. Communications (Posts, Telecommunications) 
in 
- Ownership. 
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10. Construction 
in 
- Low cost construction agencies ;
- Infrastructure, public buildings. 
11. Housing 
in 
- Ownership of urban land. 
Analogously, the private ownership would be concentrated in activities which do 
not fall under sole state ownership. That means as follows : 
1. Agriculture : 
in 
- Peasant agriculture but the State will design strategies for the formation of co- 
operatives on a voluntary basis though. And further peasants are given rights (refer 
to section B2) except that of land sale and mortgage. 
2. Mining and energy 
- The private sector’s role is limited to specific areas (refer to section C9) 
- There is a public property of all mineral resources ;
- Mining and energy projects previously confiscated will be turned over to 
private investors after careful investigations only. 
3. Industry 
in 
- Activities which do not fall under sole state ownership particularly the 
domestic-resource based industries (the cottage ones, for instance) ; 
- The health sector. 
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4. Trade 
4.1. Domestic trade 
Both the retail and wholesale trade would benefit from a specific regulation by 
the State. ., .a L 
W hoiesade trade 
in 
- All activities, at the exception of the trade of some basic goods related to mass 
consumption. In this respect, the State would take appropriate measures to create the 
conditions for co-operatives to freely engage themselves in such a trade. 
Retail trade 
Entirely to private ownership. 
Illicit trade (i.e. unregistered transactions) 
Entirely to private ownership (obviously). 
4.2. Foreign trade 
- End of the state monopoly with existing quantitative restrictions being 
remplaced with tariffs ; 
- Exporters are allowed to keep a certain portion of their earnings to expand their 
business ; the portion has to be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
- Marketing services : Most likely state agencies working on foreign trade 
would continue their operations but in competition with private exporters. 
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5. Tourism and the related services 
Private ownership (i.e. end of the state monopoly) of tour operators and related 
services, but the State will handle the foreign exchange earned from tourism so as to 
ensure its proper utilization. 
6. Services (other than tientioned elsewhere) 
Private ownership 
7. Financial services 
Through local credit associations mainly. 
8. Transport 
8.1- Road 
Private ownership ; Transport associations and Cies are the preferred forms of 
organization in privately-operated road transport activities. 
8.2 - Air, Rail, Sea 
Limited role of the private sector because this one has not now the capacity to 
run the related transport services. 
9. Communications 
Very limited role 
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10. Construction 
Private ownership 
11. Housing 
State’s encouragement to housing co-operatives 
To conclude with regard to the roles of the stute and the private sectors, the EPTP 
is a combination of public sector-based basic goodr, services and financing and 
private sector-based food production, trade and distribution. 
17. At the opposite of its role as a sole owner, the State’s protecting 
and managerial functions should increase. For instance : 
- it will have to protect any people’s democratic rights ; to regulate the 
economy i.e. issue (democratically) laws and controls, regulations and directives, 
detailed procedures of implementation, specific sectoral regulation (one for the 
domestic trade is expected), new tariffs systems (expected for the transport activities 
and foreign trade), to favour enabling conditions to encourage private accumulation 
(both the domestic and foreign ones) and to establish regulatory authorities (one for 
the transport sector is expected) ; 
- and also to monitor the economy i.e. shape it with consistent and co-ordinated 
macro policies, selected industrial and export oriented strategies ; reduce all sorts of 
disequilibria ; mobilize enough external resources ; assist peasants, alleviate the 
problems of specific regions (affected by war, recurrent drought, demobilized 
soldiers, environment degradation, . ..). Analogously, the State’s rehabilitating 
function should increase. Basic infrastructure needs to be restored and expanded as 
well as social services (health and education ones, etc). 
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B2 - A market(mixed)-based economy (or the promotion of private initiative) 
18. People should be endowned with rights related to private decision 
making. The recognized ones (i.e. listed through the EPTP) are the : 
- property rights and related to compensation ones ; 
- right to move ; 
- right to act as free trader ; 
- right to act as domestic entrepreneurs ; 
- rights recognized to foreign capital ; 
- right to apply market rules. 
a) P. to recognize property rights 
Rural and urban ownership 
19. The first one is a controversial issue between the North and South of 
the country. Therefore, it has been delayed till a referendum after the free elections. 
So, there is at the moment no expected change of public ownership of rural land. 
This means that peasants cannot sale the land or mortgage it. But they are receiving 
the rights to lease land, pass it on to kins and be fully compensated when 
expropriated. Further, the State will correct previous discriminatory allocation of 
land by reallocating land to landless without discrimination. Analogously to the case 
of rural land, the State remains the owner of urban land. But he will ensure its 
equitable distribution for housing construction. People receiving urban land will be 
guaranteed the rights of ownership including those to sell, rent, transfer, etc... In the 
eventuality of expropriation compensation would be given. 
Houses and Mineral resources 
20. The right of house ownership is fully recognized. Nevertheless, 
nationalized houses (1975) will be sold by the State and compensation paid to those 
who deserve on the basis of appropriate studies(lq. Mineral resources remain 
public property. 
10 Some of the late house owners were in the streets at AA to express their feelings against that intention on 
January 6,199.Z 
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b) P. to recognize the rights to move (resettlement and villagization) 
21. Previous resettlement and villagization must be discontinued. 
Nevertheless, the document indicates that they would have to be carried out in the 
future to relieve shortages of land, population density, etc...(refer also to paragraph 
11). In this framework, they would have to be voluntary. 
c) P. to act as private free trader 
22. Peasants can act as (private) free traders i.e. they can sell their 
products where they wish and at freely determined prices. Moreover, they would 
receive help from the State to get fair prices. How is not said. Further, they would 
receive help to get a free access to the needed input and local agriculture services. 
d) P. to act as domestic entrepreneur 
23. The right to expand modem large-scale private farming should be 
recognized. Therefore, the .State will provide fertile lands in uninhabited areas on 
concessionary bases and provide full guarantees to private entrepreneurs either 
individually or on a joint venture basis. The opening of fertile lands to private 
investors will be made after ascerting this would not result in eviction or affect the 
interests of peasants and nomads as well as those who practice shifting cultivation. 
People should receive the right to engage in the sectors of the economy with no 
limit on capital and guarantees of ownership. They can act as sole owner or on joint 
venture arrangements with the State and/or foreign capital. The preceding given 
domestic investors should receive a preferential treatment especially when they 
engage in expanding large-scale modern farming, industrial activities, 
construction, cottage industries (or local domestic resources ones) and local 
credit institutions. The preceding means that domestic capital would always be 
preferred to foreign one when referring to these activities. This is also true for 
banking. 
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e) P. to recognize rights to foreign capital 
24. The document only indicates shortly that foreign investors should be 
given adequate guarantees and incentives. This shortness may indicate that the 
Ethiopian Authorities do not really expect or wish (for instance in banking) an 
upswing of foreign capital at least at the beginning of the transition movement. 
fl P. to apply market rules 
25. All enterprises (or farms) should be submitted to market rules i.e. 
the profitability, management autonomy (at plant level in the industry sector) and 
fair competition ones. State enterprises (or fleets) which cannot be rendered 
profitable through restructuration would be either closed down or sold to the private 
sector (obviously, if any) except under specific circumstances, for instance, to keep 
employment opportunities within specific areas, etc... Moreover, state monopoly 
would be abolished as the previous regulation prejudicing the private sector. The 
first assertion concerns specially foreign trade, tourism (and the related services) 
and the transport corporations. 
B3 - An economy where economic and social targets are combined ; where 
democratic and economic requirements are simultaneously accounted for(ll). 
26. These expected fulfillments should be the achievements of gradual 
policies and policies mixing the criteria of profitability and employment 
redundancy. Indeed, the latter would occur because there is a lot of state’s 
enterprises or farms which support financial losses. The concern of labour 
redundancy is particularly emphasized when industrial privatization, the new trade 
policy and the need of exchange rate adjustment are mentioned. This concern is 
very relevant since the risk of making workers redundant could be extremely high. 
Indeed, the number of state enterprises to be closed down is high for they generally 
suffer Erom losses, routinely covered by the State. The level of expected 
privatization is low for there is a credibility gap between the State and the private 
sector (para. 61). With regard to labour redundancy, the State would take parallel 
measures to provide employment opportunities. Analogously, it is intending to 
11 Sentences due to the author. 
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favour privatization and people’s voluntary participation in development. For 
instance, in agriculture, unprofitable state farms would be handed over to those 
around the farms or to the related employees provided this measure does not lead to 
conflicts with the nearby population. In industry, the workers would receive a 
third of the voting rights through representation on enterprise management 
boards. Further, the State would favour the formation of co-operatives or 
associations on a voluntary basis. This is indicated as regard almost all sectors 
where private initiative is invitated to take over and in banking. 
Agriculture 
“The State will design strategies for the formation of co-operatives on a 
voluntary basis” (!) 
Wholesale trade 
II 
. . . to create the necessary conditions for private capital and co-operatives to 
freely engage themselves in such activities” 
Road transport sector 
c 
‘I... Transport associations and companies would be the preferred forms of 
organization in privately-operated road transport activities” . ..I’ 
Housing construction 
‘I... The State will encourage and support housing co-operatives. Banks should 
design new regulations supportive of this measure”. 
Financial sector 
“...local credit associations will be encouraged with appropriate government 
backing” . ..‘I 
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27. In the light of the preceding, it appears clearly (to the author, at 
least) that democracy in the Ethiopian sense (i.e. through allocated voting rights to 
workers on enterprise management boards, co-operatives and people’s associations) 
is a way to play some market game (privatization). More precisely, it is a condition 
(at least an implicit one) for markets to be accepted and to function efficiently (it is 
hoped) in a society where various challenges exist : heterogeneous coalition of 
rulers (para. 2), still political unstability (para. 37 to 39), extreme level of poverty 
and people’s destitution @ara.8), etc... Then, democracy is not only related to 
‘political order(the relations between a State and its citizens). It is a mix of political 
and economic organization systems. Which mix will obviously, depends on how 
various systems articulate particularly from the viewpoint of their implicit process 
of identification (i.e. these between people and the State, workers and their 
enterprises, these ones and the political regime) (refer to para. 35). Democracy is 
also a way to feature the dialogue between people and the State at various levels 
of administrative respixxsabilities. Here the document indicates that the State 
would issue detailed policies to define relationships between national and local 
administrative organs with the government regarding the ownership of resources 
and regional economic responsabilities. 
C - THE EPTP : GRASPING EXPECTED GROWTH THROUGH SOME 
SELECTED STANCE OF MACRO POLICIES 
28. Growth is expected to be grasped through a set of consistent and 
co-ordinated macro, sectoral and environmental policies. 
MACRO POLICY 
Cl - Monetary policy to be such as to ward off inflationary trends resulting 
from the circulation of money in volumes beyond the economy’s capacity. 
C2 - Exchange rate policy to permit a gradual adjustment of the Birr parity 
to the US dollar (to which it is linked since February 1973) in conjunction with the 
study of other alternatives. 
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C3 - Foreign trade policy to allocate foreign exchange to private 
entrepreneurs and replace the existing quantitative restrictions with tariffs. As 
a consequence of state allocation of foreign exchange, the exporters have to 
surrender all their earnings to the State in exchange for local currency. They are 
allowed to keep a certain portion of their earnings to expand their business but on a 
case-by-case agreement. In the cze of tourism, the State will handle the foreign 
exchange earned from tourism so as to ensure its proper utilization. 
C4 - Fiscal policy to achieve fiscal balance through : 
(i) a proper taxation system (announced for agriculture only : a fair system of 
taxation will replace the cumbersome tax structure and improvements will be made 
in the system of collection) ; 
(ii) substantial reductions of public expenditure especially in administrative and 
military outlays ; 
(iii) external resources to be secured ; 
(iv) an induced growth impact due to a reallocation of resources (domestic and 
external) to the productive sectors. It will create fiscal peace dividends. 
In this framework, the document indicates that sizable budget deficits are likely to 
continue even after taking such measures. This is a very realistic view given needs 
to fulfil1 in the Ethiopian society for the present, past debts to shrink, the reduction 
of the fiscal basis (given increased informal activities and smuggling...) and what 
the government expects during the beginning of the transition, i.e. a macroeconomic 
stabilixation and not an upswing of growth. 
C5 - Foreign reserve policy to secure external resources and channel 
these ones effectively for economic reconstruction. 
C6 - Price policy to be generally a free one except when it is necessary 
to implement the new tariffs structure (announced for the transport sector and 
foreign trade only) or to protect consumers and producers of agriculture goods 
against price fluctuation (by buying and selling grains on the open market), or to 
help peasants to obtain fair prices for their products... 
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SECTORQL AND ENMROiVMEhX4L. POLICIES 
C7 - Agriculture (and Environment) 
P. to boost peasant agriculture in coqjunction with the conservation and 
development of natural resources through a greater share of the budgetary and 
manpower resources. The general measures to boost peasant agriculture would be to 
extend an all-round support to farmers for building feeder roads, help the peasants 
in obtaining fair prices for their products, promote an extensive distribution and use 
of fertilizers, improved seeds and the provision of agricultural extension services. 
Specific measures would also be taken related to different agro-ecological zones in 
the country and population density. The measures which have to be studied would 
(attempt to) alleviate the particular problems of these areas. As far as natural 
resources are concerned priority will be given to the conservation and development 
of forestry, livestock, soil and water. 
CS - Industry 
P. to develop it (refer to section Bl - A mixed economy) with a special concern to 
its links with agriculture, the utilization of domestic raw materials and the 
health sector (intersectoral linkage of growth to be promoted). 
C9 - Mining and energy 
P. to expand private accumulation particularly in specific areas. These ones are left 
to private initiative (on the basis of concessions) because of resource constraints or 
because they are technology-intensive ; P. to explore and study geological and 
energy resources... 
Cl0 - Transports 
P. to issue a new tariffs system and establish a regulatory authority. 
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Cl1 - Services 
P. to expand the role of private capital with a particular emphasis on investment in 
export-oriented undertakings, retail trade, tourism and related services, road 
transport, housing construction. The State would also act as to minimize illicit 
trade. It would also particularly regulate domestic trade. 
Cl2 - Banking 
P. to guide the financial institutions so that they play their role in development 
while making profit. 
OTHER ANNOUNCED POLICIES 
29. The document announces the formulation of social, wage, 
population and technology policies as well as a new labour law. This one would 
have to promote productivity and efficiency in conjunction with the protection of 
the workers’ rights. So, this policy would strengthen the measures favouring a mix 
of profitability and employment criteria to lead the decision of closing down and 
generally to favour an “alliance” between democracy and privatization to grasp 
growth. Although the wage policy remains to be formulated, the document indicates 
that the existing economic conditions do not leave room for making meaningful 
changes in salaries(l2). 
12 By december 9, 1991, there was a strike of the workers from the banking system for wage increase. Civil 
servants and state owned enterprises’wages have been frozen since 1975 at the exception of a shifi in 1979 for low 
wage people. 
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D - SHORT RUN PRIORITY AREAS 
30. At short run i.e. till the free elections, the EPTP spells out the 
targeted objectives. They are : 
Dl - Rehabilitation 
To rehabilitate regions affected by drought and war particularly those affected 
by resettlement, villagization and the burden of demobilized soldiers. 
To rehabilitate means to restore infrastructure destroyed by the war and due to a 
lack of maintenance and upkeep. This would also mean to undertake activities 
benefitted to people and expand infrastructure in some neglected areas (to be 
identified). All this on a limited scale given the short duration of the transition 
(1991-93) to the free elections. 
D2 - Development 
To create a conducive atmosphere to enhance the participation of private 
capital to development. 
To complete on-going projects and launch studies in areas of mining, energy, 
irrigation, needed new organization and management schemes, etc... as well as a 
study for streamlining the administrative machinery, appreciate the employment 
impacts of the implementation of the EPTP, existing manpower, availability of 
candidates to become entrepreneur, etc... 
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m-m 
31. The EFTP is scrutinized on the basis ot its pertinency ; the 
importance of the omitted or neglected factors (or fields of action), the need for 
clarification and in comparison with some adjustment programme that could 
have been issued by the World Bank under the same circumstances. The 
criteria of pertinency covers two definitions i.e. these of internal and external .’ 
pertinency. Internal pertinency leads the analyst to ask wether a tool is the 
proper one given what it is expected to serve while external pertinency looks at 
the fitting between some announced policy and the measures already decided 
to implement it. To be more precise internal pertinency asks wether the EFT’I? is 
relevant for the expected global transition (vision of it) while external pertinency 
looks how the measures decided to implement some parts of the EPTP reveal these 
parts (or the related facets) and how economic reforms are expected to sequence. 
Through external pertinency it is the degree of fine tuning the economy 
permitted by the EPTP which is investigated. Omitted or neglected factors (or 
fields of action) as the need for clarification are revealed through a comparison 
between the EPTP and the real situation at the beginning of the transitional period 
(i.e. at the end of the civil war). As such the analyst can appreciate how major past 
economic trends are or not accounted for through the EPTP i.e. how much it is 
relevant given the country’s present economic and social conditions(l3). So, the 
reader is kindly requested to refer to point A of section II (The Economic conditions 
at the end of the civil war) and the accompanying annex 2 as to the related 
document issued from the working group. The reader should also keep in mind that 
further scrutinity will be given in the framework of other documents from the 
working group related to transitional macro disequilibrium and growth potentials. 
This would illuminate a little more the operationality of the FP’IT. Obviously, at 
the end of the process of scmtinity pertinency, relevancy, fine tuning and 
operationality have to say to same story otherwise the EPTP would be a society 
nonsense. Then, they give the EPTP its consistency. 
13As such it is assumed that the present is dominantly a product of some recent past. 
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A - PERTINENCY 
Al - Internal pertinency : is the EPTP the proper tool for the expected global 
transition ? 
32. Here, there are two questions to raise which are is it politically i.e. 
peace related to pertinent and is it economically pertinent ? The focus is on the 
conceptual level. First let us try to answer to the first question. For a society like 
Ethiopia to pass from civil war to market-based economy implies to reconstruct all 
the relations between the citizens and these ones with the State (included all the 
local, regional authorities), in such a way to drastically modify the degree of 
identification between people and the political organs. Departing from this 
viewpoint, the transition covers first of all issues related to politics or more 
precisely to democracy. This presumes crucial steps in a proper sequence. The steps 
would ease people’s access to information of any kinds (through a free press, for 
instance), attempt to increase people participation in the public process decision 
making on a voluntary basis and legalize party politics. They should occur in the 
framework of a State behaving like an impartial body. The question of the 
ranking of the steps is a debatable one for it depends on circumstances prevailing 
within each society at a given time. In the light of recent history, the legalization of 
party politics and the political neutrality of the State seem fundamental. 
Nevertheless, this must not lead to empty economic reforms from their announced 
content. Such a risk exists in Ethiopia for the present time. The very reduced 
number of measures already decided to implement the EPTP could be a relevant 
indicator of this risk (refer to section A2 which follows). 
33. From the preceding viewpoints, the EPTP seems to be conceptually 
pertinent. Indeed, through it, first, the government introduces the political 
requirement of democracy (this one being the achievement of peace) as a pillar 
for economic stabilization and recovery (para. 3) ; second, it uses a democratic 
wide bargaining process (para. 5) ‘to amend the EPTP ; third, it indicates its 
intentions to organize the functioning of the market on the basis of a policy mix 
coping with social and economic targets (para 26) ; fourth, it opens to 
continuity after the free elections (para. 3) and fifth, the EPTP is the result of 
compromise between various forces grouped around a common charter@& As 
such what appears it that the EFTP is a macro framework to refer to lead Ethiopia to 
14 They play the role of party politics. Obvio&y there could also be other forces appearing after the free 
elections. 
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a social democracy where privately-operated units of production are not only 
influenced through macro policies i.e. indirectly( but directly also through free 
organized (it is hoped so) people participation schemes. So featured, this 
democratic system has much to share with the late Yougoslavian one. One 
hopes it would not fail like this reference one, specially when the need to restructure 
firms (and farms) will make a lot of workers redundant ; when regional re- 
equilibrium will lead to conflicts with fiscal balance, etc... From these viewpoints 
what the government intends to promote as institutions related to macro market 
functioning (for instance, trade unions, employers unions, etc...) will be a key issue 
of the EPTP. To notice that this is not touched by the EPTP for the present time (but 
that will be covered by the expected new Labour law : para. 54 and 58). 
34. The question of democracy as a pillar for growth is a very 
interesting one recently re-investigated by economists. They found that the most 
immediate connection was in the case of famine and famine prevention. Major 
famines have taken place in ‘. market economies and in nonmarket socialist 
economies, but not in any country with a democratic system, with opposition parties 
and with a relatively free press. Institutionalized public pressure and a free press 
have a creative role to play, not just in preventing major disasters such as famines 
but also in making social security programs less fragile. This obviously is 
particularly relevant in the case of Ethiopia where famine has been a quasi 
permanent fact since too long as people’s poverty and misery. And more over when 
the government de facto has to apply a strong adjustment process. Political rights 
are important both in themselves and in their consequences. They give those in 
authority appropriate incentives to be concerned with the well-being and the misery 
of the people. Obviously, how to balance economic and social concern is not said. 
Recent history tells us that has never been easy in the context of developing 
countries, or those where there has been challenged government and State. 
35. In the light of the preceding democracy in the Ethiopian fense is a 
way to play the market game efficiently and with an expected social (and political) 
stability. That would be in accordance with the society global aspirations expected 
to reveal through free elections and referendum. One can also expect that this 
would lead to much equity for Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world. 
In this respect, as in that of the society aspirations, the EPTP could be challenged by 
three systems of identification interacting deeply as long as time is running. The 
first two ones are the identification between workers and firms’ goals (factory 
15 Because they injlue more on the issues of the private decision making than on the latter as such 
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identification) and that between the firms’ and the State’s ones (regulation 
identification). They interact through a third one which is the identification 
between people’s aspirations and fulfillments and the society’s achievements 
(society identification). Identification processes Cannot be neglected for they give a 
society its internal cohesion which is a key for sustained peace an democracy (if 
ever).’ Let us give a few pertinent examples based on some countries historical 
trends. In Japan, there are high levels of factory and regulation identification. 
Further, the society identification is more or less viewed (even fought to citizens) 
like the permanent result of the first ones. So, people identify micro goals with 
macro ones and social achievements. Global cohesion is extremely high. People 
adhere deeply to japanese goals wherever they come from. They have got a strong 
identity. At the opposite is France. Here, there are low levels of factory and 
regulation identification and, moreover, the society identification is very unstable. It 
has or not something to do with the result of the other ones. Macro goals reflect 
first of all the vision of some members of the elite. Compared to Japan, France is 
a society in search of its identity and as such its internal cohesion. So, micro, 
macro goals and social achievements have always to be reconciled not only 
through changes in policies or of politics but reforms of all sorts. France seeks 
always for the best reform i.e. that which would permit to fine tune the interests of 
the participants to its society. Germany lies between Japan and France. Indeed, its 
levels of identification are lower than in Japan but higher than in France. Macro 
policies have always been defined in the framework of a wide bargaining process 
where at the opposite of the Japanese society identification is not permanently 
viewed as the result of factory and regulation identification. So, macro goals are 
those on the basis of which the society hopes to manage all the participants’ 
interests. Macro goals, reflect the efforts made to reconcile goals not assumed to be 
untouched being the perfect “product” of some more intelligent people. They are not 
a vision of a high stylised society. So, the German society is practically 
endowned with cohesion while France gets it theoretically. Another interesting 
example is that of Italy where the society identification is challenged by the 
identification towards some private groups. The permanency of the mafia can be 
explained through that challenged society identification process. The Italian case 
illuminates the framework of many developing countries where the State i.e. the 
symbol of the society identity is variously challenged by private groups. In all these 
cases results of some announced Economic policy have always been challenged by 
the interaction of identification processes. This has been variously scrutinized by a 
lot of economists. 
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36. From that preceeds the EITP seems also politically pertinent. 
Indeed, departing from civil war, it adresses the question of growth on the basis of 
the country’s internal cohesion. In this respect, it carries with it processes of 
identification difficult to avoid and manage, particularly, in a society where 
ideology has been used to artificially fixing the frontiers of identification processes 
at the opposite of helping people to discover what they had in common. Further, it 
was also used to indicate how to share incomes (and, so, to prejudice some groups). 
Finally, all will depend on the nature of legality promoted by the Ethiopian 
._ *’ . Authorities as the belief by the population in the stability and enforcement of the 
. new laws. That tiill also show wether the plea for democracy was not only a way to ’ 
attract new international aid. 
37. The process of society identification has become particularly 
important in Ethiopia since several months. Indeed, to reinforce it, so as to use 
it as a tool to increase its legitimacy, the government has acted along lines of 
ethnic@, faith and language. It has attempted to demonstrate that many bad things 
occured to Ethiopia because this one was ruled and dominated by the Amhara. As 
an outcome of this, the government last year acknowledged that Ethiopia is a 
mixture of peoples by giving tribal-based movements seats in parliament and the 
cabinet, and allowing them to form parties, sometimes with their own armed 
militias. This has created a cocktail of organisations based on race (or analogous) 
rather than ideology. The promised elections will probably be fought on ethnic 
grounds. Results could be not only an independent Eritrea (with this one 
formalizing its break with Ethiopia at a referendum in 1993) but maybe also a 
Tigray one and the creation of an Oromo land in search for more autonomy, at 
least. 
38. The government’s policy has led various political fractions to fight 
for their own scrap of land. For the present time, this has already reduced the 
government’s economic capabibility to face some of the country major 
constraints. For instance, by preventing him to collect revenue on coffee, the 
main export commodity, and carrying food for famine victims. This has occured 
because of the troubles in the eastern province of HarergeW). In that area, at least 
eight armed groups claim the region as their own. Dire Dawa, the provincial capital, 
is a flag makers’ heaven. Several groups are Somali clans. Others are Oromo (once 
known as Galla), from the largest national group in Ethiopia who repeats that his 
language and culture have been banned since the Amhara conquered the region in 
16 Information from the fionomirt doted from April Ilth-17th 1992, p. 56-58. 
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the 19th century. All are calling loudly for independence, in many voices. The 
offices of the Oromo Liberation Front are just down the road from the Islamic Front 
for the Liberation of Oromia ; the Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation (a 
creation of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front which is 
presently in power at A.A.) has its headquarters nearby. 
39. The Oromo political activists opposed to the EPRDF have used two 
cards against the rulers of Ethiopia. The first one is coffee and the second the vital 
roads linking Dire Dawa to Djibouti and the seaport of Berbera in Somalia. With 
regard to coffee export’ increased smuggling and contraband of export have been 
organized. This has reduced Ethiopian export earnings and fiscal revenue to the 
State. Regarding the vital roads Oromo Muslim fundamentalists have recently laid 
mines along the Be&era one. The Oromo Liberation Front blew up a bridge near 
Harer stranding trucks carrying food for famine victims. To conclude let us just 
indicate that in the case of a break between the Harerge province and Ethiopia to 
form an Oromo land (or a Muslim one, Oromia), the government in power at AA 
would lose: 
(i) the road and the railway from A.A. to Djibouti ; 
(ii) the coffee production and export earnings from this provinceU7. ; 
(iii) the production and export earnings of khat (a mild narcotic) which was the fifth 
source of foreign currency at the beginning of the 1990s before the related trade 
becoming fully unregistered in 1991 ; 
(iv) the Bale province predominantly populated by Oromos : Cattle herding and 
dairy farming are its principal sources of livelihood, coupled with an expanding 
timber industry that draws on the huge expanses of forest that bedeck the Bale 
mountainsides. 
The fireceding indicates strongly that the society identification process is a key issue 
in the Ethiopian case. As far as the other processes of identification are concerned 
all will depend on rights recognized to trade unions and employers ones to decide 
on agreements between themselves without interference. 
17 Though Hare&e is largely a province of desert and low-lying savannah, its northerm reaches are 
mountainous and fertile and it is here, on the high edge of the eastern Ethiopian escarpment that Harar, the 
regional capital, is located. Harar stood, as for centuries past, in rich, well-watered agricultural land The area 
produces coffee, for which Harar is famous, as well as “great” quantities of khat (catha edulis), wheat, millet and 
other grains and a variety offnrits and vegetables. 
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its factors and money markets. It is through the trade between production and 
consumption that production factors are priced and, so, are integrated to the goods 
market. This is also true with the money market. In the case of labour, capital and 
money particularly, this indirect valutation (i.e. through the goods market) or 
integration led developed economies to regulate the related flows, behaviours of 
economic operators and the market structures. This was an attempt to clarify the 
functioning of these factors markets given the need to ensure the reproduction of the 
factors as to fulfil1 economic, social and democratic objectives required by the 
society. Regulation prevailed in developed market-based economies since the end 
of the 1970s. Deregulation prevails up to now because the net costs of regulation 
increased continuously and the economic trends since the first oil shock 
strengthened risk-adverse operators, particularly those from the banking sector. 
Deregulation more or less favours the idea of keeping the same price determination 
for both goods and factors i.e. that of the market. As such markets are perfectly 
integrated since a price is a cost on another market and vice-versa. Obviously, the 
emphasis put again on market has varied according to economies or better societies. 
Nevertheless, deregulation with its emphasis on market virtue has gained credit 
everywhere. This has been strengthened since the vanishing (or nearly so) of the 
command economies in Eastern Europe. Deregulation has also touched developing 
countries through adjustment programmes recommended and financialy supported 
by the “western” donors. At the eve of the 199Os, the idea of market has gained 
credit for both goods, factors, money and even environment. So, a market- 
oriented economy is an economy where market symptoms prevail everywhere. 
42. In the light of the preceding, the EPTP might be economically 
pertinent if it is recognized that market is a sequenced process leading to sequenced 
reforms. Or put it another way that to promote market-based economy one should 
first advocate it for the production of goods and second for the production factors. 
Indeed, the EPTP focusses quasi exclusively on the production front. Let us 
demonstrate this in the light of that preceeds (para. 40). The EPTP recognizes 
people’s rights (included that of enjoying of these ones) at the exception of land 
ownership and 1975 nationalized .house ownership ; it supports private 
initiative and state’s one in development ; it emphasizes price reforms leading to 
market price determination for goods and market rules for all units of 
production. Further, through expected political deep changes, it attempts to modify 
the Ethiopian process of society identification. And so, it will ioflue on the 
degree of acceptation of private operators to be regulated. Therefore through 
political and economical intentions expected to give rise to political commitments to 
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implement the EFTP, the EPTP might very well be a tool to give the government 
its expected legitimacy and market operationality on the goods market front. in 
this respect, nevertheless, two issues could be crucial, that of postponed land 
ownership and that of state’s share in the economy. The first one fundamentally 
depends on the effective popular support of the government for the present time and 
the relevancy of government’s arguments. These ones are that the State would 
remain the land owner at least during the transition period in order to avoid : 
(i) the risks of tenancy in’the South of the country, established monoIjolies all over 
the country and increased rural migrations because of speculation on lands ; 
(ii) price distortions and speculation giving rise to impoverishing process in the case 
of low income people i.e. nearly everybody in Ethiopia. 
43. The issue of land ownership has recently been investigated at the 
international level by well known economists. Let us illuminate that issue a little bit 
on the basis of the paper the related economists producedV91. The major idea 
developed by these economists(20) is that there is some economic rationality to keep 
state land ownership. Indeed, as long as development runs demand for land 
increases. Therefore, the State can benefit from land price increase at given land 
supply. This is even more true if it invests in basic infrastructure... valuting the land. 
Then coping with increased demand means that the State gets a land rent rather 
analogously to what Ricardo indicated (Essays on the Influence of the low price of 
corn on the profit of stock - 1815). Such a political measure would not only be 
relevant with regard to the deficit of the State’s budget but also in terms of equity. 
This one, obviously, when the State gets its mandatory functions through a real 
democratic process. The theory of the state land rent is not new. It was particularly 
advocated by L.Walras in its “Thiorie mathematique du prix des terres et de leur 
rachat par 1’Etat (1880)” and also by a US economist named George (1839-1896). 
State land rent in Ethiopia implies some cadastral survey. This one can in no way be 
achieved within the timespan of the transition. The land rent question which is 
that of how to organize a market for a dominant factor of production has 
been put on the agenda by the World Bank. It is worth to be investigated carefully 
19 ItIae paper has been publkhed in English in Etudes foncikres nber 52, sept 1991. 
20 These economists who are from the best ones of the wdd were : N.Tiianan, W: Vi&y, M.Gq@ey, L.Harri.y, 
J.lKsse, CH.Goetz, Jh4.Harqitd4 G. Wunderlich, DRFusfeli, E.&y&n, RDorfinan, C.ll;aysen, TScitovs~, 
R Gode, SRAckerma~ J. Tobin, RMusgrave, FModigliani, WJSamuels, G. Orcutt, E.Smolen&, T. Gwartney, 
O.Oldman, ZGriliches, ?KBaumol, G.Ranis, FAltschul, J.Helliwell, G.Ponteuwvo, RSolow, A.&-m, H.Levin. 
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for its positive potential impacts on the budget(20. It is also a way to offer rentable 
opportunity to invest to private capital in a country where this is a key issue but 
also a very debatable one. Food ramping inflation would ensure a good real return 
to capital departing from a land selling price which could not be very high. 
Marketed lands could be the 3,000,OOO ha which could become productive if 
irrigated. Out of this vast area only 100,000 ha have so far been exploited. 
44. The question of the state share in the economy remains always a 
debatable one. It has been variously investigated by a lot of economists. What 
economic science has to say about the appropriate roles of the State and the private 
sector may be summarized by four theorems, one from market socialism and three 
from welfare economics. 
1) The Lange-Lerner-Taylor Theorem says that market socialist economies and 
private capitalist ones are equivalent(22) ; 
The last three theorems are from welfare economics. 
2) Old welfare economics (1960) says that the markets are efficient, except for 
certain well-defined market failures such as externalities, or the public provision 
of infrastructure. Government, no matter how well organized, no matter how 
competent, could not do any better than the market. Old welfare theory was 
reinforced by the results of competitive equilibrium analysis. There were as follows: 
(i) there is always an efficient equilibrium (under the well known assumptions of 
Arrow-Debreu) ; 
(ii) market is an efficient equilibrium ; 
(iii) the efficient equilibrium is Pareto-optimal. 
Economists extended the concept of market failures to missing markets, 
conditions leading to the violation of perfectly competitive behaviour such as 
imperfect information, increasing returns and entry barriers. But they indicated that 
these reasons have to be set against the possibilities of government failure. More 
recently, economists have made further extensions pointing to government action. 
That would be the case for the perceived responsability to alleviate poverty and 
deprivation ; the support of basic rights and equality of opportunity ; the 
21 For more analysis on the constraints of the Ethiopian budget, the reader should refer to the related document 
issued by the DIAL’s working group. 
22 Nobody would have any doubt on that, obviously ! 
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promotion of paternalism where individual preferences are overridden by the 
government ; the acceptance of responsibility for future generations which 
current generations left by themselves might not take. New welfare economics 
tries to explore hidden assumptions in the earlier fundamental theorems of welfare 
economics. They are incomplete risk or futures markets and imperfect information. 
3) The first new theorem says that in the presence of imperfect information, 
incomplete risk markets, and incomplete futures markets, there is the potential for 
government intervention. This is due to the fact that there is simply no theory of the 
comparative properties of different economic system under conditions of bound 
rationality. This one means when economic agents are forced to form expectations 
about the behaviour of other agents, because of the absence of a complete set of 
futures and risks markets. The new theorem does not say what govemement must do 
to realize the potential intervention. 
4) The second new theorem has to do with privatization. This issue discussing 
wether government should intervene or not in the production was not addressed in 
the earlier literature. Indeed, only that of government intervention (Pigouvian 
interventions of a very limited kind, only) was touched. The new theorem says that 
private production can emulate public production, that is ideal public production, 
only under highly restrictive conditions. So that, in general, the two are not 
equivalent. This provides a weak intellectual foundation for understanding the 
precise roles of the government and the private sector. What the theorem says is that 
there is a potential scope for government intervention, but it is a fairly diffuse and 
ill-defined role until1 details are fill out. 
45. In the light of the preceding theorems, the EPTP theoretical way of 
sharing between the state and private sectors gets an economic rationality. Indeed, 
basic infrastructure extended to basic goods, services and financing, missing 
markets... imperfect information, incomplete risk markets and futures markets, 
emulation of public production, all this pleads for government intervention and 
production. How precisely remains a question. An answer has been given by J. 
Stiglitz at a roundable discussion on Development Strategies at the W.B. (1990). 
“This issue of the roles of the State and the private sector in development strategies 
should not be viewed as a contrast between the private sector and the government. It 
really is a question of the whole complex of relationships among market, 
nonmarket, government and State, and voluntary institutions and the particular 
forms that the government intervention takes. Further, the general implication from 
42 
reading history is that ownership is not as important as the environment in which a 
firm operates. Competition is more important than the private-public division”. 
So, in this respect the EPTP will be pertinent on the goods front if competition 
features really the all set of Ethiopian enterprises whatever their owner is. To 
be fully economically pertinent, the EPTP should announce reforms on the 
production factors market front too. This is not really the case at the exception of 
labour for which a new Labour law has been announced (refer para. 29). Indeed, 
and as indicated previously (para. 43), land remains state ownership at least till the 
free elections. This is also true for banking. 
46. The creation of a land market (para. 43) is not only a way to secure 
revenue to the State. It is also a way to economically rational& the use of this 
factor of production and to reconcile the peasantry with the State. Through a land 
market policy the State could fulfil1 different targets amongst which : 
1) the environment rehabilitation (para. 28 - C7) ; 
2) the improvement between surplus and deficit food production areas (annex 2) ; 
between drought affected and more abundant rainfalls ones ; 
3) the accomodation of ex-soldiers and militias properly. 
The creation of a market for land should be a flexible process. Indeed, it should 
permit to sell lands according to what people of some specific region are 
accustomed to. For instance, in the North of the country to the village community 
and in the South to peasants individually. In such a framework, the State would 
have to issue a tax system favouring the purchase of land for productive purposes 
rather than speculative ones. The fact that private and public (local) operators 
should be allowed to participate to the market in conjunction with foreign capital 
would permit to organixe some land open market policy. 
47. The organization of a market for financial funds, through the 
establishment of private commercial banks would permit(23) : 
1) to create market opportunities to private investors ; 
2) to get “rapatriated” capital flows from the informal sector (likely) ; 
23 More &tailed analysis appears atpara. 57 63,84,101 to 103. 
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3) to make the first steps to integrated markets (the real and financial ones ; 
the formal and the informal ones) ; 
4) to soften the devaluation needs by reducing the real exchange rate 
overvaluation for capital inflows generally lead to real exchange rate appreciation. 
But all this presumes real positive interest rate to remunerate saving. And also 
operators endowned with enough purchasing power so as to support some bottom 
line discipline applied by banks. What could be a market for financial funds in 
Ethiopia should lead to carefully investigate the financing power of its informal 
sector for it more or less appears that the dynamics and saving of this one could be 
important. Indeed, if all said to the DIAL’s team at A.A. during the meeting at the 
Chamber of Commerce is true : 
a) on 26 000 Chamber of Commerce members (at A.A. only) about 20 000 would 
be from the informal sector (at least) ; 
b) an important amount of idle money could be easily rendered available at the 
condition of some specific policies (a reduction of the tax system plus the possibility 
to make workers redundant, mainly (refer para. 62)). 
The creation of a private banking system could be a crucial issue for it could 
help (amongst other things) to create jobs more easily than expected. This point 
will receive further scrutinity at paragraphs 84 and 99. 
A2 - External pertinency : how the measures already decided by the Ethiopian 
government reveal some parts (or facets) of the EPTP, and the sequencing of 
economic reforms ; the degree of fine tuning of Ethiopian economy 
48. Before listing the measures, it is worth indicating that one of the 
major constraints to decide for political commitments is peace to strengthen i.e. the 
broad political consensus not to modify (at least). As such measures have to be 
efftcient given short run priority areas with a high degree of political neutrality 
or compromise (para. 2). That is the main challenge to the Ethiopian society for the 
present time which encompasses the other ones (food self-reliance, demobilized 
ex-service men, informal market economy, the country’s rehabilitation needs . ..). 
The Oromo question adressed through paragraphs 37 to 39 indicates that peace is 
not well established in Ethiopia for the moment. The political situation which 
remains unstable might explain why there has not yet been many measures decided 
to implement the EPTP. Further, it could also explain the sequencing of the 
measures. 
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1) The Ethiopian Economic Recovery and Reconstruction Program 
(ERW 
49. In the light of the preceding (para. 30), the measures should mainly 
concern the country rehabilitation assuming that the stabilization of peace is the best 
thing to promote a conducive atmosphere to enhance private initiatives. In this 
respect, the Ethiopian government has presented and discussed a rehabilitation 
programme with the international donors community under the W.B’s supervision. 
It would amount slightly more than US $ 600 m of which 47 per cent for the 
productive sectors i.e. agricuiture, industry and construction materials, 18 per 
cent for social targets (education, health, social rehabilitation funds and 
structural food aid) and the rest (35 per cent) for infrastructure rehabilitation 
i.e. transport and roads mainly. This programme covers about 92.1 per cent of 
the Ethiopian Economic Recovery and Reconstruction Program (ERRP) (table 
at the following page). Major foreign ilnancers are the IDA (38.1 per cent), the 
ADB (20.8 per cent), the EC (19.2 per cent), the USAID (14.4 per cent) and 
Sweden plus Japan (2.5 per cent). Ethiopia has also received help from the EC 
as such. Indeed, on the basis of the Lome Convention US $ 70 m have been 
made free. Further, the EC has allocated to Ethiopia ECU 0.65 m for war prisoners 
and 0.35 m for Ethiopian refugees in Djibouti. 
50. ERRP foreign financing is constrained by two main conditions 
which are the transport deregulation and the iiberalization of the fertilizers 
system. When being fulfilled they would permit the ERRP to go before the WB’s 
board i.e. to be internationally financed. The Ethiopian government has already 
accepted the first condition. Indeed, by december 1992, transports will be 
deregulated. As a consequence of such an agreement transport price increases are 
gradually decided. Disagreement between the Ethiopian Authorities and the WI3 
remains regarding fertilizers. Reason clearly indicated by the former is the expected 
price increase in the case of deregulation and the eventuality of the Birr devaluation. 
This would negatively affect the peasants demand for such products, although only 
14 per cent of the peasants are using fertilizers. But there could be another reason 
much more relevant. It could be that the government knows rather clearly that he 
cannot really boost the peasant agriculture as indicated in the EEPT (par-a. 28X7). 
Indeed, to help peasants to obtain fair price for their produce (which is the key to 
boost peasants production) is a very debatable issue for a country where the peasant 
agriculture sector remains de facto quasi the lonely source of surplus for investment 
and reduced indebtness given : 
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(i) the collapse of the state sectors (industry and farms) ; 
(ii) the increase of unregistered and contraband activities (coffee, chat) ; 
(iii) the waiting position of the private operators ; 
(iv) the remaining available registered saving (saving ratio to GDP of nearly 0 per 
cent in 1991). 
With regard to the surplus extraction, Eshetu Chole [lo] indicates that this occured 
mainly through agricultural taxation, grain marketing and pricing and foreign 
exchange generation. For instance (Eshetu Chole p. 97), “the price received by the 
producer for unwashed coffee is about 40 per cent of the international FOB price. 
Of the remaining 60 per cent, 44 per cent is taken by taxes and duties, which leaves 
16 per cent for interior costs, finance and insurance, and cleaning and other costs”. 
In this framework, to keep low fertilizers (input) price could be a way to 
circumvent an agriculture policy that has to remain from the extractive type 
(compared to the protective one) even if it is mixed with market liberalization 
and incentives to peasants. This is also relevant if one accounts for the 
government’s announced intention to promote extensive use of fertilizers (para. 28- 
C7) as for the disruption of local service co-operatives in most areas since the 
dismantling of these ones after the reforms of the Derg-regime. To conclude the 
fertilizers issue could well be regarded as a symbol of the government’s will to 
improve its relations with the peasants at minimized credibility costs. The 
government has nevertheless not closed the door to the fertilizers deregulation. 
Indeed, it has asked the FA0 to conduct a study on this issue. And finally, let us 
also indicate that the fertilizers problem hids a regional one. Indeed, the 
consumption of fertilizers is concentrated on three regions which are Gojam, Shoa, 
and Arssi. They are three surplus areas. They would be prejudiced in case of 
fertilizers liberalization and as such risks to famine could increase. Further, regional 
disequilibrium and risks to famine could also increase by december 1992 i.e. when 
transports will be deregulated. In this case, the private sector would only supply 
fertilizers to those endowned with enough purchasing power to pay for new 
fertilizers and transport costs. This might indicate that the government may 
have deliberatly chosen a mix policy (deregulated transport sector, still 
regulated fertilizers supply). 
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2) Measures 
51. The measures already decided to implement the EPTP are listed 
below. Their number is rather reduced, so that one can say that the EPTP has not 
yet begun to be implemented. This might be due to political problems (within the 
rulers’ coalition, amongst the regions...) and, therefore, to the need to gain credit for 
the EPTP (i.e. its content) at the international level as financial support to it. 
Presentation of the EPTP at Washington (W.B.) has only started mid February 
1992. The Ethiopian government has then announced he would be ready to decide 
for political commitments by June-July 1992. Measures already decided can be 
grouped into five sets respectively related to institutional changes between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, macroeconomic stabilization, privatized Ethiopian 
economy, market functioning and agriculture. 
Relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea 
52. The Ethiopian government has signed an agreement with the 
Eritrean Authorities to get a free access to the seaport of Assab from where the 
imported Ethiopian crude oil came. It was also at Assab that 70 per cent of 
Ethiopian consumed crude oil was refined. A mutual defense agreement has also 
been signed with Eritrea. These agreements reflect mutual benefit for both 
Ethiopia and Eritrea. Indeed, the first one gets acces to energy and the world 
markets while the second gets acces to agriculture raw materials (skins, cotton, 
grain, etc...) needed for its manufacturing activities. Available information does not 
permit to indicate how the external duties will be shared between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea. These signed agreements could explain, why, after a period of quasi floating 
exchange rate, the Eritrean Authorities decided to re-establish the Birr value at its 
old parity i.e. the Ethiopian one. Nevertheless, several political analysts at A.A. also 
indicated that Eritrean rulers were helping Oromo activists so as to secure their 
relations with Ethiopia by creating troubles along the roads to Djibouti ! 
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Macroeconomic stabilization 
53. On the current account front the government has abolished (dec 
7,199l) the franc0 valuta system on merchandise imports. This sytem permitted 
economic operators to import merchandise when they could pay for these ones in 
foreign currency without state intervention i.e. without requiring foreign currency 
from the banking system. In this case, they had to pay an extra fee varying from 40 
to 100 per cent of the import value. From 1983/84 to 1989/90(24) about 40 per cent 
of merchandise imports fell under the franco valuta system. In 1990/91 this 
percentage has fallen to 24. On the domestic price front, the government has 
showed its will to promote price rationality by increasing prices for a lot of 
commodities such as oil, the transports tariffs (public and private) and a set of 
consumer goods. This with frozen wage since 1975 (at the exception of a shift in 
1979 for low wage people) has revealed increased poverty and corruption. In this 
respect, it is worth indicating that for several economic operators met at A.A. to 
play the market game is nothing else but a way to legalize corrupted trade 
practices(25). Depending on the role and influence of these operators such a 
behaviour may weaken the government’s credibility and legitimacy. 
Privatized economy 
54. Economic operators are waiting for the new Labour law as for the 
announced new investment and mining codes. Information obtained when being 
on mission indicate that the new Labour law would permit to make the labour 
force redundant under specific conditions. This is one of the major requirement 
of the private operators members of the Chamber of Commerce. For these people 
labour shedding in Ethiopia is a way (not the only one, nevertheless) to close the 
credibility gap between the private sector and the government on the profitability 
and management autonomy front. In this respect, it is worth indicating that neither 
the department of labour’ nor the Chamber of Commerce have taken part to the 
discussions leading to the writing of the preliminary version of both the Labour law 
and the investment (or mining) code. In both cases, it is now too late. Indeed, the 
new investment code has been approved by the Council of Ministers and is now 
before the Council of Representatives ; the new Labour law is being discussed by 
the Council of Ministers. 
24 Ethiopian fiscal year. It begins July 6th and ends July 7th of the nert year. 
25 As it is now the case in some late Eastern countries. 
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55. On the basis of information given when being at A.A., the labour 
redundancy will be accounted for through : 
(i) the administration of some major corporation by boards where workers will 
have rights (30 per cent of the global ones has been indicated in the EPTP), 
and 
(ii) the payment of government’s compensation to workers depending on years of 
service in the case of minor factories. Almost all trade and industrial corporations 
would be touched by labour redundancy. Indeed, the government has made clearly 
understood by people participating to the Labour law discussions that 10 Ethiopian 
corporations (at least) belonging to the manufacturing sector should be sold to the 
private sector. This represents 110 factories and a labour shedding of about 100.000 
people (according to lL0 data on manufacturing employment). If one accounts for 
the government’s intentions related to the dismantling of external trade monopolies, 
all the industrial corporations would be touched except maybe the Petroleum and 
Pharmaceutical ones. 
56. With regard to the new investment code or better policy meetings 
got at A.A. permit to indicate the following features grouped into two headings :
(i) The Ethiopian managing unit 
l- All the information on the regulation of investissement opportunity in 
Ethiopia would be now given to private operators at a centralized level i.e. by a 
specific unit called the Investment Committee (I.C.). It has already been established. 
This is to permit increased rationality and speed in a favourable way to private 
candidates ;
2- The LC. would have to seek for the appropriate incentives and to send the 
fulfilled investment form to the related ministeries so as to get comments and 
licencing. He would also have to compute the fees to be paid to the government. 
Extra incentives would be given for depressed areas ; 
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3- The 1-C. would have to do its work within the shortest period of time (a 
few weeks has been indicated ; previously the investment approval procedure could 
last several months) ; 
(ii) Policy to foreign capital 
4- The policy would follow strictly the EPTP. So, foreigners are allowed to 
invest in all sectors excepted in defence, posts and telecommunications, 
broadcasting, air, rail and banking. Nevertheless, foreign investment remains to be 
approved at ministerial level (as domestic ones) ; 
5- Foreign capital would be particularly welcome in the following sectors : 
export, mining, energy and transport. This so as to help to strengthen the linkage 
between agriculture and industry, diversify the export basis and the industrial 
activities and ease the country’s energy constraint ; 
6- Special support will be given to domestic investors on the basis of 
comparative advantages nevertheless. 
57. In the light of the preceding, it appears that the expected applied 
investment policy will follow the lines of investment policy applied in developing 
market-oriented economies. Obviously, this does not indicate wether the new 
investment code will be an efficient tool to attract private capital (both the domestic 
and foreign ones). All depends on what was expected by the private sector. In the 
case of Ethiopia, the sector seems much more in favour of getting a private 
banking system with an appropriate credit policy (see para 62). For the budget 
any investment code is first of all a bit on the future. The government is allocating 
funds (incentives) waiting for growth, income, employment and taxes. This is rather 
costful when the country has an heavy international public debt. In this framework, 
a good credit policy may be much more useful by putting the burden of the private 
investment on the private sector managing the banking system. Further, this is also 
a way to favour the integration of the goods and financial markets and, as such, to 
help the monetary authorities to correctly determine the exchange rate value (para. 
104 to 114). From the preceding viewpoints, the focus on an investment code at 
the expense of a good credit policy through the privatization of the banking 
system might likely be an important mistake. This could also bias the relations 
between the government and the private sector by indicating that the former one 
through the ministerial approval of investment wishes to remain able of overseeing 
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private initiative. Depending on the relations between the government and the 
private sector (bad in Ethiopia for the present time) this could increase the 
credibility gap (or the regulation identification one)’ between the former and the 
latter. The cost would be to comfort private operators to remain on a waiting 
position a rather long time. To close the credibility gap between the private sector 
and itself the government has committed a working group to study the tax system 
and how to modify it so as to encourage the private sector. As such, it might fulfil1 
one of the requirements put forward by the Chamber of Commerce to get a free 
market economy in Ethiopia (para. 62). 
Market functioning 
58. In conjunction with the preceding expected conditions to make the 
employees redundant, the new Labour law would also include new dispositions : 
(i) reducing the government’s interference on the relations between workers and 
employers ; 
(ii) recognizing collective agreements freely negotiated ; 
(iii) allowing employers’ associations ;
(iv) allowing trade unions to become internationally affiliated. 
These dispositions reveal (it is expected so) the government’s will to endown 
Ethiopia with labour market organizations as it is the case for market 
functioning economies even if this could lead to conflicts with other objectives. 
For instance, that to restructure state firms. 
59. The government has also instructed ministeries to review their 
functioning with respect to market functioning. The aim is not to reduce the 
number of civil servants even if that could lead to such a result. The aim is to get 
administrative structures or units in accordance with market requirements. This 
would encounter another proposition from the Chamber of Commerce. 
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Agriculture 
60. Without government’s financial support peasants cannot buy 
fertilizers. But the government’s room for manoeuvre is fmancially very narrow 
given the state of the budget. So, the food production is more or less given 
depending on the availability of cultivated areas (and irrigated ones in some cases) 
and rainfalls (when peace is assumed). This is when neglecting the influence of 
environment degradation on yields (and then agriculture income). In this 
framework, the government has committed a working group to study what could be 
the impacts of using organic farming at large-scale. This could reduce the financial 
constraint of fertilizers in the eventuality of their price liberalization and improve 
the relations between the government and the peasants. Indeed, organic farming is 
less exogenous to the peasants’ knowledge than agriculture using fertilizers (and 
pesticides) produced by the chemical industry. The costs for the balance of 
payments would also be reduced. Organic farming may further help to curb rural 
migrations, a real challenge not only to Ethiopia but to all developing countries 
which have generally denied organic farming (and farming) to feed their population. 
3) The Ethiopian private sector’s expected measures 
61. Before turning to the sequencing and speed of economic reforms let 
us have a look at the measures expected by the Ethiopian private sector. The 
Chamber of Commerce has published its expectations in a document dated from 
September 27, 1991 which was sent to the government. A very interesting point 
appearing on page 2 of this document is the mention that comments and views of 
Ethiopian abroad residents had also enriched the analysis sent to the government. 
Another (introductory point) is the use of the word free market (page 7) for market- 
oriented economy. Both points indicate (at least ‘to me) the suspiciousness of the 
Chamber of Commerce to the present government of Ethiopia. 
62. The Chamber of Commerce expects the following decisions horn 
the government : 
(i) A modification of the role of the State in the economy i.e. : 
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- the withdrawal from the production, trade and services areas except under 
very specific circumstances : too high level of accumulation, low profitability, 
importation of basic consumer goods which involves subsidies, export under 
bilateral agreement, mass transport services, municipal and tiastructural 
construction. The preceding would be at the opposite of the government’s role to 
regulate and monitor the (market-oriented) economy ; 
- the focus to lay down infrastructural networks, research institutes, protection of 
the consumers, . . . . to supply input and services to the agriculture sector at 
competitive prices and easier terms of payments. 
(ii) As a consequence of (i) almost all activities in Ethiopia should be opened up 
to the private sector. So, contrarily to the government’s position, the banking 
sector would be opened up to private initiative. Then, a credit policy reading to 
positive real interest rates (on trend) could be managed. 
(iii) A modification of land ownership accounting for specific conditions featuring 
rural and urban land : 
Rural land 
- Private ownership of rural land worked on by peasants ;
- Contractual landholding concession in case of private large-scale farms (right 
to sell or exchange land being prohibited). 
Urban land 
- Under government control. 
(iv) A new Labour law permitting : 
- to get relations between employers and employees based on productivity and 
profitability i.e. to get labour redundancy when necessary ; 
- to protect both partners in accordance with internationally accepted 
principles ; 
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- to recognize the right to employer to manage his enterprise as he sees it fit ; 
- to itemize the labour benefits of the employee ; 
- to define the methods of settling disputes. 
(v) A new income tax and duty system showing : 
- a reduction of the tax burden ; 
- favorable orientations to investment and export. 
(vi) - The immediate issuance of a democratic constitution ; 
- The establishment of legally constituted court completely independent. 
(vii) 1975 nationalized assets being restituted to their original owners ; 
(viii) A reduction of the bureaucracy and the design of the rest of it in accordance 
with markets functioning. For instance, by the creation of sector specific 
institutions. 
63. The measures already decided by the government encounter some 
expectations of the Chamber of Commerce (labour redundancy, managerial 
autonomy, protection of social partners, modification of the tax system). The land 
ownership issue could also be met after the announced referendum. Ascending 
difficulties concern mainly : 
- the country rehabilitation (for which not many things have already been decided 
and done) ; 
- to complete the withdrawal of the State from the production, etc... ; 
- the opening up of all activities to the private sector i.e. particularly the banking 
one ; 
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- the deregulation of the fertilizers system, and 
- the restitution of 1975 nationalized assets. 
In this respect, the State will be led to accept a complete withdrawal from the 
production (etc...) since it cannot pay for future losses, needed spareparts and 
upkeep costs given the expected evolution of the budget. Then, the question will 
be how to price the state firms and farms. An international auditing expertise 
would be needed. The selling of state assets could be a first step to the opening up 
of banking to the private sector. Through an international negotiated agreement 
to ensure the credibility of the procedure, the state assets could be used as 
based capital for the private banks. So, the state would be one of the share 
holders of the private banking system. Unless the budget deficit would be under 
control, it would not be allowed to borrow from the commercial banks. In case 
of privatized banking system revealing a profitable .market opportunity, both the 
government and the private sector would benefit of it. This would also permit a 
gradual ajustment of the interest rates (in level and structure) leading to a trend of 
positive real interest rate in the future. A restitution of 1975 nationalized assets is 
not possible at short term given its expected costs. It would become possible at 
medium one through another banking arrangement. 
4) The sequencing and speed of economic reforms 
A SURKEY OF THE ECONOMIC LITERATURE 
64. Reforming an economy is not only a question of economic policy 
content. It has also something to do with the problem of the appropriate sequencing 
and speed of reform. Basically, there are two interrelated questions : (1) in what 
order should markets be deregulated and liberalized, (2) what is the optimal speed 
of reform (i.e. overnight vs gradual). It is on the basis of the answers given to (1) 
and (2) that a sound macro policy has to be selected and sequenced. Before 
commenting the Ethiopian sequencing and speed of reform let us illuminate the 
issues a little bit through a quick focus on what economic researchers found 
dealing with structural reforms in the LDCs. 
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(i) The speed 
65. Most analysts agree upon gradual reforms. The reason for this 
resides on the role of adjustment costs (or welfare costs) and on the opposition to 
the reform policy than these costs can generate. Therefore, they plead for 
accompanying policies to minimize the short run unemployment effects and other 
adjustment costs associated with reform policies. In this respect, some authors assert 
that one way of reducing the adjustment costs is by relying on foreign capital during 
the transition. As a result, restrictions on the importation of capital should be 
reduced as ,first step of the economic reform. The preceding assumes that capital 
controls are precluding capital inflows. This, of course, needs not be the case. That 
will not be the case in those countries where the domestic financial sector is 
repressed. Then, the implicit proposed sequencing is the domestic financial sector 
to be liberalized before either the trade or capital account. The interaction of 
credibility problems and adjustment costs has also led several economists to support 
the idea of government acting rapidly by providing a subsidy for investors moving 
into some “new sector”. In this way, the apprehension stemming from the lack of 
credibility will be compensated. 
(ii) The sequencing 
66. Economists dealing with the question of sequencing first focussed 
on trade versus capital accounts liberalization. In this framework, they raised the 
question of competition of instruments(26). The basic point is that the attainment of 
a particular target may require some variables (either exogenous or endogenous) to 
move in a particular direction while the attainment of other objectives will require 
those variables to move in the opposite direction. For instance, MC Kinnon argued 
that the capital account restrictions should be relaxed only after trade and other 
industrial sector distorsions had been dismantled. This avoids real exchange 
appreciation at a time when due to the tariff reduction reform, a real exchange rate 
depreciation is needed. This problem is compounded by the fact that foreign capital 
inflows are unsustainable in the long run. Consequently, a structural reform of the 
trade account should deliberately avoid an unusual or extraordinary injection of 
foreign capital. Further, he also asserted that trade liberalization should only take 
place after the fiscal deficit is eliminated. In this way, the government will face no 
need to borrow from abroad to finance its expenditure and, thus the need for capital 
26 This is not a new one. It was discussed by Tinbergen and Munakll in the 1960s. In the 1970s and 1980s it 
gained increased interest on the basis of Mc Kinnon and J. Sach ‘s analysis. 
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inflows during the transition will be reduced. To summarize, MC Kinnon (1973, 
1982,1984) (and others)(27) proposed the following sequencing. 
1. Fiscal balance ; 
2. Trade account to liberalize ; 
3. Capital account to liberalize. 
To MC Kinnon (and others) defenders of floating exchange rate replied that nobody 
knows wether trade reform would resul in real depreciation or appreciation of the 
exchange rate. For this reason, they argued that the appropriate order would imply 
opening up the capital account with floating exchange rate before reforming micro- 
decisions via the reduction of import tariffs. 
67. Economists also based their conclusions as how to sequence on 
macroeconomic welfare considerations. In this later case, the criterion used to 
choose a given course of action is simple : “Sequencing A is preferred to 
sequencing B if social welfare under A exceeds that obtained under B”. Here it is 
worth mentioning that the criterion does not address the important question of 
wether the government can equally precommit itself to carrying out both sequences. 
According to the modem theory of economic policy if the government runs into 
precommitment limitations time consistency problems may occur with as a result 
modified welfare based-sequencing. On the basis of welfare grounds J. Frenkel 
(1982,1983) (and others) proposed : 
1. Goods markets to be liberalized before ; 
2. Capital ones. 
This he argued because assets markets clear almost instantenously while the 
attainment of equilibrium in the goods markets usually takes some time. In all that 
preceeds it is worth indicating that credible reform programme is assumed. From 
this viewpoint many economists have indicated that it is in the credibility sphere 
where the most important lesson on the sequencing of liberalization lies. In a 
sense the implementation of a consistent and credible policy package turns to be 
more important than attempting to determine the correct order of liberalization. 
Indeed credibility is the key issue for the survivability of a structural reform attempt 
as for its related evaluation. 
.27 See for instance, World Bank Conference on the dynamics of structural reform (1989, and various LMF studies. 
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68. Impressed by East Asian macro performances, economists, for 
instance, Bhattacharya and Linn (1988) proposed to refer to the East Asian 
sequencing in the framework of other developing countries. Then, the sequencing 
should be as such : 
1. Real sectors should be liberabzed before financial ones ; 
2. Domestic financial markets should be liberalized prior to opening the capital 
account ; 
3. Barriers to international trade should be removed before lifting capital controls. 
69. The question of the appropriate sequence of economic reforms has 
also been raised in terms of stabilization versus trade reform liberalization. Here 
economists indicated that the sequence will depend greatly on the extent of the 
initial macroeconomic disequilibrium particularly from the inflation viewpoint. In 
fact, the problems faced by policy makers will be vastly different in countries with 
low or medium inflation that in those that are experiencing high to very high rates 
of inflation. Edwards (1987-1989) (as others) proposed the following scenario : 
i) Mildly inflationary countries 
Trade reform policies can be implemented quite independently of the 
macroeconomic achievements. 
ii) High inflation countries 
The strategy should be to proceed more slowly. Initially, while the process of 
controlling the fiscal deficit is underway and inflation has not been fully subdued, it 
is recommended eliminating some of the controls and external distortions. In 
particular, at this stage, it is usually desirable to tackle those restrictions that had 
been imposed solely for “balance of payments” motives. More drastic trade reform 
measures (i.e. those dealing with restrictions originally imposed for resource 
allocation motives) should generally be postponed until macroeconomic equilibrium 
is achieved. 
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70. The main rationale behind the above recommendation has to do 
with the “competition of instruments ” problem already introduced. In a highly 
inflationary context some policy measures conducive to attaining 
macroeconomic stability will tend to hinder the liberalization goals. In fact, one 
of the most important sources of tension between stabilization and liberalization 
programs resides in the fact that a successful iberalization requires a real exchange 
rate depreciation, while disinflations have often resulted in an appreciation of the 
real exchange rate. A second source of “competition of instruments” refers to 
therole that trade taxes play-as a revenue source in the developing countries. 
In many cases the elimination of tariffs will result in a decline in tax revenue and, 
thus, in an increase in the fiscal deficit, putting positive pressure on inflation. In 
countries with a large public debt there is a third potential source of conflict. If 
liberalization is accompanied by a real devaluation which is the recommended 
policy from the external sector perspective the real cost of servicing the debt will 
increase, putting more pressure on the deficit and jeopardizing the inflationary 
goals. 
ii) Very high inflation countries 
As the prevailing level of inflation becomes higher and higher the possibility of 
major trade-offs between the goals of stabilization and trade reform increases. 
In addition to the real exchange rate trade-off discussed above, in the case of very 
rapid inflations (above 100 per cent per year), three other sources of conflict 
between the goals of the two policies, related to relative price variability, 
interest rate behavior and wage rate indexation, can play a very important 
role. As Fischer (1986, 1987) emphasized, an important consequence of rapid 
inflation is that relative prices become highly variable. This enhances the degree of 
uncertainty in the economy and has a negative impact on investment decisions. The 
process of sectoral allocation of capital can, indeed, be seriously disrupted with 
some investment going into the “wrong” sectors. All of this, of course, suggests 
that the liberalization objectives may be hindered if the reform is attempted 
before the macroeconomy has been stabilized. As a consequence of this a number 
of authors, most notably Stanley Fischer, argued that under conditions of very high 
inflation liberalization reforms should be postponed until the macroeconomic 
environment has regained its stability. 
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THE ETHIOPIANREFORikiS 
71. The EPTP is not explicitly accompanied by a document indicating 
the sequencing and the speed of Ethiopian economic reforms. Such a work is 
nevertheless being done by a team of economists grouped into the Economic unit of 
the President. Information obtained at AA. indicate that they would advocate 
macroeconomic stabilization as being the first step of reforms in coqjunction 
with the country rehabilitation. The main rationale behind this would be the need 
to sustain and re-enforce peace and to get a basic peace economy. Applied macro 
stabilization would first of all mean : 
(i) to account for cessed Eritrea ; 
(ii) to get the budget deficit under control ; 
(iii) to reduce inflation through austerity monetary policy ; 
(iv) to improve the food production. 
Here it is worth indicating that although the EPTP does not refer explicitly to cessed 
Eritrea its related macrostabilization process would account for this rupture. The 
second step would .be to promote private initiative when macroeconomic 
stabilization would have created a favourable policy environment. A rational 
speculation then leads to conclude that current and capital account liberalization 
would be the third step to submit the private sector to international competition (i.e. 
to stabilize really the economy from the inflation viewpoint) and to strengthen 
private accumulation. The measures already decided are consistent with the 
proposed order of sequencing. This one follows the international recommendations 
in the case of high or very high inflation countries. In this respect, the opening of 
the banking sector to private initiative should be done before the capital account 
liberalization in order to favour integrated market which is a key issue of 
stabilization and capital account liberalization. The budget evolution will be the key 
issue of this set of processes since there cannot be any macro stabilization with 
increased deficit. From this viewpoint if an ERRP is necessary to reconstruct the 
country’s basic infrastructure, a BRP (Budget reconstruction programme) to be 
financed by the international donors community would also be needed. 
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S) The degree of fine tuning of the Ethiopian economy 
72. It is not yet possible to appreciate this one since it can only be done 
through an interactive framework of active behaviours. For instance, through the 
reaction of private investment to the government policy followed by the 
government’s reaction to the reaction of the private sector, etc... 
B - IMPORTANCE OF’ THE OMIT-FED FACTORS (OR FIELDS OF 
ACTION) 
73. On the basis of Ethiopian past trends, the omitted factors which 
would also be fieIds of future action are : 
i) how to manage the expected cession of Eritrea 
and in this respect 
ii) how to reorganize the links between Ethiopia and the world markets ; 
iii) how to tackle with the household energy consumption ; the permanent state 
of poverty ; the urgent need to reduce the most immediate risks to famine ; 
v) how to tackle with the factors of production availability (quantity and quality) 
to privatize the Ethiopian economy ? 
vi) how to promote and improve markets functioning at the macro level ; 
and 
vii) how to establish an independent monetary authority and promote private 
commercial banks. 
Further, they are factors which have been mentioned but in such a way compared to 
the reality that they appear to nearly have been forgotten. This is the case of the 
informal sector for which the word illicit has been unproperly used (para. 16) in 
the Ethiopian context. In this framework, the issues of fiscal balance (para. 28 -C4) 
could be very detrimentaly hindered because informal activities challenge fiscal 
62 
receipts, the expected reform of the tax system and the expected peace dividends 
coming from the reallocation of resources. They also challenge growth expected to 
be grasped because they compete with the formal activities through favorable 
relative output prices i.e. a price determination in terms of very low production 
costs, only. From a theoretical viewpoint, the informal sector is a pure trade 
economy (a reduced one nevertheless) i.e. a market-based one without State and 
collective social concern. The issue of demobilized soldiers is not properly 
introduced. It is emphasized in the framework of the rehabilitation of some regions, 
only, although, it is a national ‘employment problem. The reinsertion of ex- 
soldiers could also be a constraint on fiscal balance except if the government 
succeeds in boosting labour intensive activities. 
Bl - Eritrea 
74. Cessed Eritrea -might challenge the EFTP in terms of supply of 
future factors of production, demand opportunities, efficiency of the managed 
regulation and increased pressures on the Bin- parity. 
Supply of future factors of production : 
(i) approximately 40 per cent of Ethiopian potential manufacturing output remains 
to be lost with as main result a definitive reduction of fiscal receipts ; 
(ii) all Ethiopian seaports remain to be lost which also means external duties and 
basic infrastructures, for instance, the crude oil refineries. Then one understands 
why Ethiopia has negotiated an agreement with Eritrea (para. 52). 
Demand opportunities 
Eritrea has to account for a shortage of agriculture output because of its high eroded 
lands. That will create opportunities for Ethiopia to trade with Eritrea in the 
framework of Ethiopian agriculture goods being substituted for Eritrean 
manufacturing ones. Further, Eritrea needs Ethiopian supply of agriculture raw 
materials (cotton, grains, skins . ..) to get manufacturing output. 
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Efficiency of the managed regulation 
Eritrean Economic Policy is not known (at least to me). Therefore, one can guess it 
might challenge the EPTP through a set of differentials related to selling prices, 
rates of taxation, retained earnings to exporters, incentives to foreign capital, market 
structure, etc... The preceding indicates that the issues of cessed Eritrea cannot be 
forgotten for they could be very detrimental to Ethiopia’s expected stabilization and 
future acceleration of growth. The potentiality of the Eritrean challenge can be 
illuminated a little bit through a focus on the recently appearing Eritrean Investment 
Code (January-February 1992). This document published in the Gazette of Eritrean 
Laws indicates the following macroeconomic policies (MP) to be implemented : 
1. MP favouring import-substitution activities and the use of local resources ;
2. MP favouring foreign capital on joint venture arrangement in the transport and 
telecommunication sectors. 
i) air transport : joint venture arrangement with the Eritrean State, only ; 
ii) telecommunication, sea and road transport : joint venture arrangement with 
the domestic private sector, only. This one should always get a minimum of 51 per 
cent of the enterprise shares. 
3. MP favouring mining : incentives would only be given to enterprises where the 
State participates. 
4. MP attracting foreign capital. It is welcome provided that 50 per cent of the 
expected output either comes from exports or import-substitution activities. In this 
later case, the rate could be reduced to a level which has to remain at least 
acceptable. 
5. MP favouring the purchasing of imported input. Exemption from taxes and 
customs duties would feature purchased input of investment goods and materials 
which cannot be supplied by Eritrea. Exemption from income taxes would feature 
investment at the sectoral level : 
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i) Agriculture : during two years for investment from US$ 0.1 m to 0.3 m, 
five years if it exceeds US $1 m ; 
ii) Other sectors : during two years for investment from US $0.25 m to 0.75 
m, five years if it exceeds US $2.5 m. 
In the light of these listed intentions, the main Eritrean challenge to Ethiopian 
regulation would come from attracted foreign capital and favoured domestic 
accumulation through taxes exemptions. But trade opportunity between Ethiopia 
and Eritrea appears also to be more likely. Indeed, the Eritrean investment policy is 
more manufacturing looking than the Ethiopian one. And to get manufacturing 
output, Eritrea has to import from Ethiopia agricultural raw materials. This 
economic interdependency should normally lead to further agreements with 
Ethiopia which is also the easiest market for Eritrean products. Obviously, this 
presumes a set of not defavourable customs and exchange rate policies from both 
areas. All this should normally lead to the creation of some Customs Union between 
Eritrea and Ethiopia at the mutual benefit of both areas. 
Increased pressures on the Birr parity 
Challenge to Ethiopian macro policy may also come from the Eritrean Birr parity. 
Indeed, in 1991, the Eritrean Authorities devaluated the Ethiopian Birr (compared to 
the US dollar always) at the opposite of the Ethiopian ones. This has led the 
Ethiopian private operators to expect the same and to proceed on the parallel 
market at a rate different from the official one during a waiting period not yet 
ended. This has continued although the Eritrean Authorities re-established the late 
parity after signing an economic agreement with the Ethiopian ones (para. 52). For 
the present, the result is that on Ethiopia’s parallel market the rate of exchange of the 
Bin is approximately the previously devaluated Eritrean one@). This leads to 
increased smuggling and contraband(29) and a process of pure profit speculation 
difficult to get rid of or at least to manage. Further, this expands dangerously the 
stock of money in circulation so that the risk of having more inflation than recently 
increases. 
28And this one is in fact inheritedfrom the end of the DERC-regime bara. IO). 
29 Political rensons also caplain increased smuggling @vu. 38-39). 
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B2 - Ethiopia and Djibouti 
75. Despite its agreement with Eritrea, Ethiopia has turned to Djibouti 
to secure some links with the international markets. For instance, it has 
negotiated new store facilities. In the case of unresolved difficulties with Eritrea 
with as result increased dependency on Djibouti new Ethiopian transport facilities 
(not emphasized in the EPTP) would have to be provided. Ethiopian Authorities are 
aware of what could be the Djibouti challenge. They have designed a committee at 
the ONCCP (Ministry of Planning) to tackle with the Djibouti issues. Djibouti could 
not only be a challenge to Ethiopia. It could’help the country ‘to recover. Let us 
illuminate the Djibouti issues on the basis of a document Tom the related ONCPP 
committee(30). 
76. Officially, the amount of trade between Ethiopia and Djibouti in 
recent years averages around forty million US Dollar. The unregistered trade 
turnover is estimated to be about five times as much. It is mainly explained by a 
well developed inter-border in spite of unproper Ethiopian socio-economic policy 
and unfavourable price policies on the Ethiopian side. A well known example is that 
of chat (or khat). Chat is a chewable plant and is one of the major Ethiopian exports 
to Djibouti (fifteen million US Dollar yearly). Practically all the legal “chat” has 
gone underground in 1991 because of unfavourable relative prices. The Djibouti 
area has been an outlet of most of Southern Ethiopia’s exports to the rest of the 
world for centuries as ,tbe traditional trade route was served by seaports in that 
region (Tadjura in today’s Djibouti, Zeila and Berbera in Northern Somalia). 
Reciprocally, the dominance of informally imported manufactured goods from East 
Asia in Ethiopian markets was proof of the extensive trade relations with Djibouti. 
It is also worth indicating that Djibouti apart from consuming Ethiopian produce re- 
exported most of these goods to the vast Middle East Market. 
77. In the light of the preceding, it appears that the Djibouti issues (the 
old and new expected ones) could be very important for Ethiopia’s growth : 
(i) they could permit Ethiopia in partnership with Djibouti to exploit its hitherto 
untapped trade potentials with the Arab world ; 
(ii) they could make Ethiopia’s imports cheaper for Djiboutians could facilitate and 
even process some ones for the mutual benefit of both peoples ; 
30 The two folbwing paragraphs are quoted from this document written by Tesjhye Asfaw (from the ONCCP). 
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(iii) they could create a conducive environment encouraging unregistered business 
to become legal ; 
(iv) they could help to revitalize Ethiopian self-administrative regions bordering 
Djibouti (the Afar and Somali regions) ; 
(v) they could help both countries in securing international assistance to modemize 
their fragile infrastructural facilities in general and the ancient railway line in 
particular. 
B3 - The household energy consumption 
78. Paradoxically, the EFTP raises the point of natural resources 
conservation and development but without giving attention to household energy 
consumption which is a major cause for deforestation in all rural areas (and for 
misfedings in urban centers : recurrent shortages of kerosene and gaz). Further an 
energy concern is completely missing from the EPTP but it will be touched 
through the new investment code. Indeed, the energy sector is an investment 
opportunity where foreign capital would be particularly welcome (5 para. 56). 
B4 - Poverty 
79. The fourth omitted issue is poverty. Very surprisingly (at least to 
me), poverty to alleviate is not adressed as an issue in the EPTP although it is the 
dominant feature of the Ethiopian society since many years (so long, too long). 
When neglecting politics, most likely, this is the result of a belief that growth 
sustained by a market-based economy will be the solution to poverty at long-run. 
Indeed, when there is not very much to share better is to try to increase what would 
be shared. In this respect, it is worth indicating that market functionling implies 
some economic operators endowned with purchasing power otherwise there would 
be no buyers and some other ones with a surplus of production otherwise there 
would be no sellers. When these conditions lack, there is no market or more 
precisely no monetary market economy. Then, the economy is a barter one where 
people only survive and the domestic currency is no more a way to trade. Here let 
us just recall that 60 per cent of the Ethiopian ,popuIation live in a subsistence 
economy where monetary market does not matter. Further, let us also indicate 
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that the surplus which comes from agriculture which dominates GDP, employment 
and exports receipts is very low. It reaches the amount of 18 gr per day and 
person. This has led the WB to indicate that agriculture supply should increase by 
33 per cent on average during ten years in conjunction with an import increase of 30 
per cent by year to secure food consumption in Ethiopia. With regard to gross 
purchasing power, the situation is as follows (in 1989) : in the agriculture sector 
where 80 per cent of the labour force works, the average income per person and 
year is approximately US $ 141, while the average values for people from the 
industry, the manufacturing and the services sectors (20 per cent of the labour force) 
are respectively US $ 4451184 ‘and 1135; Within the agriculture sector the revenue 
is US $35 for people from the subsistence sub-sector( 
80. From that preceeds it appears that to look at poverty when focusing 
on the transition to a more market-oriented economy is fundamental. It means to 
carefully investigate the question of poverty in agriculture and, in this respect, to 
raise the following point : why is the Ethiopian agriculture poor. The answer matters 
because it will influe on the efficiency of the expected agriculture policy and, so, on 
future growth impulses. Therefore a specific policy accounting for poverty would be 
welcome not only for growth but also in terms of the society identification process, 
a key issue for peace and democracy (para. 35 to 37). This policy could be much 
more helpful to secure peace (leading to democracy) than the expected 
decentralization process (which is on the agenda). Indeed, this process will cost 
money to Ethiopia before becoming fruitful (if ever). Further, it could also re-create 
bureaucracy at different levels. When poverty is high and generalized, it does not 
matter to modify its administrative shaping. Poverty as such not to look at is also a 
pure political question, that of a State accepting responsibility for misery. The 
poverty question should normally lead to a focus on demographic trends. Indeed, 
at given income growth (which could very well likely be the most favourable result 
during the period of macroeconomic stabilization), increased fertility rate and 
decreased infant mortality one (see annex 2), increased poverty is what has 
normally to be expected. At long run the (real) per capita consumption elasticity to 
per capita real income is 0.91(32). This accounted for with a real income growth of 
0% (at best) and a 3% increase of the population means that basic welfare would 
reduce by 2.79% per year. Is this still an acceptable figure even for a transitional 
economy. And further, one of the poorest in the world ? 
31 These &ta have been computed using value a&d at factor cost except for manufacturing for which it is 
earnings. The subsistence data comes from an OECDpublication 119 : -Books- p.461. 
32 Results from the estimation of some econometric relationships on Ethiopia. Work done in w-operation with an 
OECD econometrician (N. Trot&at). 
68 
B5 - Immediate food self-reliance improvement 
81. That is the first key issue of the short run priority areas for the 
transitional period, because it is the most tangible to people. It has nothing to do 
with peasants agriculture revitalization or boosting but with how to get an 
immediate increase of agriculture output supply. Indeed, there are 9 m people at 
risk of famine in Ethiopia (6.5 m in districts where drought has killed the crops, the 
rest mostly victims of the late civil war). To tackle with the related issue would have 
meant to deliver seeds and water-tanks if people were to plant for the next harvest 
and more over medical care. This has not been done up to now. 
B6 - Factors of production to privatize the Ethiopian economy 
The related issues are illuminated below (sections B9-BlO and C para. 94). 
B7 - The promotion of markets functioning at the macro level(33) 
82. The question has to be adressed in the framework of factors of 
production markets which are not touched through the EPTP. Indeed, labour and 
capital have to be “represented” at the macro level to permit social agreements on 
productivity and wage, mainly, to be reached between workers and employers. This 
presumes trade and employers unions being recognized rights related to markets 
functioning of the economy. This is not only a question of social stability but also of 
intersectoral costs linkage and competitiveness. The rights to be given to factors of 
production unions is required by the Chamber of Commerce. An answer will be 
given through the new Labour law. Workers and employers unions to favour is also 
a way to focus on factory and regulation identification processes (para. 35). This 
may help to close the credibility gap between economic partners. 
33 For more on the analysis of market functioning in Ethiopia, the reader has to refer to the related document 
iwued by the working group. 
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BS - The establishment of an independent monetary authority and the 
promotion of commercial banks 
83. The importance of firm monetary control in stabilization efforts is 
well documented. Strong monetary control in a market-oriented economy requires a 
central banking system able to stabilize the economy indirectly by adjusting 
interest rates or other policy instruments: Establishing such an institution is 
especially critical in late command economies where controls over production and 
resource allocation and the- absence of commercial banking activities may have 
obscured the importance of a strong monetary authority i.e. first of all an 
independent from the State’s one. The cruciality of such an issue has been 
illuminated in the case of Asian success stories like Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore 
and Taiwan Province of China&#]. Two common characteristic stood out : the 
absence of pressure for monetary expansion to finance large and continuous fiscal 
deficits and the fact that none of the four countries allowed its currency to 
appreciate in real terms solely as a result of inflationary monetary expansion. In the 
light of the EPTP, it is not clear at all how the Ethiopian Authorities emphasize such 
an issue. Indeed, it has been indicated that the major financial institutions would 
stay under state ownership in order to ensure that they would play their proper role 
in the process of economic development (while making profit). So given, the quality 
of the monetary control would first of all reflect the government’s priorities. In this 
respect, the EPTP indicates that the monetary policy should be such as to ward off 
inflationary trends and fiscal policy should achieve fiscal balance. Then, the 
question is : is it not easier to fulfil1 the preceding targets with the help of an 
independent monetary authority as it is the case in most market economies. This is 
obviously a debatable question. And, finally, let us also mention that monetary 
control is particularlJi crucial at the beginning of the transition process, just 
before to remove various restrictions. Indeed, monetary control to be established 
permits any “monetary overhang” to eliminate. That prevents the possibility of large 
increases in consumer spending (and imports) from the liquidation of outstanding 
monetary balances. Only then can monetary policy maintain a reasonable degree of 
stability in both the price level and the macroeconomic environment. If restrictions 
on trade and (maybe currency convertibility) are removed before the monetary 
34 Investigation was due to Maxwell J. Fry : “Financial Structure, Monetary Policy and Economic Growth in 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South Kbrea, 1940-1983” in &port-Oriented Development Strategies, ed 
by Ettorio Corbo and others (London Wesrview Press, 1985). Sargent (1982) in his study of ending hyperinjlation, 
also stressed the critical role of strong j&al dkipline in re-establishing macroeconomic stability. Thomas J. 
Sargent : “The Ends of Four Big Inflation” in Inflation : Causes and Effects ea! by Rober E. Hall (Chicago : 
Universiry of Chicago Press, 1982). 
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overhang is eliminated the opportunity to use domestic money balances to purchase 
imported goods will drain foreign exchange reserves and put strong pressure on 
exchange and interest rates. From these viewpoints monetary control should have 
been applied once the DERG announced its reforms. This would have permitted to 
reduce recent private consumption price increase and the pressures on the Birr 
Parity- 
84. The need to promote a commercial banking system is not 
emphasized. This also is a crucial issue. Indeed, market price mechanisms do not 
’ function’ appropriately when producers are not subject to “the discipline of the 
bottom line” i.e. could no more expect the State would routinely cover their losses 
or disguise these ones. Therefore, the hardening of budget contraint with as a result 
the promotion of a commercial banking system is a particularly important step that 
should accompany the rest of the reforms. In this respect, the EFTT is weak because 
it is just said that domestic private capital will be encouraged to participate in 
banking (and insurance activities). It is worth recalling (see para. 47,57 and 63) that 
the promotion of private commercial banks in a way to : 
(i) favour markets integration (the real and financial ones ; the formal and informal 
ones) ; 
(ii) get capital inflows ; 
(iii) create investment opportunities ;
(iv) reconcile the State and the private sector (para. 62-63). 
It has to be added that it is also a way to eliminate the monetary overhang 
either from the formal or informal sector or both. A very serious risk in 
Ethiopia for the present. Further, it could also be a way to soften labour 
redundacy and expected real wage decrease in Ethiopia. Indeed, when firms are 
either unable to borrow from either the central bank or the private sector or very 
much credit constrained, their liquidity is entirely given by the stock of money they 
hold. This stock cannot be changed unless the firms sell inventories. In this 
situation, a liquidity crunch and an input loss can develop, for instance, if there is a 
one-step rise in the price of input respective of what happens with output prices. 
Then, firms will try to offset the liquidity crunch by drastically lowering real wages 
until a level of liquidity consistent with full-capacity utilisation being restored. 
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Such a scenario has already occured in the late Eastern countries, particularly in 
Poland. In such a situation there is increased labour shedding in conjunction with 
real wage decrease. In Ethiopia, this could lead to increased labour shedding and a 
decrease of the real wage from the formal sectors till the level reached on the 
informal market or even below. So, this would reinforce the position of the informal 
sectors compared to the formal ones from the profitability viewpoint (no taxes to be 
paid to the State, no social concern). 
B9 - The informal sector 
85. This issue is a very important one. Indeed, Ethiopia is embarked 
upon a transition to be fully informal-marketed(%). Through the announced 
reforms (the DERG-regime’s ones and the EPT’P) this is a result of the 
government’s drastically reduced legitimacy and operationality. As the degree 
of society identification reduces (being challenged by that of private groups 
identification) so does that of acceptation to pay for the State’s mandatory 
functions. This informalization process is also a reflection of people seeking for 
solutions to increased poverty. But, whatever it is the fact remains that a 
market-based economy has already begun functioning in Ethiopia. The 
importance of the unregistered trade may be as follows : the daily turn-over of 
mercato (which is the big market at Addis Ababa and likely also the biggest one in 
Africa) could be of Birr sm(36) compared to a yearly GDP figure of Birr 10 billion. 
86. An informal economy is a set of interrelated channels through which 
trade but also employment, prices, saving, fiscal receipts, foreign currency and 
exchange rate, etc... escape de facto from established government’s market 
regulation. Further, applied policy is challenged. At the moment, this is obvious in 
terms of the parallel exchange rate which increases the pressure to devaluate the 
Ethiopian Birr, but not only. Indeed, there is also challenge to the expected 
privatization of the economy for informal entrepreneurs are “the animal spirits” 
35 The rder has to be aware that the definition of the informal sector is a matter of opinion In thb respect the 
Director General of the IL0 wrote : “After two decades of investigation by scholars and internatkmal civil 
servants, there is still no generally accepted &@uXon of the term informal sector (The Dilemma of the Informal 
Sector, Report of the Director General, p. 1). So, given the IL.0 groups in the informal sector all activities where 
employment is below ien workers’! 
36 Information obtained when being on mission at A-A. The reader has to remain aware that it was rwt possible to 
check that figure by using rigorous procedures. 
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of the country for the present. Moreover, they also represent some potential 
domestic accumulation in a country featured by shortage of saving on investment 
and foreign aid on domestic financial resources. “Endowned” with a very 
meaningful informal sector Ethiopia could be a test-case for developing countries 
embarked upon analogous transition. Then, the question to be adressed would be 
how to combine informal private initiative and macro planning when there has 
been strong challenged process of society identification and so government 
regulation and policy. The solution is not simply to modify relative prices, generally 
through price liberalization leading to price increase. But maybe, more 
fundamentally, to improve .political order and inforrnation.so as to get.increased 
transparency (of any sort) and legitimacy and to promote specific policy looking to 
the informal sector in coqjunction with the privatization of the all economy. 
The first one may permit people to understand better who is responsible for the past, 
where they are going, what are the costs of the transition at their level and how to 
voluntarily participate or protest. As such a process of reconciliation may operate. 
Further, the government will gain credibility in front of the population. The second 
will favour competition within the all set of activities. 
87. The preceding requirements are fundamental for an efficient 
market-based economy to function. Indeed, when one speaks about demand and 
supply one refers to traders, the people which buy and sell. At the exception of 
wealth, there is no other difference between private operators. Therefore, the price 
determination does not result from traders but from trade. Prices move to balance 
supply and demand. They are the signals that direct resources to their most efficient 
uses. When prices are freed, scarce goods become more expensive, but that is the 
incentive for more production. In the case of an informal economy, supply is 
managed by a limited number of people or better families at the opposite of demand. 
Therefore the market structure is that of monopoly. Further, it is also that of a 
coalition of monopolies. Then, in the eventuality of price liberalization leading to 
price increase in the,forrnal sector, expected additional supply will be meaningfully 
captured by monopolists because their purchasing power is higher than that of the 
private operators from the formal sector. This creates a process of price 
determination in terms of monopoly, only. So, supply increases as the informal 
activities or monopolies because these ones remain always more profitable than the 
formal ones (no taxation, no social concern). In this framework, the price 
reform leads to strengthen informal activities and a monopoly price 
determination. Further, price increase as long as the demand gap does not 
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vanish through monetary devaluation (of the internal value of the currency). In 
this respect, the expected upswing of privately-managed formal activities will be 
strongly constrained for the monopoly purchasing power, trade relations, act as 
barriers to entry on the supply market(37). To reduce the preceding risks, the 
government has to issue specific policies favouring competition at long run and to 
gain increased credibility. 
88. Economists and policy makers know what are policies favouring 
competition at long run in the framework of formal activities. In the case of 
dominant informal activities and related monopolies the things are much more 
obscure. Here, the attempt is not to prejudice monopolies (of the informal sector) as 
such. Indeed, they create job opportunities, meet various needs of the population 
very well, bring advance in production, etc... at a time where the transition 
challenges the government’s policy in terms of growth, income, needs, etc... So, the 
government cannot prejudice the informal sector without prejudicing the 
economic targets of its policy. Then, it has to use the informal sector and its 
related monopolies to fulfill the targets of its macro policy. Therefore, it should 
favour the informal activities through specific policy including those 
reinforcing competition amongst the monopoly activities. This taken into 
account with policy favouring private domestic accumulation in the formal sectors 
would promote competition everywhere in the economy at minimized social 
costs. Further, this would permit the government to tax the informal activities. Such 
a policy has been pursued in P.R. China particularly in the 198Os(38). The policy has 
been to encourage and support the informal sector on the one side and on the other 
to persude the related entrepreneurs to observe regulations and abide by the law. 
Two measures have been relevant in this respect. The first one has been to issue 
licence for business on the basis of which to benefit from the 
government’support ; the second, to reform the business tax so as to get 
informal businessmen paying a certain amount in conjunction with 
encouraging them to do more business. That policy which has not led to register 
unregistered trade has been a success up to now. The total levyed taxes from the 
related sector has gone from Yuan 6 billion in 1986 to 14.5 in 1990. Such measures 
would be very helpful to Ethiopia because they would be based on what can be 
thought of as a factor of production of the country, the informal sector, which 
cannot be prejudiced without prejudicing the all transition. 
37 The preceding scenario occured in many developing wuntries embarked upon market reforms. It also featured 
the late Eastern wuntries. 
38 I discussed the later point attending a short meeting at the UhESCO (Mon&y, Feb.IO, 1991). 
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BlO - The demobilized soldiers 
89. It is an issue which has not to be introduced in the framework of 
regional rehabilitation, but in that of the country employment challenge. 
Something like 1 m soldiers (militias included) have to be demobilized(39). This 
precisely means 300,000 to 500,000 jobs to offer (at least)(40). Up to now the 
Ethiopian Authorities have raised the question in terms of further foreign aid 
requirement needed to send the soldiers back home. They ask for US $ 154 m to 
cover the living expenditure for one year as far as the urban population is 
concerned, 15 months in the case of rural people. To demobilize soldiers i.e. being 
given job or money to wait for (or create) a job, to go back to farming reveal not 
only an employment opportunity problem but also that of skills. Indeed, the army 
(militias not included) was the best trained power the country had. So, the army is 
quasi the lonely resource of skills immediately available for restructured state farms 
and factories and expected increased privatization of the economy (when neglecting 
the informal entrepreneurs). The US government has an agreement with the 
Ethiopian one under which : 
(i) a reduced army would be reconstructed ;
(ii) the rest would have to be accomodated properly. 
In this respect, it is worth indicating that no much progress have been made up to 
now. Contrarily to the Eritrean Authorities, the Ethiopian ones seem not aware that 
the restoration of the country’s basic infrastructure and power generation station 
could offer opportunities to accomodate properly with demobilized soldiers. As an 
outcome, the army is in the way to be accomodating by political groups (para. 37) 
with few gains for peace and growth and likely increased informal or really illicit 
activities. Apart from the army there was another source of skills, that of the late 
“communist party”. It represented the country capabilities to organize, manage, 
etc... From this viewpoint, the decision to made the party illegal, contrarily to open 
expressed US views, might be an economic nonsense. Xf one accounts for no much 
39 Not accounted for the Eritrean soldiers : This information has been given to me when being on mission to AA. If 
one accounts for the soldiers’ families between 1 to 2 m people have ti be helped to go back home. 
40 Militias non included but can we-really think to get the related people demobiliztd without offering them a job ? 
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progress made to accomodate demobilized soldiers properly and trend to 
increased informal activities one can say that for the present Ethiopia cannot 
really expect increased privatization of the formal economy. Therefore, the risk 
of getting a market-based economy only through the informal activities is 
high. This again pleads for specific policies encouraging and strengthening the 
informal sector otherwise growth stabilization (which is expected till the free 
elections) would not occur. What would occur in this case, nobody knows. 
‘90. In the light of the preceding, it appears that the EP’I’P is not very 
economically relevant. For instance, it neglects when spelling out the short run 
priority areas three challenges which are particularly tangible to people. There 
are food self-reliance to modify so as to reduce risks to famine for the present 
time, demobilized soldiers to be properly accomodated and poverty to focus. 
With regard to macro stabilization, it neglects the lonely factor of production 
the country has at short term to create growth and employment : the informal 
sector. Further, it does not explicitly emphasize the need to modify the banking 
system so as to ease (at least) macroeconomic stabilization. Being first of all a 
document reflecting a broad political consensus, one can understand why Eritrean 
issues have been omitted. Indeed, Eritreans who have the power now (in Eritrea) are 
allied to the coalition which is ruling Ethiopia. So, the EP’IT is a document 
securing peace between all Ethiopian forces i.e. the Eritrean ones included. 
C - A NEED FOR EPTP CLARIFICATION 
91. In the preceding framework, it is worth indicating that the EPTP 
needs some clarification in many cases. Beyond the fact that it is first of all a macro 
framework of listed intentions on the basis of which to decide for neutral political 
commitments, the insufficient degree of clarification could be due to a certain 
one of ignorance related to market dynamics(q. Let us just indicate a few 
relevant examples. What does that mean a fair system of taxation in agriculture ; - 
to help peasants to obtain fair prices for their produce ; -to prevent consumers and 
producers from grain price fluctuations ; -to advocate the development of large- 
scale commercial farms in conjunction with putting restrictions on land 
4Z For the moment, there are only two economists working withbr the Economic Unit of the President. Funds for 
more have been asked to the WB. The economists staf working at the Council of Representatives level is also 
reduced 
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allocation to investors ; -to give adequate guarantees and incentives to the foreign 
investors ; -to secure external resources ; -to favour voluntary resettlements and 
villagization, voluntary formation of co-operatives and associations ; -to 
undertake gradual adjustment of the Birr parity to the US dollar. Indeed, all these 
assertions get naturally their definitions in a command economy but this is no more 
the case with a market one. For instance, in such an economy prices result 
normally from demand and supply adjustment. So, scarced goods (or services) get 
higher prices. Since Ethiopia is a shortage economy, prices paid to the producers 
should normally increase for many goods and services in the case of the expected 
reform so as to close the gap. This would be true ex6ept when some investment 
surplus would have to remain extracted from a given sector, the agriculture one in 
Ethiopia (para. SO)). Prices fluctuate normally, then what is the level of abnormal 
fluctuation on the basis of which the State should intervene. Taxation may be a 
burden but not purely in terms of the related rates, also given market dynamics. 
Large-scale commercial farms are first of all market investment opportunities and 
not government’s decision. Incentives to foreign investors have to be such as 
equalizing domestic and international return to capital of assets bearing the same 
risks. So, they are very exogenous to a government’s decision. Rights to move or 
to co-operate are privately-managed ones. But there are a lot of pervasive ways to 
influe on these rights (specially when people are poor or in extreme destitution) so 
as to get voluntary and collective decisions. The Birr issue is illuminated further. 
92. The need for further clarification could also be due to some 
recognized (even if it is not written) unability to do something in the short-run 
(1991-93). For instance, what does that- mean to boost local agriculture 
supporting services given the disruption of local service co-operatives in most 
areas. Further, what is the real meaning of fiscal balance when decentralization 
of economic management is on the agenda with as expected results economic 
prerogatives to the new local governments particularly in the fields of tax collection, 
transfer of responsability for public expenditure or when it is indicated that sizeable 
budget deficits will continue. Short-run constraints might also be relevant in the 
case of the remaining state land ownership given the time needed to get a 
cadastral survey ; or in that how to mix profitability and social concern when 
restructuring state farms or enterprises, or that how to detail monetary policy 
(credit ceilings, interest rates, . ..) given there is not even a budget for the current 
fiscal year. 
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93. The need for clarification could also be a reflection of political 
compromise between marxists and market reformists (para. 2) given a belief that 
market adjustment could not be perfect (if ever it can) i.e. could lead to conflicts 
with the given announced targets. This might explain why : price liberalization 
could be somewhat constrained (agriculture, retail trade, road transport) ; -the 
government strongly has indicated its intention to regulate domestic trade 
when simultaneously inviting the private sector to take over this trade 
particularly the retail one(#Z), the same being true for the road transport sector ; - 
the state foreign trade marketing agencies would remain although competing with 
private exporters and retain their regulating functions (BTIMEX) ; -the 
government has advocated to decide on exporters’ retention earnings on a case-by- 
case agreement ; -the government has emphasized market rules for all traders 
(management autonomy for instance) except in the case of financial institutions. 
With regard to these ones it has the intention to guide them so as to permit these 
ones to play their role in the country’s development while making profit, and to 
reduce the private sector’s competition in that sector. 
94. Amongst all the issues which need some clarification, two are very 
relevant to the international community including the Ethiopian diaspora leaving in 
the US (Washington DC, mainly)(@). There are adequate guarantees and 
incentives given to foreign investors and the gradual adjustment of the Birr 
parity. This later issue is illuminated at section D2 which follows. So let us focus 
only and very briefly on the “foreign investors” issue. The EPTP emphasizes the 
need to support and encourage increased privatization of the economy. But as such, 
it is presumed (for the related issue is not touched through the EPTP) there would 
be enough adequate factors of privatization within the Ethiopian economy(&). 
More precisely, it means there are candidates to become private operators, a certain 
level of saving they can invest and available auditing services to price the state 
farms and enterprises to be sold (but not only). The reality might be much more 
obscure than that. Indeed, one has to account for the increased weight of the 
informal activities where the “animal spirits” of Ethiopia vanish for the present time 
and, moreover, for a very low level of registered private saving (or monetary 
42 The litmus test of the government’s intentions in this area will be the dismantling or otherwise of EDDC 
(Yhiopian Domestic Distribution Centre) and its r&ail branches, and the willingness to let private sector compete 
with other marketing agencies : AMC (Agriculture Marketing Corporation), AISCO (Agriculture Input Supply 
Corporation), OPEC (Oilseeds and Pulses Export Corporation), ECMC (Ethiopian Coffee Marketing 
Corporution)). 
43 It is influent on the World Bank for the latter requires advices and comments when preparing drafti on Ethiopia 
(comment given to me by some RB’s staff member when being on mission to AA). 
44 The EPTP nevertheless emphaskes the need to get a study related to a broad scope of manpower issues 
(jara.30). 
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overhang) (saving ratio of 0.12 per cent in 1990/91 ; in absolute terms, saving 
declined from Birr 703 million in 1989/90 to a negative Bin 14.8 million in 
1990/91). Therefore, when neglecting the informal sector, the question of privatixed 
economy could very much be how to attract urgently private foreign capital so as to 
create income and employment (and fiscal receipts) at first glance and opportunities 
for domestic accumulation (privatization) at second. Then, apart from state firms, 
industries and farms which cannot be run profitably and then should be either closed 
down or privatizcd(45) and banking which remains close to private initiative what 
could be the main fields of investment to foreign capital. Nobody knows if there 
are any at given international costs and return ‘to capital. In this respect, the 
EPTP could lack from relevancy because it may lead to conclude (through the 
priority given to the domestic investors in many activities ; the unclear 
treatment given to foreign capital) that foreign investors are not particularly 
needed or welcome. This although economic rationality would lead to urgently 
open the economy to foreign capital. Unless the investment code permits 
practically to clarify the government’s real position to foreign capital this might 
affect the process of macroeconomic stabilization through increased pressure to 
devaluate the Birr. The main rationale behind that would be economic operators 
being sure the government has no other choice but to accept this measure to get 
rapatried funds, external resources and foreign direct investment favouring 
privatixed Ethiopian economy. This would reduce the government’s operationality 
and as such the efficiency and sustainability of the EPTP. To conclude, the EPTP 
lacks from relevancy. It is a political document to sustain peace. As a 
guidelines document to apply macro policy it needs (i) to spell out relevant 
priorities (ii), to include a set of omitted subjects and (iii) to be clarified on a lot 
of relevant issues. Rather unfortunality amongst the omitted subjects are the 
main challenges to the Ethiopian society for the present and the future i.e. 
famine, employment and poverty. 
D - THE EPTP COMPARED TO A WB’S ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME 
0%’ B’S A.P.) THAT COULD HAVE BEEN ISSUED UNDER THE SAME 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
95. The comparison is made in general and specific terms. In the later 
case this means in those of foreign trade tariffs, the banking and the Birr parity 
adjustment issue. As such the appreciation of the room for action of the Ethiopian 
Authorities in front of the international donors community (including the Ethiopian 
diaspora) is better balanced. 
45 More likely by foreign capital given the lack of interest for large-scale plants of the a!omestic private sector. 
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Dl - A global comparison 
96. The EPTP could easily be a WB’s A.P. issued under the same 
circumstances. Indeed and quite analogously, it put the emphasis on the same 
determinants of growth and pleads for the same stance of macro policy to 
restore macroeconomic stability : 
Determinants of growth . . 
(i) dominant privately-operated activities ; 
(ii) a reduce role of the State in the investment process decision making ; 
(iii) market rules for all traders. 
As an outcome of points (i) to (iii) people have to be recognized rights to act as free 
traders and state firms, industries and farms have to be restructured ; privatization 
has to be expanded. 
Macro policy 
(i) a monetary policy to regulate ramping inflation ; 
(but the content of this policy has not yet been determined) 
(ii) a balance fiscal policy with the creation of new tax and budgetary systems ; 
(but budget deficit is said to remain sizeable despite the government’s intentions) 
(iii) a major price liberalization ; 
(but some regulated commodities would remain, the fertilizers, for instance) 
(iv) a wage policy that has to stay under control as long as labour productivity has 
not been strengthened ;
(but labour shedding would be possible) 
(v) a foreign trade policy where quantitative restrictions are removed ; 
(but they are replaced with tariffs) 
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So, the EPTP indicates that the Ethiopian government could accept the logic of a 
W.B’s A.P. even if it would be the case with some resemes or differences (as how 
the WB would apply macro policy in the Ethiopian case) and although the 
sequencing and the speed of Ethiopian economic reforms have not yet been 
officially. indicated. Also from the viewpoint of some omitted factors there is 
convergency. For instance, the WB’s AP does not generally focus on poverty (and 
people’s destitution) as such(46). This is also true for famine. Major differences are 
likely due to the departing framework of war and the political features of people 
grouped around the common Charter(47): And maybe also to other facts (degree of 
ignorance, unability to do something in the short-run, recognized imperfect market 
adjustment process, para. 91 to 93). Differences are as follows : 
(i) the EPTP is a political document to secure and strengthen peace ; 
(ii) through it the government intends to favour domestic private capital compared 
to the foreign one (not deliberately it seems but on the basis of comparative 
advantages) ;
(iii) it intends to mix economic and social concern at the beginning 9f the 
transition(46,I ; 
(iv) it intends to favour voluntary people participation in conjunction with 
privately-operated activities ; 
(v) the EPTP does not indicate the need to establish a central banking system able to 
stabilize the economy independently from the state’s support or pressures ;
(vi) it does not support the view of establishing commercial banking activities while 
private operators are supposed to be ruled by the bottom line discipline ; 
(vii) it does not remove all foreign trade restrictions (tariffs are substituted for the 
quantitative ones). Further international payments remain constrained(48) ; 
46 Il%e World Bank recognizes that there is SQ& ‘costs in case of structural adjustment. But it says that is the 
price an economy has to pay as long as it is not a market-oriented one and firther an international competitive 
O&C. 
47 Several analysts at AA. indicated that they could be more political reformists than economic ones. 
48 From this viewpoint the abolition of :he franco valuta system could very well be a step backward It would also 
affectjixal receipts (pora. 53). 
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(viii) it does not put forward the links between monetary policy, interest and 
exchange rates ; 
(ix) it adresses the question of the modification of the Birr parity on a gradual 
perspective and carefully i.e. without neglecting other alternatives. 
97. The preceding given, one has to indicate that, through a set of 
maintained prerogatives though always easy to legitimize on basis of some 
economic rationality, the State remains able to oversee or prejudice private 
initiative. As such, the EPTP does not send the same message to the private sector 
as would be the case with a WB’AP. This could have something to do with some 
political compromise at the government’s level as with some natural suspiciousness 
between both economic partners. Suspiciousness means that the credibility gap is 
much more difficult to close in case of the EPTP than in that of a WB’AP which 
would be exactly the same. This is even more true when they are some differences 
although quite legitimate ones. The prerogatives are : 
(i) a dominant state ownership of basic goods sectors and of financing ; 
(ii) the overseeing of the private investment through ministerial approval ; 
(iii) a banking sector i.e. a credit poliby which remains closed to the private 
initiative ; 
(iv) a state allocation of export (and tourims) earnings ; 
(v) an expected specific regulation to be issued for the domestic trade ; 
(vi) an open price policy somewhat constrained ; 
(vii) a state decided scheme of the voting rights at the enterprise boards level. 
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D2 - A comparison through the foreign trade tariffs, the banking and the Birr 
parity questions 
98. Now, let us comment a little bit on the three issues which could be 
very costful to Ethiopia given economic operators’ (domestic and foreigners) 
rational (may be) expectations and behaviours and World Bank’s views on these 
questions. These issues are : 
(i) the substitution of tariffs for quantitative restrictions in foreign trade ; 
(ii) the privatixation of banking ; 
and 
(iii) the Birr adjustment parity. 
1. Foreign trade tariffs 
99. Through the EPTP the Ethiopian government intends to 
promote import substitution activities in conjunction with exports ones. This in 
the framework of imports tariffs being substituted for quantitative restrictions. 
Depending on what could be the accompanying policy related to exports such 
an announced policy could very well be inconsistent from the exporters 
viewpoints. Indeed, the induced relative price changes (of the importables relative 
to exportables and non-tradeables) on the import side may mean that the protection 
of importables is achieved by the (implicit) taxing of other domestic activities 
besides import. Examination of the ways in which the burdens of taxes (and 
subsidies) are shifted on to other groups of producers and consumers is a critical 
element in the evaluation of trade policy. Such an examination indicates the true 
protection of importables and the extent of the shifting of the burden of protection 
on to exportables and non-tradeables. The share or incidence of this burden 
depends essentially on the degree of substituability (in demand and production) 
between the products of the importable sector and the other unprotected sectors. 
Economists developed a method of the true protection rate. It consists to estimate 
the shifting parameter through regression analysis where the explained variable is 
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. . 
the price for non-tradeable goods on the export ones and the major(49) explaining 
one the import price relative to the export one. The parameter has to range between 
zero and one. When it tends towards unity, this indicates that the increase in non- 
tradeables goods will tend towards that of the importables. A value going to zero 
indicates that the prices of non-tradeable goods follow the export ones. In the first 
case non-tradeables and importables are close substitutes, whereas in the second 
there is substitution between exportables and non-tradeables. The parameter reveals 
the extent of the shifting of the incidence of protection on to exportables. The higher 
is the parameter the greater the shifting effect. 
100. The preceding method has been applied to Ethiopia. The 
shifting parameter amounts 0.82. Although being biased for one used the 
domestic consumption deflator(5q for the non-tradeable price, it indicates that 
intervention to protect imports operate as an export tax. This result is fully 
consistent with other ones on the same subject.‘Indeed, in Africa, on average 77 per 
cent of all intervention operates as an export tax(51). The knowledge of the shifting 
parameter permits to compute the true protection rate of impor&( For instance, 
in 1987 (last available data) the nominal import protection rate (computed 
roughly as the ratio of import duties to import values) was 19 per cent while the 
true one reached the value of only 3 per cent. At the opposite, the rate of export 
taxation (computed roughly as the ratio of export duties to export values) increased 
from 19 to 30 per cent. In the light of the preceding, one understands why the WB 
advocates the need to reduce import tariffs. Indeed, through induced relative 
import price shifts, import tariffs bias the allocations of resources against exports. 
Further, they favour the activities of import substitution which is generally the focus 
of the informal sector. So, import tariffs prejudice exports and favour informal 
activities. But they favour the budget at least at short run. From the later 
viewpoint, an investigation of what could be the budget elasticity to growth and to 
the tariffs would be welcome. 
49 Other variables such as the GDP and the Balance of Payments (both in real terms) are inkniuced in the 
equation to account for disequilibrium. Me& the true protection rate has been developed under the critical 
theoretical assumption of equilibrium. 
50 13re only available to us being in Park 
51 For more &tailed analysis and computattin, see for imtance 
D. Greenawzy and Ch. Milner : ‘Sue Protection : concepts and their role in evaluating trade policies in L.DW, 
i7ae Journal of Lhlpt Se, vol. 23, nber 2 
I. Dem, A. Sogoa!ogo, M-P. Verlaeten : “LA protection dans les tkhanges commerciaux : argumenfs, formes, 
mcwres et applications aux pays de I’Afriqu subsaharienne”, DIAL, Oct. 91. 
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2. Banking 
101. TO create a private banking system (refer also to para. 47, 57, 62, 
63 and 84) presumes to be able to appreciate what is the domestic capital market 
flexibility. Indeed, this permits to appreciate what could be the departing market 
nominal interest rate to be determined and, so the real one, once one can forecast 
the inflation rate. A real positive interest rate is indeed the preliminary condition to 
get a market banking system. A team from the IMF recently worked on the subject. 
It published a macroeconometric model for developing countries allowing the * 
hypothetis of capital mobility to be explicitly tested. One estimated some parts of 
the model in the framework of Ethiopia. To appreciate what could be the Ethiopian 
capital market mobility one needs to estimate a demand for real balances equation 
and an interest rate one. Once this has been done, one solves the (real) money 
demand equation for the nominal interest rate when a shadow money supply has 
been substituted for the demand one. The shadow amount is obtained by removing 
from the supply of money the effects of current private capital flows on the central 
bank’s stock of foreign exchange reserves. The obtained interest rate is then 
introduced in the interest rate equation as an explaining variable with the 
international interest rate and the expected change in the value of the domestic 
currency. So, one gets an estimated parameter of the domestic capital market 
flexibility. It ranges between zero and unity. When it is equal to 1, it implies that the 
domestic interest rate is determined by the uncovered interest parity condition (i.e. 
the roles of the international interest rate and the expectations, only), and thus 
corresponds to perfect capital mobility, at the opposite when it has the value of zero. 
In this later case the interest rate is determined by a completely closed capital 
account. As the parameter increases from zero to unity, the degree of capital 
mobility increases, since the interest rate approaches its uncovered parity value. 
102. The preceding method has been applied to Ethiopian data from 
1960 to 1990. The method gives a value of the domestic capital market flexibility of 
0.85 being strongly influenced by the period 1974-90 for which the test was also 
made. The results indicates an equivalent degree of capital flexibility for Ethiopia at 
long run compared to African standards. Indeed, for instance, one gets values 
ranging between 0.7 to 0.8 in the case of African countries belonging to the Franc 
Zone(s2). In the light of results obtained by the IMFs team (1.04) the African values 
may appear low. But this is likely due to the belonging to the Franc Zone and the 
52 Work done by N. Troubat being a DLU’s trainee iis 1991. 
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policy applied by the DERG-regime in the case of Ethiopia (negative real interest 
rate on trend).. In the case of a liberalization of the banking system in Ethiopia, the 
preceding result on Ethiopian capital market flexibility would lead to an increase in 
the nominal interest rates. Indeed, Ethiopia through the link between Birr and US $ 
belongs implicitly to a dollar zone. So, this would lead the monetary authorities to 
follow some US leading rate. Then, the knowledge of a set of elasticities linking 
real balances to real income, inflation, interest rate and the money transaction costs 
would permit to compute the growth rate of real money supply to keep the 
Ethiopian leading interest rate constant as long as the US reference one is kept 
unchanged. But, depending on Chat would be the expected inflation rate such an 
interest one could not be enough to get a real positive interest rate. In this 
framework, the solution would be to stick the Ethiopian leading interest rate to the 
yearly expected inflation one. In this case the real interest rate would be zero at best. 
Then, money supply would be computed departing from expected inflation, only. 
103. In Ethiopia, the IS curve is flat and the LM one steep. This is 
because investment is very sensitive to the interest rate (elasticity of about -1.5) and 
real balances to real income (elasticity of about 2.0)(53j. Then, in the eventuality of 
an austerity monetary policy, nominal interest rate would increase at given real 
income because a decrease of real money supply shifts the LM curve out to the left. 
The LM curve would thus cut the IS one at a lower real income level. Given the 
high elasticity of IS to the interest rate, the real income decrease would be very 
high. This indicates that the only way to soften this depressing effect would be to 
get increased employment opportunities through capital inflows. Or put it in 
another way to get capital inflows in response to the nominal interest rate 
increase. The preceding should lead the government o carefully investigate : 
i) the available saving of the informal sector ; 
ii) how to reach an agreement with this sector (which dominates the Chamber of 
Commerce) to create private banks. 
A steep LM curve also implies some comparative effectiveness of monetary policy 
over fiscal policy even if a change to the later one is strongly advocated by the 
private sector (para. 62). 
53 Estimation ma& at DIAL’s in co-operation with an OECD econometrician (N. Troubat). 
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3. Birr adjustment parity 
104. The debate on some currency parity is a very complex one for it 
combines reasonings related to the seek of an appropriate exchange rate and that 
how to get currency convertibility. The first one is a condition of the second one 
while this latter is a challenge to macroeconomics. 
i - An appropriate exchange rate 
105. The question of how much a currency is overvalued (undervalued) 
as it is said for the Birr (the Birr exchange rate to the US dollar is fixed since 
February 1973 : 1 $ = 2.07 Birr) is a very difficult one. Indeed, first of all it 
presumes the analyst is able to identify the real and speculative factors 
influencing the external value of the currency ; second, it raises the question to 
know which theory of exchange rate determination is the proper one to apply. 
And third, it leads to conclude that the selected theory would easily permit to 
measure the gap of over-valuation (undervaluation) with a high level of 
confidence. All the preceding questions (or requirements) are difficult ones i.e. 
remain to be debatable because of the reality and/or in the light of mainstream 
economics. Let us illuminate the issues a little bit. 
106. When there is an informal sector in a developing economy there is 
always and, by definition, a certain amount of pertinent speculation on the 
local currency. Likely because the informal sector can be thought of as the one 
where economic adjustments are more easy to make (no regulation, high level of 
labour market flexibility, etc...) than on the formal market. In this sense, it plays a 
role rather analogous to the financial sector in a developed economy compared to 
the real one. It sends signals of needed adjustments to the economic operators of the 
related country wherever they perform. Therefore, the quicker adjustments of this 
market may lead to exchange rate overshooting (or undershooting) as it is the case 
with the financial sector of some developed country. But at the difference of this 
country the links of integration between both markets (or sectors) are weaker and, as 
a result, the informal sector does not really send signals which are undoubtfully 
relevant for the economic operators performing in the formal sector. Very 
obviously, because the informal activities are related to domestic consumption 
while the formal ones i.e. the export sector, mainly, fullfil needs of foreign 
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consumption. So, the related goods... equilibrium are not the same. And 
furthermore, even if signals could be relevant there is a major constraint which is 
how the monetary authorities regulate money and exchange rate policies. In a 
developed .economy, they account for both markets (the financial and real ones) 
signals (differently obviously according to the countries’ regulation, stance of macro 
policy, etc...) and are generally independent from the political authorities. In a 
developing one, they account for formal market signals only. Further, very often the 
external value of the currency is given being determined through specific exogenous 
process (the Franc zone, for instance) or on the basis of high political decision (the 
currency as the country real flag) or to attempt to curb structural inflation .given low 
productivity level and/or saving rate, to modify demand-supply imbalance. To 
conclude, on the first point, in a developing country there is always an amount of 
pertinent speculation on the currency (varying through time, obviously) because 
the markets of the economy are not integrated and it exists permanent 
disequilibria. So, one way to tackle with the related speculation is to modify 
drastically the economy so as to integrate its markets, and reduce the various 
disequilibria. Therefore, when the analyst questions on the need to modify the 
exchange rate of some developing country (coping with informal market and 
speculation) it raises the point to know wether such a modified rate is the 
proper tool for adequate structural changes and what are the accompanying 
conditions to get the expected results. In this respect, mainstream economics 
teaches us that the analyst seeks for a supply (or profit) multiplier greater than one 
to get growth acceleration and which would be revealed through a process of supply 
diversification(%] at given world markets (prices and structure). Indeed, what is 
needed at given world price is a modification of the real exchange rate leading to 
increased ploughing back of profits of the export sector (compared to the domestic 
one) and as such of financially sustained investment. This one would determine the 
capacity of production in nature and volume. This should normally lead to 
integrated markets on the basis of the expected general improvement of the 
economy efficiency and return to capital. Unfortunately, experiments made by 
developing countries since the 1970s indicate that the degree of succes to modify 
supply on the basis of devaluated exchange rate has not been very high at the 
opposite of the demand and labour depressing effects. Maybe was it due to 
unadequate accompanying conditions. Who knows ? At the opposite, industrial 
. strategies pursued by the MCs reveal that induced supply structural changes 
have been a quite powerful determinant of exchange rate parity. 
54 For more, see M-P. Verlaeten : “Apprdciation des conditions th&riques pr&uppos&s pour espber rh.s~ir 
me dkvaluution”, DIAL, janumy 1991,156~. 
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107. Nobody knows what is the proper exchange rate determination 
model for a given economy. Facts indicate that the most sensible view on that 
question it to ansver that this determination is a mix of factors emphasized by 
various theories but as such (a mix) not always (even rarely) shaped very 
consistently. Briefly, one can say that there are two big families to explain how 
exchange rate is determined(5S). One puts forward the relationships between a 
country’s macro performances (growth, inflation, interest rate, monetary policy) and 
its real balance of payments. Through their implicit effects on that balance, it 
explains how nominal exchange rate varies. Therefore, the goal of the exchange 
rate policy is how to ‘modify the-external value of the currency so as to account’ for 
internal and external disequilibria. Exchange rate equilibrium value is that for 
which there is no more gap. Or, on the basis of IMFs status, no more balance of 
payments gap. The other one emphasizes that real and financial sectors of an 
economy are linked to the related international ones after free-trade has been 
assumed. Then, it concludes that there is unicity of prices for goods (and/or 
services). with the same features and returns of financial assets bearing the same 
risks. Therefore, the exchange rate gets an equilibrium value which is that of a pure 
conversion factor only. In this respect, endowned with purchasing power an 
economic operator can perform on any market in the world he wishes. Because it is 
also assumed that the markets of a given economy are integrated there is only one 
exchange rate determination or equilibrium value (purchasing power parity = 
purchasing interest rate parity). Overvaluation (or undervaluation) occurs when 
nominal exchange rate changes do not account for inflation rate differentials 
between a country and its partners. In this case, an appreciation or a depreciation of 
the real exchange rate occurs. The theory also explains that unicity could be either a 
short run equilibrium or a long run one. For instance, the monetary school asserts 
that such an equilibrium could prevail at short run when monetary policy is properly 
used to tackle with inflation differentials. Assuming full employment and fully 
integrated markets so that the real demand for money is given (no expected 
influence from either real income or the nominal interest rate), it determines the 
inflation differentials on the basis of money supply ones, only. Money supply is 
endogenously determined by the monetary authority of the countries. When these 
authorities conduct their policy so as to reduce the monetary differentials to zero so 
is the inflation one. In this case, price unicity prevails amongst free traders and real 
exchange rate level remains unchanged. This can be put in another way. Starting 
with an all-out equilibrium, the exchange rate of country A’s currency should 
55 We deliberately focus on the two families which have influenced the most macro policy recommended by the 
international donors community to LDCS. That means we neglect the absorption and structural approaches. 
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change to maintain equilibrium in the same direction and same proportion as 
the change in A’s prices (money) over the change in World prices (money). 
108. Since the 197Os, the monetarist determination of exchange rate has 
prevailed. First of all because developed economies structurally had to account for 
increased inflation rate with decreased productivity one (structural inflation 
process), second, because ramping inflation gained from oil shocks (1974, 79 and 
80) and, third, because monetary school dominated international financial 
institutions so that mainstream economics became monetarism. Developing 
countries have been differently influenced by monetarism than developed one. 
Although one can argue that in both cases demand depressing effect have prevailed 
at least when fiscal policy tended to be a balance one in coqjunction with austerity 
monetary policy. Monetarism prejudiced developing countries because :
(i) the full employment assumption is not relevant for these countries ; 
(ii) the full integration assumption is a nonsense for these countries ; 
(iii) domestic and foreign prices have not very much in common given the level of 
development of the related countries compared to western standards. 
Points (i) and (ii) lead to conclude that disequilibrium prevailing in developing 
economies have to be accepted for monetary policy has not to account for structural 
real imbalance. Therefore as in the case of developed countries, it tackles with 
issues related to inflation, only. Exchange rate is a monetary phenomenon. It has not 
any structural real effects. Point (iii) is a crucial one. It emphasizes the need to look 
at the global input-output system of developing countries rather than at a strong 
idealized export one when questioning on what is the proper exchange rate 
determination. To illuminate this, it is necessary to put forward the following 
assertion. The price levels which are compared to determine the exchange rate level 
at the equilibrium and out of this one must price some common items otherwise 
that would be a nonsense to compare these price levels under purchasing power 
parity and the monetary approach(56). In this framework, the analyst uses generally 
aggregate price index such as the GDP deflator and similar index for the world to 
get a measure of the exchange rate level or of its changes at a certain moment of 
time. Doing so, it implicitly assumes that : 
56 There would be none pertinenq of unicity otherwix 
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(i) all goods are traded(56) 
or 
(ii) competition levels factor costs everywhere in the economy at diffused technique 
of production 
or 
(iii) non traded goods use traded ones as main input. 
Under these assumptions price unicity can prevail even when some goods are not 
traded. So, fundamentally, the analyst uses a model where there is one single good, 
the tradable or competitive one. Within this model countries can produce or trade a 
same basket of goods at the same unit price. This basket will permit producers to 
maximize their profit without distorted price as consumers to do the same with their 
utility. Therefore countries get quite analogous input-output system as tastes in the 
case of consumers. This reflects the fundamental condition to sustain currency 
convertibility (markets being integrated) at long run or equilibrium value of the 
exchange rate. For countries performing under such circumstances, the real 
exchange rate does not affect the sectoral resource allocation as long as the 
changes of the nominal exchange rate account for relative price differentials or 
money supply ones (departing from an equilibrium position). This means as long as 
the real exchange level remains unchanged. In this framework, the exchange rate 
change is a monetary (inflation) phenomenon leaving unchanged the rest of the 
economy (sectoral resource allocation). 
109. The preceding “scenario” is not valid in the case of developing 
countries. Indeed, their domestic sectors can only produce and trade a limited 
number of goods, so the rest has to be imported ; export and import goods cannot be 
aggregated into a single traded good because they differ too much in nature, price 
determination and dynamics. And further, the related countries’ price determination 
are not homogenous between their export, import and domestic sectors. Therefore, 
the analyst has at least to account for two goods when stylising the developing 
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country~economy and discussing what is the related equilibrium exchange rate 
value. The two goods or sectors are the tradable and non-tradable ones. Then, the 
equilibrium condition as to be read as follows (Michaely 1978). Starting whith an 
all-out equilibrium, a change in the exchange rate which would retain the 
original level of the relative price of tradable vs non-tradable goods in the 
economy would establish an equilibrium rate of exchange. In the light of the 
preceding condition, monetarism is valid when disturbances occuring in the 
economy either originate in the monetary sector or are neutral between the traded 
and non-traded sectors and when no change in the terms of trade takes place when 
foreign prices ‘change. That is the reason why the monetary approach exEjlains the 
equilibrating mechanism of the real balances without any resort to production 
effects in the economy. 
110. The preceding leads to conclude that mainstream monetarism could 
not very much help to define what is the exchange rate equilibrium level (or 
condition of convertibility at long run) in countries coping with structural changes 
or external shocks leading to terms of trade modifications. But it explains why 
modified parity is unstable when the influence of the informal sector is great or 
increases. Indeed, this one helps to reveal (all things being given) what could be the 
value of the exchange rate in a three goods model i.e. given tradable and non- 
tradable ones with their related price and factor costs determination. Or put it in 
another way when accounting for the country real input-output system. So, the 
informal sector of a developing country creates pressures on the legal exchange rate, 
to devaluate generally, in the absence of any price speculation motive. Indeed, it 
illuminates not only the need to distinguish between traded and non-traded 
goods when focusing on price induced structural changes but also to do that 
between traded goods. Export and import price changes differ, and so is again 
modified the sectoral resource allocation of the country. Indeed, in a developing 
country external shocks such as changes in foreign capital inflows or movements in 
world prices, internal shocks such as modified foreign trade tariffs, etc... modify the 
resource allocation departing from changes between domestic and import price and 
domestic and export ones. This occurs accounting for some related elasticity of 
substitution between the three goods in both the production and consumption 
,activities. Such an analysis which has been recently re-investigated (S. Devarajan, 
1991) generally leads to other value for the equilibrium exchange rate than the 
preceding ones (the monetarist and the purchasing power parity ones). This is due to 
the fact that the analyst attempts to focus on the general equilibrium of a given 
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country instead of a partial or ideal&d one. It is only under very specific 
circumstances that convergency occurs. This recent analysis demonstrates again that 
monetarism is not the proper theory to apply in the case of country coping with 
structural changes as why the domestic sector generates pressures (generally to 
devaluate) on the legal currency of a developing country. This is because the 
country does not account for the global interdependence between production and 
exchange rate or the complete set of relations between the sectors both in 
production and consumption. 
111. It is difficult to measure the exchange rate gap. Indeed, the 
equilibrium value accounting either for internal and external targets (balance of 
payments approach) or all that occurs at the sectoral allocation level is difficult to 
formalize. Improvements to the subject have recently been proposed by S. 
Devarajan (1991) in the framework of a General equilibrium model. The approach 
used is that of extended purchasing power parity. The author shows that the measure 
used at the international level was not adequate in case of terms of trade shocks and 
when it is not assumed that the balance of trade was in equilibrium. But 
improvement does not mean revealed certitude of what could be the equilibrium 
value of the exchange rate of some developing country. Practically, in almost all 
these countries doubt on what is the equilibrium value put the economic operators 
on a waiting position attempting to grasp information on it. They never fully accept 
the official parity. So, there .is always a pertinent speculation. To conclude, the 
Ethiopian Authorities are right to carefully investigate the question of the Birr 
adjustment. Unfortunately, they will have a price to pay for that. Indeed, for the 
Ethiopian community leaving in the US the condition to get rapatried funds is a Birr 
devaluation. The expected amount could be as big as 2.0 times the Ethiopian GDP 
(i.e. US $ 10 billion), on which period has not been said. Birr devaluation is also 
strongly supported by the World Bank which seems to assess there is no other 
possibility to boost the dominant sector of the economy but to create a positive 
real exchange rate effect. It would increase the prices of the agriculture export 
sector in domestic currency compared to the rest of the sectors. But this presumes :
(i) producers benefitting really from the relative price change i.e. the latter not being 
kept by the State ; 
(ii) inflation not being such that it would reduce the producer’s real income increase; 
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(iii) producers able to consume more or invest more (no market rationing) ; 
(iv) producers not being risk-adverse ; 
and 
(v) world market not being constrained or depressed for the main export commodity 
of the country (coffee). 
In this respect, and’ although the Ethiopian price supply elasticity appears ‘somewhat 
high (0.6) compared to the world market ones (from 0.12 to 0.72) one has to 
account for the evolution of the coffee world market. This market is rather 
depressed apart for high quality arabica coffees, mainly produced by Colombia. At 
the London meeting (April, 6 to 10, 1992) the International Coffee Organization has 
led producers to understand that further quota reductions would have to be decided 
otherwise price would continue to go down. Even in the eventuality of further price 
decreases demand (at given world income) would not expand very much for it has a 
low elasticity to price (-0.13 at long run for Ethiopian coffees). Further, the income 
elasticity (at given world price) is also low (0.22 for Ethiopian coffees). Hides and 
skins benefitt from better perspectives. The world market expands. Their price 
supply elasticity could be as high as 1.66 at long run (0.83 at short one). The WB 
also thinks that import being more expansive would be better allocated. This 
would lead enterprises to more efficient production and investment decisions. This 
can be true although the Ethiopian import elasticity to the real exchange rate is 
rather low : -0.27. Apart from growth and resources allocation to improve the WI3 
could also be seeking for a longer-term objective that how to get currency 
convertibility for current account transactions in the Ethiopian case (CCAT) 
while the government could have thought to a very very reduced form of internal 
convertibiliy (IC) and partial convertibility for capital account transactions. Let 
us throw some light on these definitions. 
ii - Convertibility 
112. There exists mainly three definitions of convertibility@‘/ : 
57 I quoted the following from an I.M.F. ‘s occasional paper to write the next paragraphs : “Currency 
Convertibility and the Tranrformtion of Centrally Pkned I.konomiesm, by Joshua B Greene and Peter Isard, 
june 1591, p. l-9. 
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(i) Convertibility for current account transactions (C.C.U.) along with measures 
to liberalize trade and payments, generally, is advocated as a source of competitive 
discipline and appropriate price signals that can play a vital role in guiding domestic 
enterprises toward efficient production and investment decisions. Economists have 
traditionally identified certain preconditions that must prevail if C.C.U. is to be 
implemented successfully. These preconditions have changed somewhat as the 
concept of convertibility and prevailing views on macroeconomics have evolved, 
and the basic requirements are now : 
1) an appropriate exchange rate i.e. which is conformed with balance of 
payment equilibrium (see para. 107). It varies through time as the transformation 
process of the economy deepens ;
2) an adequate level of international liquidity so as to maintain a stable 
macroeconomic environment in the face of adverse short-term disturbances to the 
volumes or prices of exports or imports, to render credible the country’s overall 
adjustment effort and discourage speculative action against its currency ; 
3) a sound macroeconomic policy including the elimination of any 
monetary overhang (so as to avoid unsustainable speculative pressures) ; the 
establishing of a central banking system able to stabilize the economy 
indirectly by adjusting interest rates or other policy instruments is crucial for 
that issue ; 
4) an environment in which economic agents have both the incentives and 
the ability to respond to market prices, from which all major distortions should 
have been eliminated(58). The same preconditions apply to the elimination of trade 
restrictions generally(59). 
58 The reform of enterprise incentives is thus a critical step along the road to establishing CC. LT.. So is the 
introduction of laws or other measures to clarify property rights, to legimitize the kinds of activities with which 
economic agents can respond to market pricer and LO designate which individuals hove decision-making 
responsabilities within state owned enterprises. Further to encourage and promote privatisation. 
59 Restrictions on trade and currency convertibility have to be applied after the monetary overhong is eliminated 
otherwise it will drain foreign txchonge reserves and put strong pressure on exchange and interest rates. 
Monetary overhang can be eliminoted through currency reform, price liberalization and the sale of state owned 
assets. And also by setting interest rates at positive real IeveLs although the latter may raise government 
expenditure if most interest bearing instruments are claims against the government. 
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(ii) Convertibility for capital account transactions (C.C.A.) or, at least, for 
certain types of capital flows is seen as helping to attract foreign investments 
inflows and associated managerial resources and transfers of technology, which 
can significantly affect the transformation process. It also permits residents to 
cushion the real value of their savings against various shocks to the domestic 
economy. Discussions of C.CX. centers on three issues : 
1) Wetber capital account convertibility should be delayed until late 
in the transformation process or introduced simultaneously with C.CA. In this 
’ respect, effective controls on capital outflows may be essential for the reform 
program to succeed. Without such controls risk-averse residents could have strong 
incentives to send capital abroad, even in the presence of sound macroeconomic 
policies and the resulting capital outflows could undermine the reform program. In 
this framework, it is worth remembering that private investment requires an 
appropriate and credible economic environment... and does not respond well when 
investors, foreign and domestic, doubt that the government will sustain its reforms. 
Thus the legal system and the nature of the investment code matter much. Further, 
there is the possibility of greater macroeconomic instability raising from the 
volatility of short-term capital movements. They can intensify any macroeconomic 
difficulties (pressure on the exchange rate) that develop during the implementation 
of a reform program. At the same time, the threat of volatile capital flows can be a 
source of policy discipline, heightening the Authorities concern to keep their 
macroeconomic policies sound. It is obvious to recall that given some trade-off 
betwen C.C.U. and C.C.A. authorities should recognize that C.C.U. without 
C.CA. is essentially equivalent to a dual exchange rate system(61) ;
2) Wether restrictions on C.C.A. are likely to be effective once 
current account restrictions have been removed is unclear. Indeed, they can be 
circumvented through leads and lags in the timing or distortions in the invoicing of 
current account payments. Therefore, the related effectiveness is likely to depend on 
the strength of the incentives for circumvention. Experience has shown that controls 
are generally ineffective when a country’s macroeconomic policies and prospects 
are poor. Further the effectiveness reduces when information and transactions 
technologies increase the integration of international capital markets ; 
60 Especially when various ti concessiorrs and subsidies are used as inducement for private capital injlows. 
61 This could explain why the Ethiopian Authorities abolished the fiance valuta system. 
96 
3) If C.CA. is delayed, what types of capital account restrictions 
should be still removed in the short run. The answer is those which could 
encourage long-tern capital inflows. These changes could be part of a general 
investment code reform. 
(iii) Internal convertibility (I.C.) means that residents are free to maintain 
domestic holdings of certain assets denominated in foreign currencies and thus to 
convert domestic currency internally into foreign currency assets. Such freedom is 
not tantamount to $zrmission to make payments abroad or to hold assets located in 
foreign countries. Nor does it necessarily permit residents to hold any financial 
assets, other than foreign currencies that represent claims against nonresidents. 
Internal convertibility is a way to make foreign currencies available to banks or 
other intermediaries, thereby easing a country’s foreign exchange constraint. And 
also a way to integrate black markets into the formal economy thereby 
lowering transaction costs and encouraging greater uniformity in exchange 
rates. It is obvious to indicate that internal convertibility renders difficult for a 
country to prevent currency conversions associated with payments for international 
transactions. Moreover, it renders difficult the maintain of effective restrictions on 
capital outflows. The preconditions to introduce I.C. are the same as the first three 
preconditions for CCU namely : 
1) an approprate exchange rate ; 
2) an adequate international liquidity ; 
and 
3) a sound macroeconomic policy, including the elimination of any monetary 
overhang. 
In the absence of sound macroeconomic policy and attractive prospects, I.C. can 
level to large-scale substitution out of domestic currency into foreign currency (at 
given interest rates), which in turn can deplete official foreign exchange holdings. 
To summarize, it can very much complicate monetary policy making. 
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113. Should convertibility be established quickly ? That depends upon 
how fast a country can establish the related preconditions. This, in turn may depend 
not only on the speed with which resources can be reallocated across sectors to 
reflect the new environment but also on wether there is ample popular support for 
rapid and comprehensive reform. The later condition may hinge on the extent of the 
country’s initial macroeconomic instability and distortions. In deciding wether to 
introduce convertibility countries should also consider how rapidly they can 
implement supporting institutional changes and other structuA reforms. 
114. In the light of the preceding definitions, it appears that Ethiopia 
neither fulfills conditions of current account convertibility nor that of internal one. 
Further, it would be very relevant to delay capital account convertibility till the 
macroeconomic transformation gets a certain level of operationality and therefore 
credibility. In this respect, questions which remain debatable are : 
1) what is the appropriate exchange rate for Ethiopia at the beginning of the 
transition period ? 
2) how to get an adequate level of international liquidity ? 
3) is the expected macro policy sound enough given private operators’ 
(domestic and foreign ones) rational (if any) expectations ? 
Then one also understands why the Ethiopian policy makers have to look at the 
informal sector. Indeed, it has an exchange rate which is accepted by the economic 
operators (included the Ethiopian diaspora leaving in the US) ; it seems to be more 
liquid that the formal one for it is in the process of integrating both its real and 
financial sub-sectors ; it is a pure free-trade economy where market adjustments 
are at least effective if not perfect. All this indicates why the parallel exchange rate 
would more and more compete with the official one. It is a way to integer Ethiopia 
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to the world markets whatever they are and so to the market economy. Therefore, 
one can strongly advocate for the EFTP being modified so as to support the 
informal activities with the highest priority. One can also strongly recommend 
the EC emphasizes the importance of the informal sector and therefore 
allocates funds for applied researchs on that sector in Ethiopia. One 
understands also why a private banking system matters. It will : 
- help to reduce the monetary overhang and as such to strengthen macro policy ; 
- soften the international liquidity constraint via rapatried funds from the informal 
sector, the Ethiopian diaspora ;
- decrease the pressure to modify the Bin via capital inflows ; 
- help to integrate Ethiopian markets and to modify the interest rates levels (and 
structure) ; 
- ease the measures leading to convertibility (C.C.A. + C.C.U. + I.C.). 
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V-CONCLUSIONS 
A) SUMMARY 
1 - The economic conditions at the end of the civil war 
115. At the end of the civil war, the Ethiopian economy may be 
featured as follows. It has become a supply-shortage economy under the DERG- 
regime. The agriculture sector cannot supply enough food and goods, the industry 
one camrot supply enough goods and the services cannot supply enough services. 
For instance, at the level of agriculture which accounts for 40 per cent of GDP at 
factor cost(62) in 1990 and 80 per cent of employment and exports receipts, the 
average food surplus is 18 gr per day and person under normal circumstances. This 
leads to an amount of 1760 gr which is 4 per cent below the FA0 emergency ration. 
Even if shortage increased at the end of the 80s because of the civil war, it is not 
only the result of that war. More fundamentally it is due to a sample of facts. A 
combination of civil war, anti-democratic choices, policy distortions, environmental 
degradation, an unfavourable demographic dynamics, adverse external factors 
(drought, natural calamities, external shocks) and a host of structural problems 
(backward technology and methods of cultivation, weak linkages between sectors, 
. ..) has been responsible for. the disappointing performance of the economy from 
1974 to 1990. 
116. Although the military government attempted to introduce policy 
reforms in its last days, specially relevant for peasants agriculture (the dismantling 
of producers’ co-operatives, the recognition of tenure rights, the abolition of the 
Grain Marketing Board, mainly) these came too late to make any appreciable global 
macroeconomic and social differences. Per capita real income declined by about 0.8 
% per cent per year (compared to +1.5% from 1960 to 1974) revealing declining 
living standard of a population already wallowing in extreme poverty. More then 60 
per cent of the population was living below the absolue poverty level (US $90 per 
year). Constant dollar GNP per capita was lower than in 1965. Further, the 
population had been denied human and democratic rights. Ethiopia became also a 
two gap country. Saving decreased compared to investment as export to import 
62 In reality this is more that 40 per cent of GDP at factor costs. Indeed, agriculture output is ratderpriced 
compared to the rest of the economy. The dfference (in 70) between paid price and market ones is the nominal 
protection rate It averages 40per cent on trend in the 1980s. 
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ratio. The import cover of the country by the end of the 1980s was less than ten 
days. On account of a steadily declining saving rate, an unhealthy state of the 
balance of payments and generally rising tendency of (military) investment, the 
budget deficit increased as the country’s debt position deteriorated deeply. Pressures 
to devaluate the Birr, the local currency increased giving rise to a parallel exchange 
rate and some capital outflows. 
117. Despite measures or programmes to combat environmental 
degradation potential land yields reduced by 1 to 2 per cent per year in the 
Highlands which account for 90% of the population and economic activities, 95% 
of land cultivated and two thirds of livestock. The Highlands of Ethiopia have been 
characterized as one of the largest areas of ecological degradation in Africa, if not in 
the world. If present trends continue, by the year 2010 10 million people would 
have to derive their food and income from sources other than cropping their own 
lands. So, they would have to be absorbed elsewhere in the economy. 
118. The DERG-regime’s reforms gave rise to a process of increased 
informal market activities due to the reduced government’s legitimacy and 
operationality. This was also a population’s solution to increased poverty. This with 
the parallel exchange rate created a dual economy in Ethiopia, one where market 
functioned and another where rents of various sorts operated. To conclude at the 
end of the civil war Ethiopia was about to collapse. 
2 - The political context of the EPTP 
119. The government which has overthrown the DERG-regime has 
recognized that Ethiopia was in dire conditions by issuing documents on its 
intentions related to Ethiopia’s Economic Policy during the Transitional Period. 
This one is defined to be the period (after the DERG-regime) characterized by the 
coalition of various forces (represented in the Council of Representatives) around a 
common Charter which is the pillar of the transitional economic policy. It will cover 
the years 1991 to 1993 and end by announced free elections. The Charter has a 
major aim which is the strengthening of peace. Therefore, the EPTP final document 
has as main objective to stabilize the economy but departing from neutral political 
commitments. Moreover the document indicates that although being also designed 
to provide satisfactory solutions to urgent problems (the country rehabilitation, for 
instance, or the soldiers to demobilize and accomodate properly), the EPI’P has to 
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serve a longer period than the transitional one with minor changes. With regard to 
economic rationality, the coalition resembles mainly marxist reformists and market 
ones. Further, at different top levels either the government or the State ones, there is 
a lack of market culture. To conclude, the EPTP is first of all a compromise 
policy document. It carries with it major constraints these of relevancy versus 
political neutrality, market advocacy versus market understanding. 
3-TheEPTP 
120. The final EPTP document pleads for market functioning in 
Ethiopia as the efficient solution to the country’s challenges. As a consequence, 
it indicates that : 
(i) the role of the state in the investment decision process should be reduced at the 
opposite of that of the private sector and that of the state issuing market regulation 
and monitoring the economy as it is the case with market-based ones ; 
(ii) people should be recognized rights to act as free traders. This in addition to 
democratic rights ; 
(iii) enterprises whatever their owner is should be submitted to market rules i.e. the 
profitability, management autonomy and fair competition ones. 
121. Practically, and, as it has been the case for many developing 
countries, and rationalized through mainstream economics, the state ownership sole 
or on joint venture arrangements with domestic and/or foreign capital should 
concentrate in sectors or activities which are crucial for the economy in terms of 
growth potential, employment opportunity, price stabilization, or are featured by a 
lack of interest from the private sector, reveal market failure or externality, or may 
be a source of revenue to the State. So given, the State keeps the opportunity to 
intervene in any sector of the economy. Likely this is a result of some 
compromise between the two groups of reformists already mentioned. For the 
present time, the EPTP would lead to measures of implementation shaping the 
economy as a combination of public-based basic goods, services and financing 
and private sector-based food production, trade and distribution. Although the 
private sector would be encouraged to participate in banking state ownership would 
remain in that key sector. The trade and transport (road) sectors where private 
initiative is strongly invited to take over would nevertheless “benefit” from a 
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specific treatment, i.e. a regulation for the former, a new regulatory Authority for 
the latter. In any sector of the economy, private investment remains to be approved 
at ministerial level. Also, to mention that in the case of all sectors where private 
initiative would prevail the State would favour the formation of co-operatives or 
associations on a voluntary basis, though. So, the State remains able to prejudice 
private initiative through various ways (regulation, financing and people 
participation schemes). 
122. The document also pleads for enterprises restructuration given 
the need to render these ones profitable. But, in this framework, there could be 
two big exceptions which are banking and the industrial sector. Again, this could be 
a result of political compromise. Banking would remain state ownership to ensure 
banks would play their proper role in development while making profit. This 
assertion could lead to conflicts of objectives. At the industry (plant) board level, 
workers would be given 30 per cent of the voting rights. This also could lead to 
conflicts of objectives. For instance, when labour shedding would have to be 
decided for profitability motive. The government has clarified its position in the 
second case. Indeed, it has issued a new Labour law on the basis of which labour 
redundancy is now permitted and liberty to negotiate recognized to trade and 
employers unions. 
123. Although, the document pleads for market rights, it does not 
advocate the change of the property rights in case of land (rural and urban) and 
1975 nationalized houses. The first is a controversial issue between the North and 
the South of the country. It is delayed till the free elections. In the case of the 
second, compensation will be paid to those who deserve on the basis of appropriate 
studies. So, the late owners are not privileged compared to the actual tenants. No 
mention is made of what would occured to other 1975 nationalized assets. 
124. Through the state ownership in banking, the promotion of 
collective participation schemes, the regulation announced for the private 
trade and transport activities, the overseeing of ministeries on private 
investment, the number of motives put forward to advocate state intervention 
in production, private initiative although being praised remains very directly 
state regulated. Further, the profitability and the management autonomies appear to 
be somewhat constrained. All this reflects also likely political compromise. But it 
could also be due to some intentions to guide Ethiopian macro policy along the lines 
of some Yougoslavian model. One can hope, the system would not fail like this 
reference one. 
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125. With regard to macro policy, the document advocates policies 
recommended by the World Bank. For instance, a monetary policy to ward off 
inflation, a fiscal one to achieve the control of the budget deficit, an open price 
policy. Regarding sectoral potentials, the government indicates mainly intentions of 
boosting peasants agriculture by helping producers to receive fair prices for their 
produce and an easiest access to the needed input. It also advocates an agricultural 
open market policy. Privatization will be encouraged. How will depend on the 
new expected investment code. 
4 - A scrutinity of the EPTP ’ 
126. Although being politically pertinent for peace to be secured is the 
highest priority(63), and economically pertinent for market functioning is much 
more efficient than non-market one to tackle with the stabilization of a 
decentralized economy, the EPTP lacks from relevancy given Ethiopian present 
situation. Indeed, it advocates the functioning of a market system while 
neglecting basic challenges to the Ethiopian society and the market 
fundamental requirement i.e. the availability in quantity and quality of 
production factors. It does not either advocate an independent monetary authority 
to ease macro stabilization or the promotion of a private banking system to create a 
credit market policy, a feature of market-based economy. 
127. The basic challenges to the Ethiopian society are the risks to 
famine to reduce, poverty (and people’s destitution) to alleviate, employment 
opportunities to create and the process of informalization to account for. With 
regard to two first challenges a market-based economy may help but not at short 
run for it is by itself a longer term challenge to Ethiopia. Further, it presumes a 
focus on profitability when conducting investment decision in a framework where 
firms are and will remain heavily liquidity constrained. So, at short run this will 
mean labour shedding and some decrease of the real wage maybe below that of the 
informal sector. The disequilibrium in the income distribution will increase rather 
quickly. Moreover, the State has not the money for the EPTP it advocates. Taxes are 
no more collected, smuggling of all sorts of commodities increases as informal 
activities. Debt to the international donors community including the late USSR has 
to be paid... Peasants are no more receiving seeds (and medical care). So, food self- 
reliance and poverty need to be tackled with as such and not through the 
expected functioning of some economic process. Poverty and famine are needed 
63 Present increased d@culties in the Oronw region reinforce this assertion. 
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focus in Ethiopia for there could, not be any peace and expected democracy where 
60 per cent of the population earns only US $35 a year and 20 per cent (at least) are 
permanently at risk of dying from starvation. And moreover when demographic 
pressures remain permanent contrarily to growth impulses. The international 
community has to be (or to remain) aware that peace in Ethiopia does not only get a 
meaning within the Ethiopian context but also beyond it. It also gets relevancy 
within the Horn of Africa. If Ethiopia does not succeed to secure peace, the all Horn 
of Africa will explode given the present situation in Sudan and Somalia. To secure 
peace means first of all to feed the population and satisfy its most urgent needs. 
An institutionalized market functioning can in no way be a short term solution when 
people are poor (and extremely destituted) and need food to survive. There could 
not be other priority but how to reduce these constraints immediately. 
128. The informal sector as to be thought of as a factor of 
production the country can immediately use to reduce supply shortage and 
create employment opportunities. There are between 300,000 to 500,000 soldiers 
to be accomodated properly i.e. jobs or help to be given. To that amount redundant 
labour from needed restructured state firms has to be accounted for (2 100 000 
people). An urgent focus on what is needed to improve the functioning of the 
informal activities as how to strengthen those ones would thus be relevant. Informal 
entrepreneurs are the “animal spirits” of the country for the present. Moreover, they 
also represent the lonely source of potential domestic accumulation in a country 
challenged by shortage of saving on investment and foreign aid on domestic 
financial resources. The informal sector is an Ethiopian production factor. On 
26 000 members of the Chamber of Commerce, 20 000 or about 80 per cent manage 
informal activities mainly at Addis Ababa. The daily turn-over of their business 
could be Birr 5 m compared to a yearly GDP figure of Birr 10 billion. The big 
change at A.A. since several months with regard to jobs opportunity is the upswing 
of construction (private houses, shops and restaurants). It is mainly due to 
informal entrepreneurs in agreement with local authorities. So, the EPTP 
instead of praising some mythic market functioning should have focussed on 
what to do to improve the functioning of the already functioning market 
activities. This would have been particularly relevant given the fundamental 
requirement of any market-based economy and expected stabilization i.e. to 
account for factor of production availability when designing policies. 
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129. And finally, the EPTP does not advocate the need to get an 
independent monetary auto&y and a private banking system to help to 
stabilize the economy. A monetary control is particularly crucial at the beginning 
of the transition process, just before to remove various restrictions. Indeed, it 
permits any monetary overhang to eliminate. Otherwise the opportunity to use 
domestic money balances to purchase imported goods will drain foreign exchange 
reserves and put strong pressure on exchange and interest rates. That has occured in 
Ethiopia since March 1988. As a result the stock of money in circulation has 
expanded. It has led private operators to speculate on increased future inflation rate. 
’ So, the risks to have now more inflation than in the recent past are high. A monetary 
authority is also a key issue for government’s credibility in front of private 
operators. It indicates that all operators will be submitted to some discipline of the 
bottom line. This more obviously when the creation of a private banking system is 
on the agenda. In this respect, the EPTP is weak because it just indicates that the 
domestic private sector will be encouraged to participate in banking where state 
ownership will remain. Here again, the government neglects an opportunity which 
could help to soften some constraints. Indeed, a private banking system may 
help: 
1) to close the credibility gap between the government and the private sector in 
Ethiopia. That is a key issue for no macro stabilization can be expected when 
private operators remain on a waiting position. Further, this generally leads them to 
speculate against the currency annihilated the government’s efforts to stabilize it ; 
2) to eliminate the monetary overhang, wherever it comes from, challenging the 
expected macro stabilization by leading, private operators to use it instead of 
endowning banks with the required reserves ; 
3) the country to get capital inflows from the informal enterpreneurs, Ethiopians 
leaving abroad and foreigners. This would increase the capital market flexibility 
(index of about 0.85 at long run) and favour an adequate level of international 
liquidity ; 
4) the country to create investment opportunities (through the fulfillment of one 
of the major requirements of the Chamber of Commerce) ; 
5) to favour markets integration (i.e. the real and financial ones ; the formal and 
informal ones) which is a longer-term issue of macro stabilization and recovery ; 
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6) to soften the expected labour redundancy and real wage decrease by 
reducing the liquidity constraints of firms which often leads these ones to offset the 
liquidity crunch (when it occurs) by drastically lowering real wages and making 
labour redundant ; 
7) to favour private saving for it gradually permits to modifiy the interest rates in 
level and structure so as to get positive real interest rates on trend. 
130. The impact of the increase of the interest rates on the economy is 
the price to pay to get a private’banking system. In Ethiopia, the IS curve is flat and 
the LM one steep. This is because investment is very sensitive to the interest rate 
and real balances to real income. Then, in the eventuality of an austerity monetary 
policy, nominal interest rate would increase at given real income because a decrease 
of real money supply shifts the LM curve out to the left. The LM curve would thus 
cut the IS one at a lower real income level. Given the high elasticity of IS to the 
interest rate, the real income decrease would be very high. This indicates that the 
only way to soften this depressing effect would be to get increased employment 
opportunities through capital inflows. Or put it in another way to get capital 
inflows in response to the nominal interest rate increase. The preceding should 
lead the government to carefully investigate : 
i) a change of its fiscal policy. Indeed a steep LM curve also implies some 
comparative effectiveness of monetary policy over fiscal policy even if a change to 
the latter is strongly advocated by the private sector ; 
ii) the available saving of the informal sector ; 
iii) how to reach an agreement with this sector (which dominates the Chamber of 
Commerce) to create private banks. 
Indeed, some arrangement could be organized between the State and the “banks” at 
the mutual benefit of both partners. According to it, state enterprises which cannot 
be run profitably would be “traded” against expected private banks equities the 
government would receive. So, if banking reveals to be a rentable opportunity, the 
government will also benefit from it and so, there would be more financial 
resources... to fulfil1 people’s needs. As long as the deficit is not under control, the 
government would not receive the right to loan from the private banking system. 
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131. Apart from neglecting key factors, the EFTP lacks also from 
relevancy to give the country a guidelines document for a real operational macro 
policy. Indeed, its needs clarification for a lot of relevant issues. For instance, what 
does that mean : to advocate a price and an agricultural open market policy in 
conjunction with an announced intention to help peasants to obtain fair prices for 
their produce. This could indicate that the agriculture policy will remain from the 
extractive type even if it is mixed with market liberalization and incentives to 
peasants. Indeed, the government has no other source of revenue given : 
i) the collapse of state firms ; 
ii) the increase of smuggling and contraband as that of the informal sector. 
The need for clarification which could be quite legitimate given (i) some ignorance 
of market functioning or dynamics or (ii) the impossibility to do something at short 
run or (iii) the need to get political compromise has a cost. It is to comfort private 
operators to remain on a waiting position. In this framework, a real income change 
of zero per cent a year would be the highest macro performance. It would be 
accompanied by labour shedding and real wage decrease i.e. by increased poverty. 
With a 3% increase of the population per year, this would lead to a decrease of ,real 
per capita consumption of 2.79% per year. Is this still an acceptable picture for an 
economy which is one of the poorest in the world even if it is a transitional one ? 
5 - Measures 
132. There are not many measures decided to implement the EITP so 
that one can say the EFTP has not yet begun to be implemented. This might be due 
to political problems (within the rulers’ coalition, amongst the regions...) and, 
therefore, to the need to gain credit for the EFTP at the international level as 
financial support for it. Measures already decided are related to (i) institutional 
changes between Ethiopia and Eritrea ; (ii) macroeconomic stabilization ; (iii) 
privatized Ethiopian economy ; (iv) market functioning and (v) agriculture. 
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6 - World Bank 
133. The EPTP can easily be compared to a WB’s Adjustment 
Programme that could have been issued under the same circumstances. 
Nevertheless, there are some major differences. Two of these are the promotion of 
a private banking system and the adjustment of the Birr parity. In the later case, 
the government has indicated intentions to carefully investigate the question in 
conjunction with the study of other alternatives. The WB is very much interested by 
that assertion although it does not believe there are other alternatives. In this respect, 
it does not really put pressures on the Ethiopian govermnent to devaluate but to 
provide the other alternatives. Obviously, all depends on why to devaluate. In 
Ethiopia, export supply, for instance, that of coffee the main export commodity, has 
an elasticity of 0.6 to the price received by the producers. So, the producers would 
react positively to the Birr devaluation if they really get a real exchange effect. In 
this case there could be some additional growth. But, this would take some time (3 
to 4 years for coffee) and above all, it would depend on the evolution of the Coffee 
world market. That market is depressed apart for high quality arabica coffees 
produced mainly in America (Colombia). Further, quota decreases have already 
been proposed by the International Coffee Organization at its London meeting 
(April 92) otherwise price would continue to go down. But even in that later 
eventuality, world market would not expand very much for it has low price and 
income elasticities (-0.13 and +0.22 for Ethiopian coffees). A devaluation can also 
be advocated to rationalize investment decisions through induced import price 
increase. Here, it is worth indicating that this could not be very relevant in a country 
where that would cost some time to render imports more price elastic (actual 
elasticity value of -0.27 to the real exchange rate) and where the price stabilization 
is the key issue just to discover what could be the domestic new reallocation of 
resources. 
134. A devaluation can also have a longer-term target, that of 
convertibility. Here, the WB could have sought for some forms of current account 
convertibility (C.C.U.) while the government could have referred to a very reduced 
form of internal convertibility (I.C.) and partiai convertibility for capital account 
transactions (C.&L). There are preconditions to introduce C.C.U. or I.C. There are: 
1) an appropriate exchange rate ; 
2) an adequate level of international iquidity ; 
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3) a sound macroeconomic policy ; 
4) an environment in which economic agents have both the incentives and the ability to 
respond to market prices. 
C.C.U. without C.C.A. is essentially equivalent to a dual exchange rate system. I.C. 
means that residents are free to maintain domestic holdings of certain assets 
denominated in foreign currencies and thus to convert domestic currency internally into 
foreign currency assets. Such freedom is not tantamount to permission to make 
payments abroad or to hold assets located in foreign countries. I.C. is a way to make 
foreign currencies available to bank or other intermediaries, thereby easing a country’s 
foreign exchange constraint. In the light of that preceeds, the Ethiopian Authorities are 
right to take the time to investigate the Birr parity question. Indeed, neither the market 
behaviours nor the economic conditions plead for immediate adjustment. Unfortunately, 
the Ethiopian Authorities could have a price to pay for their investigation time. Indeed, 
for the Ethiopian community leaving in the US the condition to get rapatried funds is a 
Birr devaluation. The expected amount could be as big as 2.0 times the Ethiopian GDP 
(i.e. US $ 10 billion), on which period has not been said. Further, the WB could also 
block the negotiations leading to an international financing of the. Ethiopian Recovery 
and Reconstruction Programme. 
135. With regard to the negotiations between Ethiopia and the WB related 
to the Ethiopian Recovery and Reconstruction Programme disagreement is on the 
fertilizers issues. The WB would like to get the sector liberalized while for the 
government it is the symbol of its relations with the peasants given that there is no 
money to boost peasants agriculture as advocated by the EPTP. Further, the government 
has to account for the regions where fertilizers are used (Gojam, Shoa and Arsi). They 
are also some of these ones where there is a surplus of production. Therefore, it cannot 
deny the risk of increased famine in the eventualities of fertilizers price liberalization 
and/or Birr adjustment. Further, it has also to account for the impacts on fertilizers price 
of the transport deregulation by december 1992. 
B) EC’S MAIN FIELDS OF ACTION TO HELP ETHIOPIA TO RECOVER 
136. In the light of this document, only, the EC’s main fields of action could 
be to help Ethiopia : 
(i) to focus on poverty and agriculture ; 
(ii) to focus on its informal sector to get growth and employment opportunities at short 
run; 
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(iii) to appreciate which industrial activities have to be restructured ; 
(iv) to promote a private banking system. 
1 - Poverty (Famine) 
137. Poverty is now (again) on the agenda of international institutions. 
Indeed, the UNDP for the 1992 edition of its ‘“Human Development Report” 
understates the increased gap between rich and poor. Poor countries contribute only 
1% of formal world trade and receive 0.2% of world private investment. They 
became poorer. Since 1960, their share of gross world product declined from 20.8% 
to 17.3% at the opposite ot their share in world population. So, the living standard 
of their population deteriorated. Ethiopia fits “perfectly” that reality. Up to 1965 
its population has become poorer. It has been affected by recurrent drought so that 
westerners became accustomed to contemplate Ethiopian people dying from 
starvation on their domestic television screens. Further, as it has been (and remain) 
the case of many developing countries, the population has been denied human 
rights. In this framework, the EC should develop and finance (alone or in co- 
operation) a specific program of actions focusing on the major aspects of 
poverty. It could do so in co-operation with the WB for the new director of that 
one has recently said that to alleviate poverty was (again) the highest priority of the 
Bank. 
2 - Agriculture 
138. The focus on poverty shoud lead to a search of urgent measures to 
help agriculture production to feed people. That would be the highest priority. 
Ethiopia has to be helped to become food sufficient. At the end of the 80s food 
production per capita (1979-81 = 100) reaches the level of 88.7 compared to 97.6 
fifteen to twenty years ago or 109.6 twenty-five to thirty years ago. The WI3 has 
indicated that to produce enough food for its population (3 per cent increase 
annually) Ethiopia should increase its agriculture production by 3,3 per cent on 
average during 10 years and import at a rate of 30 per cent. Further, it has to account 
for soil erosion. Indeed, potential land yields decrease by 1 to 2 per cent per year as 
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a result of wind and rainfall erosion. Productive top soils are definitively lost in the 
Highlands which accounts for 90% of the population and economic activities, 95% 
of land cultivated and two thirds of the lifestock. So, 10 million people have again 
to be displaced. The EC should thus concentrate its help on agriculture 
production. EC help should be articulated with the EC’s programme on soil 
restoration already implemented in Ethiopia. To strengthen the later programme 
should be a priority for medium term EC’s actions given the costs of soil 
degradation (reduced land yields and people to be again displaced). One easiest 
measure to get short term output increase would be to ensure peasants with seeds 
during the,next following years. The second and third ones would be to ensure them 
with some basic medical care and with draft power (animal one) and water(#). The 
costs of such measures could not be very high at the opposite of their gains : 
food and employment. 
3 - Informal sectors (the employment challenge) 
139. The focus on employment should lead the EC to link its 
counterpart to the ERRP to the decision by the Ethiopian Authorities to use the ex- 
soldiers to rehabilitate the country (as it is the case in Eritrea). This basic 
requirement is much more relevant that the liberalization of fertilizers. It should also 
lead the EC to plead for specific policy supporting and strengthening the informal 
sector. Policy of this sort are difficult to formulate. Indeed, evidence suggests that 
the processes and profile of the informal economy are historically specific, 
depending upon the relationship between the State, capital and labour in each 
country. Nevertheless, it is likely to say that such a policy would encompass 
measures :
(i) permitting small enterprises to develop ; 
(ii) helping the enterprises not to remain limited to the production of labour- 
intensive, low-technology goods but to capture a niche in upscale segments of the 
market ; 
(iii) helping enterprises to export. 
44 From this viewpoint the amount of money devoted to irrigation in the ERRP (US $18.5) is just but ik~~ficient. 
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4 - Restructuration of industry 
140. Up to now, nobody knows with some economic rationality which 
industrial enterprises have to be restructured. The EC should finance an auditing 
programme of action related to industrial activities. It should determine which 
enterprises have to be closed down and what are their market price in case of private 
candidate willing to buy the related enterprises. It should also illuminate what would 
be the social costs of such an adjustment. 
5 - Banking ’ 
141. EC should contract some study group to carefully investigate the 
question of : how to create it and at what costs and gains. That is a key issue for 
credibility, operationality and sustainability of Ethiopian economic reforms. 
C) BEYOND THE ETHIOPIAN TRANSITION : WHAT CAN BE 
GRASPED TO HELP OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO PASS 
FROM CML WAR AND COMMAND ECONOMY TO PEACE AND 
MARKET-BASED ONE 
142. There is not a lot to say. Indeed, relevant facts only occur when a 
certain policy package has been implemented which is not yet the case with the 
EP’lT. Then, it is possible to better understand the behaviour of operators ; how they 
have reacted ; where were the bottlenecks ; which were the real constraints, etc... 
For the moment, in Ethiopia, the private sector is on a waiting position. There is a 
credibility gap which has to be closed. Maybe the lonely teaching of the Ethiopian 
experiment (up to now) is the following. When the question is to reconcile people 
or groups or both better is not to announce a big reform but to decide urgently 
for political commitments on very limited but relevant issues. From this 
viewpoint, the government should have helped peasants to get immediate access to 
seeds and some needed input using ex-soldiers and military trucks. It should have 
invited the Chamber of Commerce to participate to the elaboration of the EPTP, to 
the study group working on the tax system. These actions, very concretely, help to 
re-create the society identification process which has been destroyed by the late 
regime and the civil war. Without that process a peace market economy could not 
function in Ethiopia. Indeed, there would be increased inconsistency between 
private interests and social individual achievement within a society where that has 
been a rule. 
113 
ANNEX 1: 
THE DERG-REGIME’S REFORMS 
143. Under pressure from western governments unwilling to 
contemplate another famine on their domestic television screens and hoping to 
benefit from increased western financial support the Derg-government opened up to 
economic, social and political reforms at the beginning of 1990. At the 11th Regular 
Plenum of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Ethiopia on March 5th 
President Mengitsu Haile-Mariam announced a completely new Ethiopian 
economic system based on a mixed economy. In addition, the President’s speech 
included political innovations through which to embody an Ethiopian perestroikha 
(or so called it). 
144. The mixed economy was defined by several points amongst which 
the most relevant were : 
1) The co-existence of state and private enterprises or farms to construct a 
socialist Ethiopia. In both cases private enterprises should be encouraged and 
strengthened ; 
2) A state managing system putting the emphasis on competition, 
profitability and productivity otherwise state enterprises or farms should be 
sold or closed down ; 
3) The abolition of the Agricultural Marketing Corporation and the 
quota system ; 
4) The abolition of the producers co-operatives if this would be the 
democratic will of the members ; 
5) The admittance of peasants’ rights to use specific areas of land and to 
transfer these rights to their legal heirs when they derive their livelihood from 
farming ; 
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6) The peasants’ rights to hire workers to work on their farms ; the 
private investors’ rights to establish modern large farms ; the private traders’ 
rights to compete without any restrictions with the state-run trade enterprises 
in all sectors of the economy. 
145. The government indicated also that the six points should lead to a 
change in the national plans. Instead of issuing state’s directives they should be 
transformed into indicative plans reflecting both planning and marketing laws. One 
of the government’s objectives was to stimulate the agricultural sector. As such the 
reform was more or less a response to a recognized agriculture crisis. The 
Ethiopian perestroikha was prepared since the beginning of 1988 i.e. in the context 
of the IDA supported Peasant Agricultural Development Project, the Ninth Plenum 
of the Central Committee of the Worker’s Party of Ethiopia and the July 1989 three 
decrees. These ones were promulgated to liberalize the economy, improve the 
climate for private investment and encourage external assistance(6.5). 
146. The Ethiopian perestroikha was just one comer-piece of a wider 
Government’s Economic Reform Programme (ERP) covering the period through the 
year 2000. Its major aims were : 
a) to raise the real GDP growth rate on a sustained basis in order to 
progressively increase per capita income and consumption ; 
b) to increase food production and food security ; 
c) to diversify the production base ; 
‘r 
d) to increase exports through broadly based external sector policies ; 
e) to promote balanced regional development in order to expand employment 
opportunities in both urban and rural areas ; 
65 The notes of the next paragraphs are from The Policy Framework Paper (1990191 - 1992193) prepared by the 
Ethiopian Authorities in collaboration with the Staffs of the Fund and the World Bank (August 30,199O). 
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f) to provide adequate levels of health, education, and other social welfare 
facilities ; 
g) to introduce and diffuse appropriate technologies in order to raise labor 
productivity ; 
h) to work toward removing long-term structural impediments to economic 
stability with a sustained high rate of growth ; 
i) to remove or minimize constraints to the quality of life, including the 
adverse effects of recurrent drought, high population growth, and environmental 
degradation. Vulnerable groups would be protected during this transformation. 
147. To ensure the success of the reforms already announced as well as 
that of the institutional reforms envisaged in the ERP, the Ethiopian government 
announced the implementation of comprehensive macroeconomic policies and 
structural adjustement measures during the next three years (1990-93). They would 
permit : 
a) to adopt an appropriate exchange rate level in conjunction with decreased 
trade and exchange restrictions ; 
b) to phase out the remaining price distortions by eliminating most official 
price controls while allowing a flexible administration of the remaining controlled 
prices ; 
‘, 
c) to reduce the budget deficit through revenue measures that seek to 
broaden the tax base by removing price distortions and improving the elasticity of 
the tax system, and through expenditure restraint by containing the wage bill, 
curtailing subsidies, gradually reducing security-related outlays, and setting 
priorities for capital expenditure ; 
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d) to pursue a monetary policy consistent with the reduction in the rate of 
inflation by curtailing the Government’s recourse to the banking system, while 
providing adequate credit to the expanding private sector, and adoption of a 
nondiscriminatory interest rate structure that is positive in real terms. 
These measures and policies were expected to result in an average real GDP growth 
of about 4.5 per cent per annum during 1990/91-1992/93. This rate was mainly 
determined by the agricultural sector which would continue to be the leading sector 
in the economy. 
148. The successful implementation of reforms was crucially dependent 
on containing the civil war and receiving increased financial support from the 
international community through increased levels of external resources on 
concessional terms and substantial debt relief. This was not the case with regard to 
civil war. So, even the period was too short to appreciate the outcome of the 
announced reforms on people, it can be said that Ethiopia had begun a transition 
from a command economy to a market-based one under the DERG-regime. 
ANNEX 2 
ETHIOPIA : KEY DATA 
1. CURRENCY : Bin rate per US$ 
(fixed since February 1973) 
2. POPULATION 
mid-1989 
15-20 years ago 
A. Level (million) 
1980-1990 B. Rate of change per annum (%) 
C. Fertility rate (births per woman) 1989 
1975 
1989 
1975 
D. Infant mortality rate 
(per thou live births) 
E. Life expectancy at birth (years) 1989 
1975 
3. AREA AND NATURAL RESOURCES 
A. Area (thou.sq.km) end of the 80s 
13. Density (pop. per sqkm) 1988 
1975 
1988 
1975 
C. Agricultural land (% of land area) 
D. Forests and woodland -thou.sq.km 
-% of land area 
end of the 80s 
15-20 years ago 
end of the 80s 
1970 
(66) 40% at the beginning of the 20th century 
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4. WEALTH 
A. G N P per capita (US $) 1989 120.0 
15-20 years ago 90.0 
1974-90 - 0.8 
1965-73 + 1.5 
Own computation B. Rate of change per annum (%) 
(from constant price data) 
190.0 
f 90.0 
(2) 
(2) 
1981 C. Absolute poverty income : .-US $ per urban person 
-US $ per rural person 
(2) D. Population (urbantrural) below the absolute poverty level (%) 1981 60.0 
1987 21.2 (2) 
1975 14.2 (2) 
E. Energy consumption per capital (kg of oil equivalent) 
1985 14.0 (2) 
1985 69.0 (2) 
1985 9.0 (2) 
F. Access to safe water (% of pop) 
Urban 
Rural 
5. FOOD 
1989 88.7 
15-20 years ago 97.6 
25-30 years ago 109.6 
Mission A. Production per capital (1979-81= 100) 
(2) 
(2) 
(2) 
(2) 
(2) 
1987 609.0 
15-28 years ago 67.0 
25-30 years ago 28.0 
B. Cereal imports (thou metric tonnes) 
1987 825.0 
15-20 years ago 87.0 
(2) 
(2) 
C. Food aid in cereals (thou metric tonnes) 
D. Daily calorie supply (calories per person) end of the 80 s 1,658 
15-28 years ago 1,533 
25-30 years ago 1,802 
(2) 
(2) 
(2) 
end of the 80s 50 
15-u) years ago 48 
25-30 years ago 59 
(2) 
(2) 
(2) 
E. Daily protein supply (grams per person) 
1991-92 20 Mission F. Population in need of food aid (% of pop) 
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6. EXPENDITURES SHARES (% of G D P) 
Food 
Housing 
Fuel and power 
Transport and communication 
1985 24.9 
13.1 
3.7 
9.3 
(2) 
(2) 
ii; 
7. INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL 
A. Medical care (% of G D P) 
Population per physician (persons) 
1985 1.3 
1984 77,356 
1975 86,100 
1965 70.191 
1984 44.0 
(2) 
g; 
(2) 
(2) Access to health care (% of pop) 
D. Education (% of G D P) 
School (% of school-age group) : 
-primary 
1985 0.4 (2) 
1985 36.0 
1974 24.0 
1965 11.0 
(2) 
(2) 
(2) 
- secondary end of the 80s 15.0 
1975 6.0 
1965 2.0 
(2) 
(2) 
(2) 
- lerliary (science/engineering) 1986 19.0 
1973 17.3 
1965 19.0 
(2) 
(2) 
(2) 
1986 48.0 
1975 58.8 
(% of cohort) 
(% of pop age 1st) 
7 (per thou pop) 
C. Human development index (OcH<l) 
(2) 
(2) 
1986 90.0 Mission 
1970 4.0 Mission 
1985 1.0 
1975 2.1 
(2) 
(2) 
0.282 UNDP 
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8. LEVEL OF URBANIZATION 
1984 (census) I Population living in the cities as % of lotal population 10.6 
Growth of urban population (% per annum 1966-84) 4.8 
9. SHARE OF G D P (from current price data) 
A. Market prices 1965 1973 1990 
Net ind. taxes 6.4 7.5 9.3 
Agriculture 53.8 46.6 36.9 
Industry : 13.1 14.9 14.2 
of which Manufacturing 7.0 9.3 9.6 
Scrviccs 26.7 31.0 39.6 
- B. Factor cost 
Agriculture 
Industry 
of which Manufacturing 
Services 
1965 1973 1990 
57.5 50.4 40.7 
14.0 16.1 15.7 
7.5 10.0 10.6 
28.5 33.5 43.6 
Own computation 
10. AGRICULTURE GROSS VALUE ADDED (40.7 per cent of G D P at factor cost in 1990) 
(1) A. Share (%) (trend under normal circumstances) 
Field crops 
Livestock 
Cash crops 
40 
40 
20 
B. Mqjor cash crops : coffee, tea, oilseeds, pulses, cotton, 
tobacco, fruits, pepper, sugar cane, vegetables Mission 
ETHIOPIA : 
A GUIDE TO INVEST 
(February 1991 - p.9) 
OECD - p.200 
OECD - p.199 
OECD - p.199 
C. -Grain production : mostly for subsistence, 
only 25% of the production being marketed 
1970:18% ; 1986187 : 30.7134.6 
-Surplus areas : Arssi, Gojam, Wellega, Shoa, Gondar, Illubator, Bale, WoIIo 
-Deficit areas : Harerghe, Kaffa, Gamu Goffa, Tigray, Eritrea, Sidamo 
ETHIOPIA : 
A GUIDE To INVEST 
(February 1991 - p.9) 
D. Land under cultivation : 15 to 20% of the agricultural land 
E. Land cultivated under : 3% of the potentially irrigable land (=3% of 3.5 million ha) 
irrigation 
F. Economic operators : 
.; 
- 94% of land under cultivation is operated by farmers 
with less than 2 ha (per capita arable land 1965 : 0.5 ha - 1987 : 0.3 ha) 
- 14% only of the total farm households use chemical fertilizers 
- 30 % of the farm households are without draft power 
G. Employment : Agriculture accounts for 80 to 85 per cent of the labour force 
H. Exports : Agriculture accounts for 90 per cent of export earnings. Coffee is the principal export crop. 
It generates over 60 per cent of export earnings at normal rainfall. The production areas are Harerghe, 
Kaffa and Sidamo. Under normal rainfall the average production is between 160 to’200,OOO tonnes ; 
98% of the production is operated by small farmers. 
I. Ibestock population : 
Total population exceeds more than 130 million 
including cattle (27), sheep (24), goats (18), equine (7), 
camels (7) and poultry (52). 
1. INDUSTRY VALUE ADDED (15.7 per cent ofG D P at factor cost in 1990) 
A. Principal manufactured goods : food and beverage items, textiles, cement, leather and footwear, 
metal products, paper, plastic products, tyres and certain chemicals. The volume of production 
in most of these fields is fairly limited and covers only a small proportion of domestic 
demand. The manufacturing industry account for 10 to 11 per cent of G D P at factor cost in 1990. 
B. Geographical localization : most industrial concerns are concentrated round 
Bsmara (Eritrea) and Addis 
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C. Mining 
Although the exploitation of gold and copper ores dates from prehistoric times 
on the Eritrean plateau, the mineral resources of Ethiopia are largely unknown. 
There are alluvial gold workings in the Adola area of Sidamo Administrative 
Region, and platinum workings which have been reopened near Yubdo in Wollega 
Administrative Region. There is a small output of iron ore from Eritrea. It is 
likely that the Eritrean plateau region will yield more extensive copper and 
iron deposits, but probably the area with the highest mineral potential lies in 
the west and south-west in Wollega, illubabor and Kaffa Administrative Regions. 
However, this area is at the moment the least accessible and much of it is covered 
by rain forest. Valuable potash deposits have been proven in the Dallol Depression. 
These await the development of other infrastructure in this desolate region, but 
represent a potential source of mineral exports. Exploration for petroleum was 
carried out for some years in the Ogaden region without success. Emphasis was then 
transferred to the Red Sea coastal areas in the latitude of Massawa where some oil 
seepages were recorded and strikes of natural gas offshore from Massawa were obtai- 
ned. More recently, however, attention has been diverted to the southern borders of 
Ethiopia. In Bale Administrative Region between the rivers Web and Webi-Shebelli, it 
has been reported that promising strikes of oil have been obtained. These, however, 
await official confirmation and suggestions on how effective exploitation can be ’ 
achieved. Finally, estimates are now being made of the geothermal power potential of 
extensive sources in the Afar plain region. With its high rainfall and precipitous 
relief, Ethiopia is well-endowned with hydroelectric power potential. A number of 
plants are already in operation along the course of the Awash river, south of Addis 
Ababa. The Blue Nile river basin has been extensively studied and a large number of 
sites identified at which power production could be coupled with irrigation schemes. 
D. Employment-Exports 
Industry accounts for less than 10% of employment (i.e. about 100 000 persons in 1!287)(67) 
and export earnings. The textile industry provides the hugest sector of employment, 
occupying about one-half of the industrial workforce. Most output is for the home 
market but a growing proportion, notably of semi-processed hides and skins and oil-seed 
products is being exported. Sales of hides, skins and finished leather goods account 
for 80% of the industrial exports. 
Europa Publication 
Limited (1990) : 
Africa South of 
the Sahara - 1991 
p. 454-455 
Mission 
(67) According fo IL0 Statistics registering employment in establishments with ten or more persnw employed. 
123 
ACCUMULATION 
A, Capital output ratio (average 1968-88) 2.5 
l3. Rate (%) of capital depreciation (average 1968-88) 2.0 
C. Import content (%) of gross domestic formation (average 1961-80) 33.0 
D. Share in G D P (from current price data) 
of: 
Gross domestic saving(68) 
Gross national saving@) 
Gross domestic investment 
RESOURCE BALANCE (% of G D P) -1.0 2.0 -11.0 -8.3 
REGISTERED EXPORTS (in ‘000 birr 1990/91)(69) 
A. Main commodities (Asanding order) 
1. Coffee (washed and sundried) (266%) 
2. Livestock & livestock products (215%) 
3. Oilseeds & Pulses 
41 
4. Fruits, vegetables & spices 
5. Flowers 
6. Olioresin 
1965 
12.3 
11.7 
13.3 
551701 
1973 1988 1990 
13.4 4.4 3.0 
12.9 7.2 5.2 
11.4 15.3 11.3 
7. Sugar & Molasses 
8. Tchat 
9. Gum (olibanum, oppoponax, arabic 
and myrrh) (5->12:15%) 
10. Cotton textiles 
11. Mining and quarrying 
12. Miscellaneous 
Gwn computation 
Own computation 
D.M. Etherington and 
A. Yainshet - p.50 
(1) 
(1) 
Customs and Excise 
Tax Authority 
(68) Gross domestic saving (CDS) = GDP - total consumption 
(68) Gross nadonal saving = GDS + net factor income and private transfers from abroad 
(69) Ethiopian fiscal year 
I3. Destination of Expprts 
1. EEC member countries : Germany, the Netherlands and Italy mainly 
2. US and Japan 
3. Developing countries : Yemen, People’s Dem Rep., Saoudi Arabia, Djibouti and Sudan, mainly 
4. USSR 
C. World share for coffee (the main export commodity) (%) TAkiyama & RC.Duncan p.48 
AI1 grades of coffee 
Unwashed arabica 
D. Nominal protection rate (producer to world price ratio) (%) 
Coffee (average 1978-86) 
E. Export duties : Exports are a source of revenue to the State. 
In the case of coffee, the main export commodity, 
taxes are particularly heavy. 
Coffee : The following taxes are levied on coffee exports 
1. Export duty 
A flat-rate specific duty of 150 Birr per ton levied 
on all coffee exports 
2. Cess tax (coffee board fees) 
Another flat-rate specific tax levied on coffee at 
the rate of 50 Bin per ton. 
3. Transaction tax 
4.0 
14.0 
40.0 
Chamber of Commcrcc 
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Own computation 
Custons and Excise 
Tax Authority 
An ad valorem tax on the turnover of exporters levied 
at the rate of 2 % of sales. 
4. Surtax 
A variable rate specific tax on all coffee exports. Recently, with the drop in the international coffee 
price due to the abolition of the ICO quota system, the coffee surtax threshold was raised while direct 
subsidies were introduced so that the producer is paid a minimum of Br 2.26 /kg. for clean coffee 
(sundried coffee) and Br 0.45 /kg. for red cherry (washed coffee). The base of the determination of the 
surtax is the daily ICO Composite Indicator Price according to the following : 
o- 50 0 
51- 75 0.50 birr/quintal 
76 - 100 1 ” ” 
101 - 125 2 ” ” 
126- 150 3 ” ” 
151 t 4 ” ” 
5. Local authorities in the interior levy municipal charges at various points of the marketing chain. 
6. No taxes are levied on domestic sale and consumption of coffee including the 2% transaction tax. 
Hides and skins : Apart from a transaction tax of 2% they 
support an extra tax of US$O.O6 to 0.15 per hide or skin 
which has to be paid to the Meat Board. 
Pulses and oilseeds : A transaction tax of 2% plus an extra 
tax to be paid to the Grain Board. The rate of the surtax is as follows. 
Fob price per 1 CK) kg rate (%) 
a) up to 20 nil 
b) over 20 up to 80 40% 
c) over 80 up to 120 50% 
d) over 120 60% 
5 . REGISTERED IMPORTS (in ‘000 birr 1990/91)(70) 1955 007 
A. Main commodities (Ascending order) 
1. Machinery 
2. Transport equipment 
3. Manufactured goods 
4. Chemicals 
5. Mineral fuels 
70) Ethiopian focal year 
B. Origin of imports 
126 
l.USSR 
2. EEC member countries : Germany, Italy, the UK, France, Sweden 
the Netherlands, Switserland 
3. us 
4. Japan 
5. Developing countries : Korea, SArabia, India, Kenya, China, People’s Rep 
C. Franc0 Valuta Purchases (average ratio to total imports) (%) 
1983/84-1989190 
1990/X 
D. Import duties : All imports are taxed except capital goods. 
Intermediate goods are subject to tax rates of 
mostly 50 per cent. Most consumer goods are 
laxed 100 per cent and luxury goods 209 per cent. 
16. G D P growth (% per year) 
17. Price indexes (% per year) 
A. Consumer prices 
(Addis Ababa retail price index) 
B. Implicit GDP deflator 1.9 5.7 2.0 3.7 2.8 
18. Fiscal deficit (% of GDP) 
1965173 1973180 
4.1 2.2 
1965173 
1.8 
1986188 
9 
1973180 198Ol90 1989 1990 
14.9 4.0 7.8 5.2 
1988/89 
12 
about 40.0 Customs and 
24.0 Excise Tax Authorities 
1980190 1989 1990 
2.0 2.3 -2.5 
1989190 
16 
(0 
(1) 
127 
19. Debt outstanding and disbursed (US $ million) 
Total (i.e. IMFtnet short term capitaldong term capilal) 
20. Debt service/exports (%) 
Total (i.e. IMF+net short term capitaltlong term capital) 
21. Reserves incl Gold (US $ million) 
1980 
804 
7.5 
1990 
3,330 
58.5 
(1) 
(1) 
262 55 (1) 
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